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
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
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THE CRITICS OF HERBARTIANISM

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"INTEREST IS THE GREATEST WORD IN EDUCATION"

THE CRITICS OF HERBARTIANISM

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12179

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LONDON

SWAN SONNENSCHN & CO., LTD.

PATERNOSTER SQUARE, E.C.

1903

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PREFACE.

THE following work was begun at Cambridge as a thesis for the London Doctorate of Letters, was continued at the Thuringian centre of Herbartianism, and was completed in a West of England district where, with every passing day, the vital need for an Herbartian propaganda has become to the author more and more pressing and manifest.

Scotsmen,¹ with an educational tradition of some sort at their back, may afford or affect to disparage Herbartianism, but a Southron who knows the paralytic condition of education in his own country and district will, if wise, hesitate to stand aloof from a system which—alone among systems or rudiments of systems—can inspire, move and fascinate. The sun in the heavens is, after all, a more useful luminary than any nebula to be generated a billion years hence by the clash of boreal or other meteorites.

The man who has read Herbart's educational works unmoved has read them either *without* understanding or *with* prejudice. Of Herbart's psychology one may perhaps say with some justification :—

Shall I take a thing so blind,
Embrace her as my natural good,
Or crush her, like a vice of blood,
Upon the threshold of the mind ?

¹ Mr. Darroch is dealt with in the Appendix.

But Herbart's educational writings are another matter. The man who has been saved from sin will hesitate to revile the means of his salvation; the man who has found educational light in the pages of Herbart will hesitate to call the light an illusion. Extinguish Herbartianism and you extinguish for a century the hopes of education. Herbart fascinates; his critics do not.

Two Herbartians have recently died, Professor Lazarus and Mr. F. G. Rooper. The writer cannot avoid taking the opportunity of referring to the educational loss involved in the death of the latter. The ranks of official educationists are distinctly poorer now that he is gone from among us.

A remark as to the use of the term "Herbartianism". Purists may protest, but there is real need of a word sufficiently general to embrace the entire school of thought to which Ziller, Dörpfeld and dozens of other German thinkers, and a fair sprinkling of thinkers outside Germany, belong or have belonged. Professor Adams, Dr. Eckoff and other writers have deliberately employed the term "Herbartianism," and the present writer therefore feels but few scruples of conscience in following suit.

Again, the use of "stupid" as a translation of "stumpfsinnig" is not without its drawbacks. The writer is conscious of them; having said so much he has here said enough.

The work is not precisely a unity, it is rather a collection of matter dealing with the historical and polemical aspects of Herbartianism. British educationists will, sooner or later, have to come to a decision upon their attitude towards this question, and it is hoped that the matter of the present volume will be of some assistance to them in the task. They cannot, at any rate, complain that the weaknesses, supposed weaknesses, of Herbartianism have been con-

ceased. At last we know the worst; and now that the worst is known some of us feel that the best shines brightly. However, be it repeated, the book is a series of contributions rather than a definite unity. But, in view of the fact that British educational thought seems, for the moment, to have a predilection for crystallising itself in books of heterogeneous essays,¹ the imperfections of the present collection may perhaps be pardoned if not applauded.

The peculiar form of the Natorp section is due to the fact that it was printed separately from the rest.

Miss Thomas is responsible for the sections on Vogel and Linde, and desires to express her appreciation of the help given by Miss A. Kirby, B.A., of Plymouth High School. Miss Thomas has also read through the whole work, and made many useful suggestions on matters of detail.

Several of the author's Bristol friends have again helped him by reading proofs; so also has Mr. J. W. Besley, the able Master of Moorland School, Okehampton; Professor Alexander and Miss Catherine Dodd (Owens' College, Manchester) also deserve his thanks; and to Mr. E. H. Carter, M.A. (Board of Education), whose soundness of judgment and knowledge of German educational thought have been of much assistance, the author wishes to tender his warm gratitude.

F. H. H.

OKEHAMPTON, June, 1908.

¹ *Teaching and Organisation* (Longmans); *National Education* (Murray); *The Nation's Need* (Constable), etc., etc., etc.

THE CRITICS OF HERBARTIANISM

AND OTHER MATTER CONTRIBUTORY TO THE

STUDY OF THE HERBARTIAN QUESTION

to keep the wayward feet of man in the narrow path of virtue. Who is right? Are we in moral education to be Aristotelians or Herbartians? Are we to put faith in Habit or in Knowledge?

The answer probably is, that Character is twofold. It has its passive, mechanical, conservative, and preservative side given over to the sway of Habit; hence the enormous importance of the Aristotelian factor in education, a factor emphasised by William James in a chapter that bids fair to become a psychological and educational classic.¹ But Character has also its active, growing, changing side, and here Knowledge, or, to use Herbart's favourite word, Insight, is supreme.² In the treatment of this latter aspect of the education question Herbart is probably matchless. His psychology may or may not be faulty; his view may be hyper-intellectual and therefore one-sided; but his message is one to which the world, sooner or later, must give heed. Society is daily manufacturing criminals because it cannot hear his warning voice crying: "The stupid man cannot be virtuous". Nay, if it hears him above the babel, it rejects his words as blasphemous.

The above is an illustration of the genuinely vital nature of some of the problems raised in the following pages. Herbart's famous declarations that "all action springs out of the circle of thought," that "the stupid man cannot be virtuous," that there should be "no instruction which does not educate the character," are no mere concatenations of syllables, no watchwords for hair-splitting competitions between rival German professors. Even when we come to the apparently more academic question agitated between Natorp and the Herbartians, the question whether a presentation³-mechanism is an adequate explanation

¹ *Talks to Teachers*, ch. viii. See also his larger work, *Principles of Psychology*.

² There is the analogy of a tree with its half-dead stem and its growing point. Each of the two is necessary.

³ "Presentation" is a very general word for "impression," "idea," etc., as most readers will scarcely require to be told, and represents the German "Vorstellung".

of mental facts, or whether a higher principle is involved in what we call self-consciousness (really another form of the above question), the problem is genuinely vital. If we solve it in the Herbartian sense, and accept the deterministic hypothesis, the task thrown upon teachers is enormous.

It would be no exaggeration to say that we have no right either to hope or to fear for the human race until this and similar questions have received solution.

And here, perhaps, an avowal may be appropriately made. When, several years ago, the present writer began to study the Herbartian question, two brilliant works, destined to exercise no small influence over British education, had not then appeared. These were *Herbartian Psychology Applied to Education*¹ by Professor Adams, and Dr. Findlay's *Principles of Class Teaching*.² The former is probably the most readable book on education that has ever been written in English,³ and, fortunately, its raciness and readableness are by no means purchased at the expense of solid wisdom. The second is almost the only attempt to nationalise Herbartianism among us by retaining its most valuable features, and judiciously supplementing or correcting its defects. With neither of these books will the present work essay to compete; its design is, in fact, as different from theirs as its execution may seem to be far less interesting to the majority of readers. If, then, the field is already occupied by two brilliant books and half a dozen others, perhaps less brilliant though equally necessary and valuable (translations and expositions of Herbart), why should another writer enter the field with one or two additional volumes under his arm? Has he anything fresh to contribute? He has, even if the neglected critical side of the Herbartian question had not been the object of much of his work.

English books on Herbartianism—including the two most brilliant of all—seem strangely deficient in one respect. *The moral significance of the system is well-nigh ignored.* To the

¹ Isbister.

² Macmillan.

³ Though the works of Thring and James "run it close".

writers Herbartianism appears as a thing mainly or exclusively for the class-room; they rarely convey the impression that it is an ethical, social, or religious propaganda, and one that bears upon the most vital problems now crying for solution. But this is the aspect which specially strikes the present writer. When Herbart, by a daring flight of ethical speculation, put "Vollkommenheit" among the "moral ideas," he thereby placed the pedagogic profession on the "sacred" platform; lifted the pursuit of Culture up towards the level of the pursuit of Virtue, or rather—it would be but slightly erroneous to say—identified within limits the two pursuits; and mapped out a plan of social reform more daring and more positive—probably, also, more likely to prove permanently effectual—than the crude plans which, under the name of "philanthropy," go far to demonstrate how little modern society cares for "prevention" so long as "cure" is more thrilling and dramatic.

In the *Student's Herbart*¹ this aspect of Herbartianism—ignored or merely suggested by British writers on the subject—has been especially emphasised, and in a projected larger book the question may be considered at greater length. It is because, to the writer, the system founded by Herbart is a moral gospel for men perishing through stupidity and absence of ideas, that he is burrowing into its often unattractive literature and serving up, for British readers, more than one instalment of the product. Even when, as in the present work, which is largely critical and historical, there are but few opportunities of proclaiming with loud and emphatic iteration the moral significance of Interest, such opportunities as present themselves should not be ignored. Much will Herbartianism do for the school; but unless it succeed in transforming that institution into a temple, and the teaching profession into a profession claiming "holy orders," other results (*e.g.*, the unification of the curriculum) will be of but small moment. Herbartianism in its claims is nothing less than an educational High Church movement with the transubstantiation of ideas into virtue as

¹ By the present writer. (Sonnenschein.)

its central marvel; it is not (as one would too often gather from most of the current works on the subject¹) merely an academic system from which pedagogues can pick up a few useful hints.

If any gospel has a warning message that gospel is Herbartianism, and the message is that the stupid (*stumpfsinnig*) man cannot—*cannot*—be virtuous. If any gospel can claim to be constructive and inspiring it is that one which hails many-sided interest as “a protection against passions, an aid to one’s earthly activity, and a salvation amid the storms of fate”. If any gospel can claim powers for its priests it is the one which proclaims how, by the manipulation of the principle of Apperception, the interaction of a group of ideas will be made to generate Interest and pass over into Virtue and Character. In the present work there will be no opportunity to expound in detail this magnificent doctrine, with the substantial correctness of which Herbartianism must stand or fall. But in view of the neglect of this aspect of the Herbartian question there was good reason for emphasising it here. If Interest is really a protection against evil, nay, itself an element in moral good, and if Herbart has shown how, in normal cases, such Interest can be aroused, then Herbartianism is a gospel and nothing less. And, after all, it is more important that Education should become a “gospel” than that it should become a “science,” though when seen through an Herbartian medium it begins to appear as both.

Some even of the enemies of the system admit that there is a certain value in the doctrine of many-sided Interest. But on the whole the gospel is a new one, and surely as necessary as it is new. When at Roman Catholic conferences (and the same spirit is present also in many other religious assemblies), we find ecclesiastics avowing that they “do not attach much importance to the teaching of arithmetic or geography or other

¹The reason why even Professor Adams and Dr. Findlay do not touch upon this side of the question is perhaps that the design of their works scarcely allows of it. But they might have given *some* pointed indication of the moral significance of Herbartianism.

subjects,"¹ we naturally and rightly infer that any teacher who acquiesces in the spirit voiced by these words is an appendage rather than a man. Nine-tenths of his work is work to which "he does not attach much importance". What a chasm separates the holders of this view from the believers in Herbartianism! The Herbartians attach *very great importance* to these and other despised subjects. An Interest in such things is, in their view, a life-force of incalculable value, saving, or helping to save, from many a sin, which, if we are to judge from appearances, all the sacraments in existence seem powerless to suppress. "Arithmetic" and "geography" may not be, on the Herbartian view, so character-forming as history and literature, but no Herbartian would rank his work so low as to utter words of disparagement concerning even the humblest subjects in the curriculum. The wonder is how any teachers can endure to be told point-blank by their ecclesiastical leaders that their work is of small importance. But possibly they agree with their rulers. "The degree of estimation in which any profession is held becomes the standard of the estimation in which the professors hold themselves."²

The Herbartian believes in the moral value of "secular" as well as "sacred" subjects; he believes in many-sided Interest; *ipso facto* he believes in himself and in the future of education. Interest in *anything* worthy is a moral force dominating life, keeping from evil, opening up vistas. Interest protects, Interest guides, Interest elevates. Two boys may be otherwise identical, but if one of them is influenced by a saving Interest in natural science or in history which the other does not possess, such an Interest is not a thing to which Catholics, or any other people, ought "to attach little importance". Many-sided Interest actually performs, under our very eyes, the task which the sacraments profess to perform; it builds up character and works for moral salvation.

The distinction between the "sacred" and the "secular"

¹ Bishop of Clifton at the Newport Conference, 22nd September, 1902.

² Burke, *Reflections on the French Revolution*.

things of life is probably the most fatally mischievous distinction ever drawn by the perverse ingenuity of man. And yet let us retain it—though with a changed application. There are “secular” things; there are “sacred” things. Nine-tenths of the Bible reading in our schools is practically “secular,” exerting no special influence whatever upon character. Even the sacraments appear every whit as ineffective and “secular,” if we are to judge from the records of prisons, poor-houses, and inebriate homes, the sacramentalists often contributing the highest percentage of inmates to these institutions. The question is whether Herbartianism, once intelligently and enthusiastically grasped and applied by an army of many thousand teachers, would not accomplish more for the moral elevation of man than the devices and denunciations of many generations have accomplished.

But there are others that Herbartianism hits hard, even harder than the sacramentalists. “Save the drunkard, rescue the fallen, shut up this, abolish that,” are the cries we hear from our very best men, the salt of the earth; men who, in moral fervour, are often miles in advance of such persons as “do not attach much importance either to arithmetic or geography,” or, often, even to temperance and such like philanthropic but “secular” movements. Yet these cries, too, sound pitifully feeble and thin when once the sonorous trumpet-call of many-sided Interest has broken upon the ear. Modern philanthropy is almost wholly reformatory, corrective, and negative: in sharp contrast to this is Herbartianism; ever positive, preventive, constructive. So long as any genuine Herbartian has a voice and a pen he will urge upon an unbelieving public—which nominally acknowledges an overruling Benevolence, but daily reduces him to moral impotence by attributing evil to any cause except the mental limitations of man—that *most if not all moral evils are gratuitous and unnecessary, the results of emptiness of mind, unintelligence, rigidity of thought, absence of wholesome interests.* “Absurd optimism,” some one will say; “a Socratic and Platonic error long ago exploded.” Yet evil must be absolute if it is not ultimately the result of intellectual

defects, such as ignorance and sluggish or diseased imagination. "The stupid man cannot be virtuous," and conversely the entirely *unstupid* man cannot be vicious; or if he can, the moral government of the universe is a delusion, and the monarchs of hell may, for all we know, be holding sway in the councils of heaven. *That and nothing less is the inference we must draw if the great central doctrine of Herbartianism is false*: the doctrine that "action springs out of the circle of thought," and that therefore "the smaller the amount of mental activity the less can we look for Virtue". In the strange posthumous book of F. W. H. Myers¹ we are told that to disembodied spirits "evil seems less a terrible than a slavish thing. It is an isolating madness from which higher spirits strive to free the distorted soul." Would moral evil exist but for ignorance and but for mental disease?

When the Herbartian seeks to penetrate into the dim recesses from which issues the human Will, he discerns there, not the form of a fiend, baffling daily the armies of heaven, but rather a chaos of forces, innocent though untamed and undirected, working out their destiny in the mysterious gloom. And the Herbartian asks, with wonder, why these dark recesses should remain dark; and why a nation which prays for deliverance "from pride, vainglory, and hypocrisy; from envy, hatred, and malice, and all uncharitableness, from fornication and all other deadly sin," forgets that these, like "lightning and tempest," are effects, and may some day be tracked to their causes.

It takes a higher order of mind to aim at the prevention of evil than at its cure. The first is the high aim of Herbartianism, whereas any housewife, provided she has a warm heart, can aim at cure—and give alms to every beggar.

"An expansion of the concept of morality is required," said Herbart almost at the outset of his career as an educational author. The battle which he fought was that of the claims of "culture"; the same battle revived years ago by Matthew Arnold. The word is a bad one and rouses many a prejudice.

¹*Human Personality and Its Survival of Bodily Death.*

But there is no better word for the purpose, and apologies are after all unnecessary, for the strenuous Hebraic elements supposed to be absent from the notion of Culture are already rooted in our midst and are never likely to leave us. Our duty is therefore to exalt Hellenism while not derogating from the glories of Hebraism. And "Culture" in the eyes of its English advocate was, after all, no nerveless dilettantism: "there is a view in which all the love of our neighbour, the impulses towards action, help, and beneficence, the desire for removing human error, clearing human confusion and diminishing human misery, the noble aspiration to leave the world better and happier than we found it—motives eminently such as are called social—come in as part of the grounds of culture, and the main and pre-eminent part. . . . Culture is a *study of perfection*."¹ This is Herbartian Ethics deprived of its technical and deterrent form. The "Culture" gospel may be overdone, though there is small chance of this in Britain; the danger is that we shall ignore rather than exaggerate. But we ignore at our peril. When a Herbart can tell us that "stupid men cannot be virtuous"; when a Matthew Arnold can bewail the moral and social results of an absence of mental "flexibility," and a George Meredith, as if in echo, can explain much of the viciousness of the poor as a result of the "dulness and impenetrability of their minds,"² it is time for us to ask whether, after all, culture and morality are not more closely connected than we have dreamt.

The writer has elsewhere³ indicated what he regards as the real significance of Herbart's "second moral idea". Practically speaking that idea represents the forgotten claims of Greek thought. Greatness, width of mind, culture, Interest appear on the Herbartian scene as demanded by the moral intuitions of man. Virtue is no longer abstinence, but an effort after a total perfection, of which abstinence is only a phase.

¹ *Culture and Anarchy*, pp. 5-6.

² *Ordeal of Richard Feverel*. But does Mr. Meredith say this for himself?

³ *The Student's Herbart*, pp. 39 ff.

Objectors will say—Dittes and others have said it repeatedly—that culture and many-sided Interest are not virtue. Herbart never said that they were. The “second moral idea” is only one of five, and if the other four are ignored the person is not “virtuous”. But, conversely, a person is not completely “virtuous” if the “second idea” be ignored. That is to say, an English aristocrat devoid of ideas, a country ploughman or a humble housewife with stunted mental development and no interests, or “daughters of well-to-do parents, whose minds have been disciplined by no harder work than a study of novels and talk about the clergy,”¹ are not types of moral perfection even though they may be honest, benevolent, well-meaning, not grossly sensual, and so forth. They may keep every prohibitory commandment, but they cannot be virtuous in the Herbartian sense; a chilling numbness rules nine-tenths of their nature; a fatal paralysis confines them in a moral prison house. “*Stumpfsinnige können nicht tugendhaft sein.*”

To a man who has once drunk deep of the Herbartian spring mankind appears in a new light, no longer as a multitude of beings each torn by an internal conflict between the angel and the devil within, but rather as a multitude of sightless hydrozoa immersed in an inhospitable medium and feeling outwards with every tentacle for the mental nourishment which never comes.

Said Gray of the poor of England:—

Knowledge to their eyes her ample page
Rich with the spoils of time did ne'er unroll;

in the great poem whose beauty has too long detracted from its educational significance. To the Herbartian, the poor—nay the rich also, scarcely less often—are mutely craving for something they do not possess, and indeed cannot define, but the absence of which shows itself in a moral disease, whose diagnosis has been muddled too long by their spiritual physicians. “Sin—sin—sin” has been shouted from every pulpit, and the

¹The words are Mr. Rooper's (*School and Home Life*, p. 315). Many-sided Interest is a gospel for women as well as for men, and would do much to save them from hysteria, nervous irritation, self-concentration and self-love

Herbartians, careless of criticism or convention, retort, "The stupid man *cannot* be virtuous". Where in his anæmic mind and palsied will lie any springs of noble action? Can any good thing come out of such a Nazareth?

Evil does not spring from nothing or from Free Will. It has its causes. It is a disease rather than a miracle. It is to be cured rather than inveighed against.

To claim Herbartianism as a remedy for all the evils which afflict mankind would be veritable folly, though not greater folly than to claim as such any single religious or economic prescription. There are champions of both the latter. The Socialist traces all or most ills to poverty, and Gray himself rightly saw in poverty one cause of the mental and moral degradation of the poor.

Chill penury repressed their noble rage
And froze the genial current of the soul.

But it is certain that man cannot live by bread alone, and the preacher, seeing this, brings forward *his* prescription, and traces all or most ills to the neglect of the "gospel". But he, too, sees only an aspect, and a superficial aspect, of the disease; sees, in fact, symptoms rather than causes. "Men will not accept the gospel," we are told. But why should we expect them to feel the historical meaning of any great World-Tragedy, if history and literature—the "humanistic" studies which make us sensitive to nobleness, to pathos, to martyrdom, to divinity—have been kept afar off? Why should they reverence Christ if they are never taught to reverence Alfred or Sidney? The thing is absurd. We exclude the "humanities" from the school, or, what is worse, we teach them soullessly, or, what is worse again, we confuse them with dates, and grammar, and construing—and then we complain that the "gospel" is neglected.

Tennyson sings truly that the course of time and progress will—

Crook and turn upon itself in many a backward streaming curve;
for the catechetical Christian schools of Alexandria were cen-

turies in advance of modern England in their grasp of the problem of spiritual education. To the wise Fathers of that city there were laws of spiritual apperception long since forgotten until re-discovered by Tuiskon Ziller.¹ Greek thought, prophetic thought, historical study were necessary preliminaries for the student before the Christian mysteries and spiritualities could be discerned. There was less said about the "neglect of the gospel," and rather a solemn and earnest effort to show how, in the view of these, the wisest of the early Christians, Christianity was a culmination, and as such only capable of being grasped in all its force and significance by minds prepared. But we have forgotten the lesson. With well-nigh every humanistic element excluded from the school; with the fact that, when viewed in the light of the vast moral importance of the subject, history is practically unknown and untaught in modern England; with the other fact, which would strike an observer as equally appalling, were it not ludicrous in its very imbecility, that great literature makes no appeal to the modern Englishman and but little appeal to the modern English woman; we still have the audacity to complain that the soul-message of a Tragedy, enacted in some unknown country called Palestine, then under the rule of an unknown nation called the Romans, but formerly under kings of its own, unknown except by name, warned and inspired by unknown men called "prophets"—that a Tragedy taking place under such unknown conditions exerts but little attractive force on mankind! Again be it said, the thing is absurd. If we wish the "gospel story," or any other story, or any other humanistic force, to act upon mankind, we must restore the "humanities" to the school. Thousands of English souls are literally perishing from lack of the historical knowledge which humanises.

Knowledge to their eyes her ample page
Rich with the spoils of time did ne'er unroll.

The truth is that the preacher, if a man of culture, has no

¹ Consider the *late* position of the *Life of Christ* in his scheme of study.

point of contact with his audience ; he speaks a foreign language ; he talks of colours to the blind. The "apperception masses"—the requisite ideas—of his auditors are so few and attenuated that he, and the moralist, may appeal for a lifetime without touching any inner spring of action. "Dulness and impenetrability," not deliberate choice of evil for good, are the causes of much present-day spiritual decline and much of the desertion of the churches recently revealed. And with this "dulness and impenetrability" towards what is suggestive of higher things goes necessarily a heightened susceptibility to all that is degrading. "If intellectual interests are wanting, if the store of thought be meagre, then the ground lies empty for the animal desires." So says Herbart, wiser a thousand times than those who shout "sin—sin—sin".

It is the supreme glory of Herbartianism to have shown how intimately connected are Intelligence and Virtue, Unintelligence and Vice. It is the supreme error of many philanthropists not to have recognised that the secret of failure is often absence of ideas, scrappiness of ideas, feebleness of ideas. The intolerant man is intolerant because he has lived only in one mental world ; the cruel man is cruel often because his imagination is weak ;¹ the impure man is impure largely because he has nothing to interest him except impurity ; the Hooligan is a Hooligan because he has never been taught to be anything else.

"Human nature," says Ruskin, "is kind and generous, but it is narrow and blind, and can only with difficulty conceive anything but what it immediately sees and feels. *People would instantly care for others as well as for themselves if only they could imagine others as well as themselves.*"²

We have wandered for the moment from the doctrine of many-sided Interest to that of *Gesinnungsunterricht* or the teaching of "humanities," and to that of "Apperception". But in truth they are all connected. The moral value of the first

¹ Still there *may* be "Schadenfreude," pleasure in another's pain, as Miss Cobbe urges. (*Contemporary*, May, 1902.) But probably most cruelty is due to defective imagination. Schadenfreude is, let us hope, insanity.

² *Relation of Art to Morals*. (Quoted, Felkin.)

doctrine, even when applied to subjects such as arithmetic and geography, is enormous; while when applied to humanistic studies (history, literature, etc.) it becomes incalculable. The doctrine of Apperception is, of course, applicable to all subjects, at least to all that involve the imparting of knowledge as distinct from skill or dexterity. A few words more upon it may therefore not be wholly useless, in view of the fact that the majority of expositors, with all their lucidity, fail to show its moral and social significance.

This significance will be discovered by any person who will take the trouble to try or to conceive an experiment. Let him go into a country village with eager heart, pure motives, and boundless energy. He is determined to lay before the people "whatsoever things are lovely" in religion, in literature, in science, in history. It is *all* "lovely" to him; how easy it must be to rouse others to a sense of the same loveliness! How easy to thrill Englishmen and Christians with a sense of the grandeur of their national history, with the beauty of their national poetry, or with the true and deep pathos of that scene when a single man inspired the Jews in their mountain fortress to throw defiance at Sennacherib and the greatest army in the world! Easy! Alas, it is *not* easy! Mention "Alfred," and the rustic imagination remains unkindled; "Wessex," "Norseman," and every other proper name mentioned falls as a meaningless sound: *the apperceiving ideas are not there, and Interest is not awakened*. Tell of the origin of *Adonais*, and the rustic asks "Who was Keats?" and the expositor has to begin the weary task at another point; again *the apperceiving ideas are not there, and Interest is not awakened*. Turn at last to the Bible, "the poor man's book," the common heritage of Christians; surely here we shall find something that the rustic can appreciate! Tell of Sennacherib, tell of Isaiah. In the midst of the narrative comes the question—if, indeed, an ox-like stare be not the only response which the enthusiast obtains—"Who were the Assyrians?" Well-nigh in despair the speaker produces a map, proceeds to point out Mesopotamia, and—*inter alia*—discovers that though "religious education" is the order of the

day not one person out of ten can point out Palestine on the map of the world ! Sennacherib and Isaiah, like Guthrum and Alfred, awaken no interest ; there is no background of knowledge into which the new material can be received ; *the apperceiving ideas are not there, and Interest is not aroused.*

Thus we come back to the old place ; preaching, teaching, exhortation, books, can exert but little influence unless, early in life, vistas have been opened up before the mind. "The conceptions acquired before thirty remain usually the only ones we ever gain."¹ Immense is the value of ideas. The man who has them in rich abundance may perchance sink, on occasion, into debauchery or greed, but he is always *open to influences* ; there is always the chance of revolutionising his character. The hopeless person is the impenetrable person, the man whose "apperceiving masses" are poor, scanty, or non-existent. Professor James's jokes at the expense of the "apperception" doctrine² are therefore out of place. He complains that "the conscientious young teacher is led to believe that it contains a recondite and portentous secret". It does contain a secret, and a portentous one.

The chief aim of the present work—which is to lay before Anglo-Saxon readers the critical literature bearing on Herbartianism—precludes the devotion of much further space to a panegyric of the "Interest" and kindred doctrines. But if these doctrines possess vitality, clearly Herbartianism has by no means been criticised out of existence—an impression which might possibly arise after a perusal of the hostile criticisms which are summarised in this book. No, Herbartianism lives and moves and develops. Its critics do good service when they point out possible dangers and when they demonstrate obvious errors, but as the system is grounded upon many a deep moral and psychological truth, though its outworks may fall to ruin its main walls will surely stand.

"'Interest—Interest—Interest' ; all very well : but let us have definite practical *hints*." A teacher will respond in this

¹ James, *Talks to Teachers*, p. 168.

² *Ibid.*, p. 156.

wise. Well, Herbartians can give many, but the truth is that British Education is already well supplied with "practical hints" (of a sort), and that these, so far as they are good, will find their proper places in the Herbartian system. The need is for a new spirit, a definite point of view, a programme, a creed; precisely these are provided in the Interest doctrine. Teachers who once feel that in creating powerful, permanent Interests they are regenerating the world as no other body of professional men are capable of doing, will soon discover "practical hints" for themselves, and (far more important) they will realise that school work has a meaning; that the preparation of their lessons is drudgery no longer, but truly a preparation for the "Kingdom of God on earth"; and that they have a right to look in the face of the clerical and the medical professions with the glance, if not of superiority, yet at least of equality, instead of with the cringing glance of conscious abasement. Is this nothing? Cannot we balance a good many "practical hints" against such a boon? The function of Herbartianism is not to add a new and equally dreary set of "school-management" books to the lumber-room of a schoolhouse, but to give a soul, spirit, life, and meaning to the whole of the schoolmaster's work. We need no Herbartianism to tell us how geography should be taught; even now we teach it fairly well. But we do need Herbartianism to explain to us in what spirit we should teach it; we do need Herbartianism to tell us we are a profession; we do need it to provide us with a programme for the future, with a tradition, with a philosophy, with a court of appeal, with self-respect, with leaders, with encyclopædias,¹ with stimulus, with hope, with zeal—with everything, in fact, which we do not possess and which the medical profession in a measure does.

One parting word on the "Interest" doctrine. Is there any

¹It is not without significance that the magnificent Encyclopædia of Education, published at Langensalza, is edited by the modern leader of German Herbartianism. The reference is, of course, to Rein's *Encyclopædisches Handbuch der Pädagogik* (16 volumes).

truth in the charge brought forward by Dittes that Herbartianism is devoid of heroism? Was Herbart's apathy, at a time when Fichte and other Germans were engaged in the war against Napoleon's aggression, a symptom of the paralysis which "Culture" sometimes induces, and a gloomy presentiment of the flabbiness of his educational system? He would be a bold man who, in face of Herbart's spotless life and the enthusiasm of his followers, would seriously claim this. But there may be a trace of truth in the charge. "Interest" with Herbart was mainly to be of the "involuntary" kind. An Herbartian teacher, consistent to the doctrine of the presentational-mechanism, would aim mainly at the smooth working of the forty or sixty presentational-mechanisms sitting before him in class and called his "pupils". "We have of late been hearing much of the philosophy of tenderness in education; 'Interest' must be assiduously awakened in everything, difficulties must be smoothed away. *Soft pedagogics* have taken the place of the old steep and rocky path to learning." So speaks a great American writer,¹ and (must we not admit?) there may be now and then an absence of strenuousness, vigour, and backbone in Herbartianism; it may easily degenerate into the "soft pedagogics" said to be prevalent in Herbartian America. It may—or it may not. Professor Adams's reply is at least pertinent. "The theory of Interest does not propose to banish drudgery, but only to make drudgery tolerable by giving it a meaning."² "Interest," says Schurman, "is the greatest word in Education"; let us now finally add, "in morals and religion too".

Some further remarks will be of service in calling attention to other really valuable aspects of Herbartianism, aspects likely to be partly lost sight of during an examination of the weak points of the system. Partly—not entirely; for reasonable-minded critics like Dittes, Bartels, and Christinger are by no means insensitive to its excellences.

Connected with the doctrines of Interest and Apperception is the one that Instruction cannot be dispensed with or safely

¹ James, *Talks to Teachers*, p. 54.

² *Herbartian Psychology*, pp. 262-63.

underestimated. Ostermann followed the example of his master Lotze in attacking Herbart's presentational psychology. That psychology is probably but an overdone, over-systematised attempt to explain the fact that ideas or presentations are of supreme importance for mental life. Now the strange thing is that some people deny this to be a fact at all.

There are those who tell us that "mere knowledge" is of small moment; that the main thing for educationists to look after is training in good habits, not Teaching or Instruction. They tell us that we must form in children certain tendencies rather than confer upon them information. Among those who adhere to this view are the ecclesiastical and other worthies who oppose "ethical lessons" on the ground that "virtue cannot be taught". To the same group belong advocates of a predominantly classical education on the ground, not of the knowledge it confers, but of the "unrivalled mental gymnastic" which is provided by construing Homer and composing Latin verses.¹ The same depreciation of knowledge is shown by the champions of the "heuristic system" of science teaching, who protest against "lecture methods," and declare that "the great object in view in education is to develop the power of initiative".²

The notion is that, provided certain capacities or tendencies are developed in our pupils, these capacities or tendencies will be always operative, no matter whether the mind be filled with mathematical, classical, or other knowledge, or with little knowledge of any kind. A man "trained" in the classics is ready for anything. He is "knowing," even though he may have little knowledge. He has "Können" if not "Kennen".

What are we to say to this?

There are two opposite dangers to be faced by modern educationists. One is "didactic materialism"—the view that the more knowledge we can pile up (never mind how!) the better.

¹ "A master's business," says Mr. Benson, "is to try to see that there is mental effort." "Not a bit of it," replies Sir Oliver Lodge, in the spirit of a genuine Herbartian, "a master's business is to supply proper pabulum" (*Nineteenth Century*, December, 1902).

² Dr. Armstrong's *Special Report on the Heuristic Method*.

Quantity is here regarded as the main thing. The logical outcome of this educational policy is that habits of initiative, of independence, and so forth, are not cultivated. Advocates of "training" rightly protest against this. "Didactic materialism" is the present-day creed of elementary schools and of all other schools influenced by the tradition of examinations.

The opposite danger is "didactic formalism" (if the coining of the phrase may be allowed). "Smash up the knowledge idol," said Edward Thring. "Create initiative" is the watch-word of "didactic formalism".

Now the "Artful Dodger"¹ and many of his fraternity possessed "initiative" in abundance and yet there was something seriously deficient in their characters. Waiving the question of innate criminality (with which the normal teacher has little to do), may we not say that the defect in the Dodger's character was that his *ideas* were wrong?

On the whole, the tendency—not necessarily the actual result—of Herbartianism may sometimes be in the direction of "didactic materialism". If "action springs out of the circle of thought," vast importance, perhaps exaggerated importance, will be attached to the conferring of Knowledge. There may be an undervaluing of "training," of the formation of habit and of the strenuous sides of character. Herbartianism, we are told, is hyper-intellectual. It lays too much stress on Instruction.

Such is possibly its occasional tendency. But the Herbartians are practical men, and fully alive to the dangers of their presentational psychology. Thus they wage war against the purely "narrative" method of teaching, and lay stress on "developing-presentative Instruction" (*entwickelnd-darstellender Unterricht*) because of the mental activity this is supposed to awaken. As shown also in their scheme of "formal steps," the Herbartians are awake to the problem of *method*, and their opposition to the catechetical and memo-

¹The example is borrowed from Professor Adams's book, Chapter V. of which is the best exposure of the "formal education" delusion in our language.

rising system is another indication that mere quantity has no attractions for them. Moreover, they are never weary of telling us that the only legitimate aim of education is the formation of a strong, moral Will, and that Instruction which fails to build up such a Will is not educative. Lastly, there is "concentration".

The conclusion arrived at is that Herbartianism may be a wholesome corrective to "didactic formalism," a doctrine which, though less prevalent than that of "didactic materialism," is every whit as dangerous. There is surely vast truth in the watchword that "action springs out of the circle of thought". Thus one great lesson Herbart has to tell us is that *we cannot dispense with conferring Knowledge. Instruction is vitally important.* However much stress we may rightly lay on "heuristic" methods and the awakening of mental activities, we cannot ignore the scientific giving of information. Man is not *always* in a pronouncedly conative state, aggressively striving towards a goal. Mentally as well as physically he must sometimes passively receive or assimilate. The advocates of "heuristic" and "gymnastic" methods forget this. Impressed as they are by the great mistake of former generations of teachers who regarded the minds of the young as so many *tabulae rasæ*, or empty receptacles, the new apostles have swung to the opposite extreme and would fain make the young into perpetual motion machines. Such a procedure is grimly described by Dörpfeld: "die Schüler lernen zwar vortrefflich kauen, aber sie haben nichts im Magen". Which error is the more serious it is difficult to say. Mental life is rhythmic; at one moment it may passively receive, at another it must actively seek.

Herbartianism corrects the error of "didactic formalism". In the hands of unskilful teachers it might, perhaps, as already said, degenerate into a new kind of "didactic materialism," and indeed Hubatsch¹ has boldly avowed that Herbartianism prefers easy subjects to difficult. Some educationists, on the other hand, will deny that there is any tendency in Herbartianism

¹ See pp. 154 ff.

towards "didactic materialism". Was not the condemnatory phrase itself invented by an Herbartian? Does not methodology owe much to the Herbartians? Do not the Herbartians lay enormous or exclusive stress upon character-forming? Yes, but with them character-forming has to take place mainly through Instruction. Herbart had "no conception of Education without Instruction". This doctrine is, after all, the very essence of his teaching. If he was wrong here his system was wrong as a whole, despite possible excellences of detail. If ideas are not vitally important then Herbartianism is on the wrong tack.

Connected with the fact of the high place given by Herbartians to Instruction is that of their deprecation of the policy of working *merely* on the Feelings. Here again Ostermann finds fault with the reformers, though in reality the practical outcome of Herbartianism is precisely what Ostermann himself desiderates; the Feelings *are* touched, but *via* ideas. What Herbart specially protested against was the direct "swaying of the feelings by which mothers especially so often believe they are educating their children". Such a procedure, he contended, has little permanent result. The Feeling comes, and goes again; the Character remains untouched. Aim at the circle of thought; give *ideas*, so that, sooner or later, the apperceptive reverberations of these ideas may generate *high* Feeling—many-sided Interest. This is the message of the Herbartians. Here again, surely, they are right, sane, and suggestive. The utter powerlessness of certain great religious revivals permanently to reform the human race is some testimony to the inadequacy of appeals to pure Feeling. The ebbing tide is with feeling, the flowing tide is with ideas.

Many other things we owe to Herbart. There are the five steps of Instruction, called, by Ziller, the "formal steps". The bitterest critics of Herbartianism do not deny that here we have a valuable contribution to educational method. True, we find the "steps" already suggested by Comenius, but the main glory of working them out is undoubtedly Herbart's and Ziller's. Yet to this day, despite their admitted value, they are unknown in many British training colleges for teachers and misunderstood

by expositors.¹ For many a decade teachers have been asking how to draw up notes of lessons. The Herbartians can tell them.

But there are dangers. The formal steps must not be applied unintelligently to *all* subjects. They must not always be employed in the same order. Frequently one or more steps must be omitted. Still, the first thing necessary is to know them; after that, the warnings of Karl Richter²—who, by the bye, is one of the sanest of the critics of Herbartianism, and fully recognises the value of this part of the system—may well be attended to.

Then there is the “concentration”³ doctrine, mainly the work of Dörpfeld and Ziller, but distinctly foreshadowed in Herbart’s plea for “large unbroken masses of thought”. It is out of such masses, says Herbart, that moral action must spring. It is by building up such masses that the teacher will work effectively on the mind of his pupils. A curriculum consisting of isolated subjects is bound to be not only unwieldy (“didactic materialism” is a hard master), but also incapable of arousing Interest. The springs of Apperception are dried up.

There are, it appears on examination, two elements in this “Concentration” doctrine. First there is the view that knowledge should be a whole; that hard and fast lines of distinction between one subject and another should be removed; that one subject should throw light upon another. This doctrine may be called that of “unification”. Slowly it is working its way into British schools. The walls erected between history and geography, between arithmetic, algebra, and geometry are being broken down. Even writers who do not claim to be Herbartians are moving towards this standpoint. Dr. Armstrong urges us to “cease to be slaves to a rigid time-table, at least in the earlier years of school life,” and rather, at each stage, “to do incidentally what is necessary” for the matter in hand.⁴ Only in this way

¹ See p. 97.

² See pp. 125 ff.

³ The non-Herbartian reader must be warned that this does not exactly refer to “concentration of mind”. See what follows.

⁴ Article on “Science in Education” in *National Education* (Murray), p. 119.

can real interest be aroused. When, in the course of a history lesson, the name of a place is mentioned, the map must be immediately consulted. The history teacher must not say, "Geography is outside my province". The teaching of such subjects as these must be—let us admit the fact boldly—more diffuse and rambling.

It is striking how from various unexpected quarters comes testimony to the need of this unification or concentration doctrine. The recent famous report on the education of army officers declared that "military topography is treated too much as if it was a subject by itself, unconnected with tactics". From writers on Sunday Schools comes advice that maps and geography should be more extensively made use of in teaching the Bible—very necessary advice and disgracefully belated.¹ We are, in truth, constantly drawing lines and erecting barriers where none should exist. Subjects like history, geography, languages, biblical literature, and so forth, are so mutually connected that, though each lesson may suitably bear a special name, it should yet make use of whatever pertinent information can be obtained from the other subjects. Thus, though the time-table need not perhaps be abolished, it should be obeyed in no slavish spirit; and the person who draws it up should take care that the various related subjects fit into each other so far as possible. It is absurd to teach the geography of China alongside of the history of Alfred.

But there is another element in the concentration doctrine which is of more dubious value. Ziller, as is well known, placed at the very centre of his curriculum "character-forming Instruction". Everything else had to be fastened on to this. Simple arithmetical exercises had to be set on a basis of Grimm's fairy tales and the life of Abraham. The history of the patriarchs had to be used for teaching the geography of the East. Possibly such a plan involved an unjust treatment of all subjects except the favoured one at the centre; and even the supposed advantage of the plan—that all the thoughts of the

¹ See the writer's *Student's Herbart* for further information as to the progress of the "concentration" principle.

pupil would gather round and be connected with the "character-forming material"—was an illusory advantage. Fortunately, Ziller and most of his followers were early convinced, as a result of the criticisms directed against them, that their plan in the above crude form was unworkable. More "centres" than one were admitted to be necessary, and the claims of important subjects like science for a respectful treatment could not be resisted. Dörpfeld, a safer and saner guide than Ziller, placed *three* great knowledge-departments at the "centre," those which dealt with God, with man, and with nature; to these three had to be subordinated or connected (1) the "formal" studies like mathematics and (2) the dexterities. The knowledge-departments had, likewise, to support each other.

As a residuum from the exaggerated "concentration" doctrine of Ziller we find left to us: (1) that all subjects which really and naturally throw light upon each other should be allowed to do so; no *artificial* walls of separation between subjects should be permitted; (2) that character-forming Instruction should have a place of great honour in the curriculum in virtue of its enormous importance; (3) that *possibly* "formal" studies and dexterities should, as Dörpfeld and Dr. Findlay suggest, be made to follow the fortunes of the "knowledge-departments" rather than be pursued in isolation; thus, at any rate, in primary schools.

The various criticisms which have been directed against the usual form of the "concentration" doctrine will be found on a perusal of the argument of Bartels.

Then there is the "culture stages doctrine"—faintly foreshadowed by Herbart, and applied logically, though only in part successfully, by Ziller. Here again criticisms have been copious and severe. The doctrine in its abstract form is undoubtedly based on a certain amount of truth, though Dr. Sallwörk and others have raised some weighty objections. The child *does* perhaps tend to reproduce the history of the race, and educationists should, if possible, try to adapt their instruction to the different stages of child-development.¹ But

¹ Certain authors can only be appreciated by persons of a certain age. Boys of twelve love Marryatt and Ballantyne. Shakespeare's works do not

no one will admit that Ziller's proposals are entirely satisfactory, though a few of them may represent an approximation to what is advisable. The "fairy-tale" proposal for the first school-year is easily justified. The child at this stage is scarcely yet a human being; its moral judgments are poor and fleeting. The moral life rests so largely on ideas, on imagination, on the circle of thought, that the best way to support this life in its earliest beginnings may be to feed the fancy rather than to stimulate artificially the nascent moral sense. Unfortunately many of the Zillerians have been unfaithful to this valuable part of their own doctrine, and have tried to use the fairy-tales for directly moral purposes, an attempt which critics have rightly ridiculed.

Again, Ziller's startling proposal to postpone the life of Christ to the end of the school course, though violently attacked by Lutherans, is slowly coming to be recognised as justified. When we find American Doctors of Divinity declaring that "the child has to repeat a great many pre-Christian stages of evolution in its own life" because "Christianity came late in the history of the world"; and when we find them saying that we must "bring the stress of teaching Christianity, from the New Testament, a little later than we put it,"¹ are we not bound to admit that perhaps Ziller was, after all, no mere pedant, but a man with true scientific insight?

The Robinson Crusoe proposal is of more doubtful value as a part of the culture-stages scheme, though the pedagogical capacities of the story are undoubted; but the general plan upon which Ziller has worked out his scheme is valid—that, if the Bible be retained at all, the child must work through it in chronological order,² not dart in and out among the books, and

appeal very much to the young, and it is doubtful whether, to any great extent, they should be employed in schools. No young person can appreciate Thackeray. Facts like these are inadequately recognised.

¹ See below, p. 71.

² This does not mean necessarily to follow the order of the books. See the writer's *Reform of Moral and Biblical Education* for a scheme essentially Zillerian at basis.

study simultaneously scraps from Samuel, Genesis, Isaiah, etc. The same remark also applies to the teaching of "secular history". On this question our school-managers and teachers would profitably study Miss Dodd's book *The Herbartian Principles of Teaching*.¹

Still, when all the merits and all the suggestiveness of the labours of Herbart and Ziller have been admitted, the critics remain undaunted. They insist that the underlying psychology is wrong. It is easy, for example, to ridicule the presentation-mechanism of Herbart. It is easy to cry aloud for a soul before whom presentations can appear; to cry aloud for self-activity, for a creative principle. These demands can, possibly, be justified on metaphysical grounds. But for the educator the Herbartian conception is, far and away, the safer. Assuming that the creative, free-will, or self-activity principle is metaphysically justifiable, is it worth anything educationally? Is it amenable to systematic guidance? Examination will show that it has no existence apart from presentations, though it is probably not resolvable into these, as Herbart thinks. Now presentations *are* amenable to systematic control, and though they are not such well-nigh self-existent entities as Herbartianism represents them, they are, in a measure, capable of being treated as such. They have number, intensity, quality, and so forth: to some extent, moreover, they appear as mechanical forces in mutual interaction. For these and other reasons they are capable of a systematic treatment of which the self-activity principle, however essential to a complete view of mental life, is not capable. In fact the educator must, in large measure, view his pupil as a presentation-mechanism and nothing else. The pupil may have a soul, and free-will, and transcendent faculties of all kinds, but it is certain that these faculties have neither existence nor significance apart from presentations. Whether Presentationalism has a future before it or not as psychology or philosophy—it has many supporters and their number is not, perhaps, decreasing—it will probably always

¹ Sonnenschein,

maintain its place as a valuable working-hypothesis for practical teachers.

"But," it may be objected, "your presentations are no good unless they touch and rouse some innate tendencies in the pupil's soul. Apart from a latent or patent impulse, your presentations are, to use a homely illustration, 'so much water on the duck's back'." The writer was once discussing the Herbartian doctrine of Interest with a highly intelligent man, gifted, one would think, to an unusual degree with the power of rousing "interest". "There is my son," he said, "without interest in anything. There is my daughter, keenly intelligent. Approximately they have received the same 'presentations'. Yet the one feels a keen interest in all speculative questions, the other feels none." An example like this reveals the weakness of Presentationalism as a completely interpretative system of philosophy, but does not subvert its enormous value for educational purposes. What answer is to be made to the objection just cited? Simply this, that innate faculties are beyond the reach of *all* educational systems—not merely of Herbartianism;¹ but that, given these innate faculties in whatever degree, Herbartianism draws them forth and exercises them as no other system does or can.²

This, then, is the answer to the group of objections which come, strangely enough, from two very opposed schools. The physiologist or the materialist, with his emphasis on brain-traces and heredity, pours contempt upon Herbart's presentation-mechanism, and avows that it cannot explain the simplest cases of instinctive action. The idealist, with his emphasis on self-consciousness, self-activity, freedom, and so forth, claims that the presentation-mechanism cannot explain these essential facts. Each contention may be admitted. But the Herbartian

¹ "Doch ist kein Zweifel dass der Erzieher lieber seine Macht auf den Zögling über- als unterschätzen möchte." Rein, *Pädagogik im Grundriss*, p. 76.

² Many, as we have seen, would deny this, and claim that Herbartianism is destructive of initiative.

may answer, "The teacher cannot manufacture heredity or make a clean sweep of brain-traces; he has no recipe for creating self-consciousness, no text-book for freedom of will. But he has the power of giving presentations, and this is his work." The other factors, as being incalculable or inevitable, he is bound, in some measure, to neglect. The gardener assumes that his seeds contain the vital principle—a principle beyond his power of production; his work is to give soil and nourishment. He is not disturbed by the objection that all his efforts can neither create a seed nor cause one species to change into another. He answers that upon him rest the alternatives of life or of death for the seeds committed to his care.

Educational schools which lay too much stress upon the inner principle inevitably relapse into vagueness. Fröbel is no match for Herbart; Natorp's criticism of Herbartianism may or may not be metaphysically sound, educationally it is, as a whole, worthless. Let us, if we choose, endow the Will with all kinds of mysterious potentialities instead of regarding it, with Herbart, as generated out of the movement of presentations. What then? Is our educational system revolutionised a single whit? Is the importance of presentations diminished? Flügel's¹ answer to Natorp seems here quite conclusive: "Man sehe den Willen als ein ursprüngliches Strebevermögen an. Die Stellung der Pädagogik bleibt vollkommen dieselbe. Der Wille sei ein allgemeines Strebevermögen ohne alle Vorstellungen. Als solches ist er zunächst schlafend, unwirksam, blinder Trieb oder wie man sich ausdrücken will, jedenfalls muss die schlummernde Kraft geweckt, ausgelöst werden. Wodurch geschieht dies? Ohne jede Einwirkung würde sich kein Mensch zu einem denkenden, fühlenden, wollenden Geschöpf entwickeln. Es müssen also Einwirkungen von aussen kommen. Von seiten der Natur und der Menschen geht dieser Einfluss aus, und er besteht allgemein gesprochen in Vorstellungen." It matters not for educational purposes whether we regard the Will, apart from presentations, as sleeping or as non-existent. Ultimately,

¹ *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Pädagogik*, 1899, p. 273.

no doubt, there is an important and fundamental difference between the two interpretations, but for the educationist the difference is practically negligible. In other words, Herbart's psychology may be incorrectly based, yet for the teacher it may be the best psychology in existence. Natorp¹ ridicules the notion that Herbart's educational system can be accepted as approximately valid, while at the same time its supposed metaphysical and psychological foundations are to be rejected. Surely he might have remembered the case of astronomical science, many of the practical applications of which involve a use of the Ptolemaic terminology and conceptions as these are found more convenient than the Copernican.²

But need one be so apologetic for the supposed foundations of Herbart's system? Certainly it is no time to dogmatise in psychological matters, but Presentationalism—in the persons of Münsterberg and others—is sufficiently alive to demand respectful attention. Many of the phenomena of hypnotism and mental disease, phenomena such as "fixed ideas," and so forth, immediately suggest Herbart's scheme.³ No doubt Natorp would reply that in these very cases self-consciousness is at a minimum, and that such cases are, for that reason, not typical. He is right; but until he has discovered the laws in accordance with which self-consciousness can be trained apart from presentations, his observation is of little educational value. And, be it remembered, the Herbartian principles of education were, after all, never *deduced* from the doctrine of the presentation-mechanism. Critics who forget this merely tilt at windmills.

A similar answer can be made to critics of another stamp. Just as Natorp entered the field as champion of the Will against Herbartian Presentationalism, so Ostermann has appeared

¹ *Herbart, Pestalozzi und die heutigen Aufgaben der Erziehungslehre*, p. 3.

² "Auch aus falschen Voraussetzungen lassen sich mitunter richtige Ergebnisse ableiten," admits one of Herbart's critics. Ostermann, *Die hauptsächlichsten Irrtümer der Herbartschen Psychologie*, p. 37.

³ See the remarks of various modern psychologists on the "tendency of ideas to act themselves out," e.g., Stout, *Manual*, p. 468, 1st edition.

championing, as we have seen, the cause of Feeling. Feeling, he protests, cannot be resolved into presentations or into any combination or co-operation of presentations. However closely connected it may be with these latter, it has peculiar properties and hence demands peculiar treatment. "Wohl sind die Gefühle mit den Vorstellungen eng verknüpft, aber sie sind darum keine blossen Zustandsweisen derselben, sondern stehen *neben* ihnen als selbständige geistige Vorgänge und als ureigene Zustände der Seele selbst."¹ He therefore urges the importance of direct appeals to the feelings *per se* through the medium of stirring stories—a recommendation which, curiously enough, brings us close up to the proposals of the Herbartians; witness the doctrine of *Gesinnungsunterricht*. Here, as in so many other points, they have had a fine sense for what is genuinely important and educative. Their presentation-mechanism may be a fiction, but it has shown itself an innocent and useful one. A feeling may not be a presentation or purely the result of presentations, yet it is closely connected with them (as Ostermann admits in the above quotation), and hence the Herbartian emphasis on these latter does not in practice lead astray. It may not be true that "all influence on the feelings must take place through the circle of thought," but any error here involved is more than counterbalanced by the priceless element of truth.

Herbart's ethics has been criticised even more severely than his psychology. There seems at first sight an artificiality appertaining to the "five moral ideas" as great as that which attaches to the presentation-mechanism. Why *five* ideas? Is this unity? Why accept the five blindly as immediate intuitions? Why not find some common basis for them all? These questions are pertinent, but the answer to them is that philosophers have for centuries been trying to unify ethics and have failed. One portion of the moral notions of man may be satisfactorily "reduced to lower terms," but another invariably

¹ *Die hauptsächlichsten Irrtümer der Herbartschen Psychologie und ihre Pädagogischen Konsequenzen*, p. 239.

escapes such reduction. Individual Perfection is one moral end; social Justice is another with equally urgent claims, and it passes the ingenuity of philosophers to base them upon a common ground. Intuitionism has vitality yet, and Herbart's ethics with its five moral ideas intuitionally apprehended is at the present moment as logically defensible as any other system. One of the most searching of English investigations into ethical problems has resulted in a return to a purified Intuitionism in which the ideas of Equity and Benevolence hold a prominent place, in which the notion (though not necessarily the fact) of Freedom is regarded as essential to the moral life, and in which the notion of Perfection cannot be got rid of except by a desperate effort.¹ Here are four ideas, superficially at least similar to four of Herbart's, yet arrived at in a way altogether different from his.

We may probably say with considerable truth that when the student of education first dips into Herbartianism he is entranced with the thoroughness and logical connectedness of the system. Then comes a period of reaction and distrust; he finds, as he thinks, that it commits him to fatalism, that personality vanishes, that a consistent Herbartian is cousin to a materialist. Then on deeper study he begins to see the astonishing—almost miraculous—adaptedness of this system for educational purposes and for social reform; he begins to see that though its metaphysical basis may be false, and even its psychology deficient in its neglect or misinterpretation of the consciousness-factor, yet those aspects in which the system is strong are precisely those which touch upon the work of the teacher.² The student can, if he choose, supply the supposed deficiencies of Herbartianism by adding correlative spiritual factors; his mind will then be at rest, and he can, with a clear conscience, call himself a reformed Herbartian. But probably the best features of his work as educationist will spring out of the original Her-

¹ Sidgwick's *Methods of Ethics*.

² "Herbartianism has its weaknesses, yet it seems to me the best system for application to education." Professor Adams, *Herbartian Psychology*, p. 14.

bartian contribution—the notion of the presentation-mechanism and of its intimate connection with volition.

The primary design of the present work is not to give an exposition of Herbart's principles. The English reader has now ample opportunities for becoming acquainted with those principles, and if, in addition, he can read German, he will find Herbart's own works comparatively easy once he has acquired some familiarity with the leading thoughts and the technical expressions. There are, of course, later developments of Herbartianism, and some of these are now available in an English form.¹

If any one unacquainted with Herbartianism should take up this book with the desire of mastering the details of that system, he will thus, in some measure, be disappointed. The design of the work is to indicate the nature of the present-day educational controversies over Herbartianism, and in this way to pave the way to an impartial judgment upon the questions at stake.

A word or two as to the "critics".

The sections on Wesendonck, Bartels, Hubatsch, and Christinger deal largely with Ziller. On the other hand the attack of Dittes was directed exclusively against Herbart. Because of its importance it has been given in some fulness, and a considerable number of footnotes have been added in order to ensure that both sides of the question may be known.

The Richter section deals fully with the "formal steps"; Bergemann is suggestive on the "culture steps"; while Linde deals well with the question of "developing presentative Instruction".

The attack of Hubatsch is often fresh and forcible, as when he accuses Herbartians of preferring easy subjects to hard. Natorp is treated somewhat fully, mainly because of the recency of the attack and because the Herbartians have officially replied to him at considerable length. But Natorp's treatise is mainly philosophical and does not deal with practical problems or, to any great extent, with Ziller. Ostermann's psychological criti-

¹ *E.g.*, Rein's *Outlines of Pedagogy*.

cism, owing to the nature of the case and to the condensation rendered necessary, will probably be found hard; so also will Vogel's. Sallwürk subjects the doctrine of "culture stages" to a thorough investigation; Drews deals with Ziller's peculiar prejudice against questioning (in a few matters Ziller was distinctly a reactionary); while Kunz discusses Herbartianism from the standpoint of a Roman Catholic. There are, by the bye, plenty of other "critics" awaiting exposition—if the task is worth anyone's performance.

One really great name has been omitted from the list—that of Dörpfeld. But Dörpfeld himself was an Herbartian, and though he freely criticised some of Ziller's proposals it would be misleading to enrol him formally among the critics of Herbartianism. From one point of view he may be regarded as its greatest exponent. Moreover if Dörpfeld were dealt with at all he ought to be dealt with in great fulness. It is only because, in most English expositions, Zillerianism is identified with Herbartianism, that there is any temptation whatever to deal with him as a "critic".

PART II.

HISTORICAL SURVEY.

1. *Herbart* (1776-1841).

HERBART was a contemporary of Fröbel (1783-1852), and a younger contemporary of Niemeyer (1754-1828), and Pestalozzi (1746-1827).

The name of Pestalozzi is so well-known in Britain that there is little need to enter here into an account of the various weighty reforms of educational method for which we have to thank the great Swiss philanthropist. Still less need is there to go further back and trace the connection between Herbart and Rousseau *vid* Pestalozzi. The connection has much historical interest; but, pedagogically, Herbart's ideas are remote from those of Rousseau, and show such wide divergences even from those of Pestalozzi himself¹ that educationists are to some extent divided on the question whether Herbart was in any sense whatever faithful to the Pestalozzian tradition. The truth appears to be that the significance of Pestalozzi lies less in the concrete achievements of his life (though these were important and valuable) than in the stimulus and the idealism which he imparted to other thinkers. Fröbel and Herbart both came into contact with him (Fröbel, 1807-9, Herbart, 1799), and upon both of them his *Anschaunung*² doctrine had effect, giving

¹ For example, Pestalozzi's work was lamentably weak on the side of history, whereas history is all-important in the Herbartian system.

² It is useless to try to translate this word; accordingly it will be used, in the present work, as it stands. "Sense Experience," "Intuition," "Observation," are all sorry translations.

rise to the Kindergarten system and to the "Apperception" doctrine.

The name of Niemeyer is unknown in England, but the influence of this writer upon Herbart was apparently considerable. It was his *Principles of Education and Instruction*¹ upon which Herbart, when professor at Königsberg and Göttingen, based his pedagogical lectures, and to which frequent references are made in his works.

It was an age of great names. Besides Fröbel, Herbart had for contemporaries the idealistic thinkers Schelling and Hegel. As an older contemporary there was, as we have seen, Pestalozzi; there were also Kant and Fichte. In England, Lancaster and Bell² were working; Arnold was born in 1795; Jacotot in 1770.

Herbart himself was born in 1776 at Oldenburg. He early showed signs of promise, and in 1794 entered the University at Jena, a town destined to become in later years one of the three chief centres of the educational propaganda associated with his name. Here he came, *vid* Fichte, under the influence of the then predominant Kantian philosophy; we must probably trace to this source his emphasis upon the moral end of education, an emphasis which his followers have even increased. From 1797 to 1799 Herbart was in Switzerland as private tutor to the three sons of Herr von Steiger, and the letters he despatched relative to the progress of these boys throw much light upon the growth of his ideas. In 1799 he met Pestalozzi at Burgdorf, and in the same year he was to be found at Bremen as student of philosophy. Three years later, having taken his doctor's degree, he began at Göttingen to lecture and write on Philosophy and Education. A little earlier he had written (1801) *Ideas on a Pedagogical Plan of Teaching for Higher Classes*, and now, located at Göttingen, he began seriously to devote himself to working out an educational system. In 1802 appeared certain

¹ Niemeyer was Chancellor of Halle University. In 1836 his book attained its ninth edition.

² To hear of Bell among "great" men sounds strange. But some nations have to be thankful for small mercies.

works whose titles suggest at once his interest in the life-task of Pestalozzi: *Upon Pestalozzi's Newest Work; How Gertrude Teaches her Children*; and *Pestalozzi's Idea of an A B C of Anschauung*. In 1804 appeared his *Æsthetic Revelation of the World as the Chief Work of Education*, and still another brochure dealing with Pestalozzi. Two years later he came before the world as author of an educational masterpiece, *General Pedagogy, deduced from the Purpose of Education*.¹ Here he appeared as an independent thinker, and no longer in obvious relation to Pestalozzi. Works on logic, metaphysics, and moral philosophy also came from his pen. It is clear, from the foregoing sketch, that Herbart's interests were primarily educational and only secondarily philosophical. His educational system was no deduction, as many people suppose, from a pre-arranged and artificial philosophical system; his philosophical system was rather an artificial structure thrown around or placed beneath his educational system. He was not, like Kant, philosopher first and educationist afterwards; education was his first and his last interest. He worked at psychology and philosophy partly (perhaps mainly) in order to gain a foundation for his pedagogical ideas.

In 1809 his fame was such as to cause him to be summoned to the most distinguished philosophic chair in Germany, that which had been occupied only a few years before by Immanuel Kant. In 1810 Herbart ventured on the founding at Königsberg of a College or Seminar for the training of teachers, an establishment which, though not numerically strong, and though fated to come to an end when Herbart left for Göttingen, was full of significance for the future.² During the Königsberg period Herbart published various works on philosophy, psychology, and metaphysics. In 1833 he went back to Göttingen and taught again with success and considerable fame. In 1835 appeared his *Outline of Pedagogical Lectures*, in some respects

¹ Referred to as *Science of Education* by Mr. and Mrs. Felkin.

² As we shall see, Stoy and Ziller both founded "Seminars" on Herbart's plan.

a more important work than the *General Pedagogy* because representing more mature views. In 1841 he died, and with him Herbartianism seemed, for the time, to have died also.

For the remarkable feature about this system is that at Herbart's death it possessed but little authority and few adherents, whereas thirty or forty years later it had risen to a commanding position, and was claiming the allegiance of hundreds if not of thousands of German teachers. This resuscitation was the work mainly of three men, Stoy, Dörpfeld, and Ziller.

But before an account of the labours of these giants can be thoroughly intelligible, the leading Herbartian doctrines must be known in outline, and in the form which they had taken at the death of Herbart. The term "Herbartianism" covers a wide field of thought, and we must distinguish the contributions of the founder from those of his followers.

2. Outline of Herbart's Doctrines.

(1) Most fundamental is Herbart's view that "Character" is the end of true Education. "Ethics gives the goal," and ethics, of course, is the science of Morality or Character. Whatever does not contribute to the moral life is not true Education.

[Needless to say, this view has met with abundant opposition. Many teachers and writers claim that Education has *several* goals—Morality, Knowledge, Skill, etc.—and urge that these cannot be reduced to one. But the most characteristic feature of Herbartianism is the denial of any ultimate multiplicity.]

(2) Character, then, is the end, goal, or purpose of Education. But how is the goal to be reached? "Ethics gives the goal, psychology gives the means." Hence teachers must know psychology or mental science.

(3) But *which* psychology? "*Herbart's* ; and the characteristics of this psychology are that the soul has no 'faculties' in the ordinary sense, no semi-independent powers of Will, Feeling, Memory, etc. ; that it is quite empty but for 'presentations' or ideas ; that the whole life of the soul consists in the rise, fall, and mutual action of these units. Even Will is only a phase in the movement of presentations."

[But what about heredity? Here, perhaps, is the weakest side of Herbart's psychology. It cannot be said that he denies organic facts like heredity and variation; he admits that the soul, on becoming united with a bodily organism, receives a special individuality, bent, or direction. But the *tendency* of Herbartianism, and indeed of most educational systems, is to minimise these facts. And such is natural. An educator cannot influence heredity; he must take children as he finds them. Herbart's psychology was, in part at least, elaborated for pedagogical purposes, and thus laid more stress upon environment and Education than upon such elements as heredity and variation, which, unlike "presentations," are quite beyond the power of the teacher.¹]

(4) Since, in accordance with (3), presentations are of supreme importance, and all action "springs out of the circle of thought" (*i.e.*, out of presentations), the great task of the educator must be to form aright this thought-circle. This is the work of "Instruction".² "Education,"³ which is [see (1)] the forming of a good Will or good Character, must rest mainly or entirely⁴ upon Instruction, the forming or culture⁵ of the circle of thought.

[This emphasis on Instruction is another characteristic of Herbartianism. Opponents have not been remiss in criticising this doctrine; but it has great pedagogical importance.]

(5) Though "the one and the whole work of Education may be summed up in the concept 'Morality,'" yet there is another concept of almost equally fundamental importance, that of "balanced, many-sided Interest". If the pupil has attained to this, *ipso facto* he has advanced a long way towards Virtue or Morality. Many-sided Interest is of enormous moral value, guiding the life, keeping from evil, building Character. "If intellectual interests are wanting, if the store of thought be

¹ Cf. Locke, *Thoughts Concerning Education*, § 1. "Of all the men we meet with, nine parts of ten are what they are, good or evil, useful or not, by their Education."

² *Unterricht*.

³ *Erziehung*.

⁴ These alternatives stand for one of the ambiguities of Herbartianism.

⁵ *Bildung*.

meagre, the ground lies empty for the animal desires. . . . Stupid people cannot be virtuous." Thus it matters comparatively little which of the two goals (Morality or Interest) we regard as the teacher's. Interest may be classified as empirical, speculative, æsthetic, sympathetic, social, and religious.

[Here again opponents, especially Catholics and strong Lutherans, have objected. They have claimed that between "Virtue" and "many-sided Interest" there is not necessarily any close connection. But the doctrine is characteristic of Herbartianism.]

(6) This "many-sided Interest," which is of such supreme educational importance, depends upon the relation of new presentations to old. An absolutely unfamiliar object or event has no "Interest" for us; hence the teacher's task must be so to arrange his teaching-material that all new matter may be brought into relation to the previous acquisitions of the child. The new must be "apperceived" (grasped, interpreted, assimilated) by the old. Apperception is the process by which individual ideas are brought into relation to our previous experience, are assimilated with it, receive meaning from it, and are thus raised to a position of significance.

[Herbart here amplifies the *Anschaunung* doctrine of Pestalozzi by showing that new things must not only be presented in concrete forms, but also be seized hold of by the previous knowledge of the pupil. One probable result of this doctrine is the elevation of those subjects that confer *ideas* to a chief place in the curriculum; for Apperception, and therefore Interest, depend on ideas.]

(7) In working out this doctrine of Interest and Apperception Herbart arrived at his doctrine of the "formal steps" of Instruction. This doctrine solves, in large measure, the vexed question, "How to draw up notes of lessons". The steps are, according to Herbart,¹ (a) Clearness (the analysis of previous

¹ Later Herbartians have greatly improved Herbart's terminology, and have divided his first step into two. But they have not essentially altered his doctrine.

notions and the addition of the new matter); (b) Association; (c) System; (d) Method. At the second stage¹ (Association) similar phenomena are brought together, compared, and contrasted; at the third, generalised notions are attained; at the last practical applications are made.

[The "formal steps" admittedly constitute one of the most valuable portions of Herbartian pedagogical doctrine.]

(8) Though "Instruction" is the main work of Education (inasmuch as "action springs out of the circle of thought"), yet Herbart admits (inconsistently?) the necessity for two other tasks. These are "Government" or "Discipline," and "Training".² The former aims at the preservation of external order in the school; though it is a necessity, it is devoid of direct character-forming significance and Herbart therefore hesitates to include it under Education proper. "Training" includes various processes (*e.g.*, certain punishments) which cannot be regarded as falling under "Instruction" and which are yet of some importance for Character.

The tasks of the teacher are thus Instruction, Training, and Discipline.

(9) A word must be said with regard to Herbart's ethical doctrines which were of an intuitional nature. There are, he held, five moral notions which we intuitionally recognise as worthy of approval. These are Inner Freedom, Perfection,³ Benevolence, Right (or Justice), and Equity (or Fairness). The first of these is almost the same as Conscientiousness, the harmony of one's Will with one's Moral Insight. The second is of special significance to the educator, inasmuch as it is closely related to the doctrine of "balanced, many-sided Interest". The

¹ Third stage with Ziller.

² Mr. and Mrs. Felkin translate *Regierung* as "Government" and *Zucht* as "Discipline". But *Regierung* really stands for what most English teachers would call "Discipline," while *Zucht* may be very roughly translated "moral Training" or "Training". In this book Van Liew will be followed; he constantly represents *Regierung* by "Discipline" and *Zucht* by "Training".

³ Not "perfection" in the usual vague idealistic sense. It represents efficiency and breadth of Will.

"second idea" really puts in a claim for culture, breadth of outlook, strength of mind, etc., as "moral" qualities. The remaining three ideas are somewhat, though by no means exactly, congruent with popular notions. The five ideas are independent of each other and cannot be further reduced or simplified. On no account, says Herbart, are we to try to represent morality as a calculation of consequences such as pleasure or pain.

3. *The Revival of Herbartianism.*—Volkmar Stoy (1815-85).

Though Herbart's educational labours had not passed without recognition during his lifetime, there seemed no likelihood, in the year of his death (1841), that his system would ever attain a commanding position. True, his general philosophy had won the approval of a circle of thinkers whose aversion to Hegel had predisposed them to a "realistic" system. Among the philosophical followers of Herbart were Drobisch, Strümpell, Lazarus, Steinthal, Nahlowsky, Waitz, Volkmann, and Cornelius, from whom have come various weighty contributions to philosophy, more especially to the psychology of language and of the feelings. But Herbart's pedagogical efforts seemed to have borne but little fruit. Mager, in the pages of the *Pädagogische Revue*, and in an important work on the teaching of languages, was one of the few who, during the decade which followed 1841, kept alive the memory of the master's educational labours. But Mager laid down his pen at forty. Waitz, too, who had contributed substantially to educational theory, and had, among other things, anticipated Ziller's approval of "fairy tales," died comparatively young. Herbart's *General Pedagogy* remained a first-edition book.

Why this neglect? Partly, perhaps, because Herbart's educational system belonged, or seemed to belong, to a great philosophical scheme, and at that time there was less desire for such a system than for plain, matter-of-fact, unphilosophical advice, for "common sense in Education". Previous to the Napoleonic wars Education in Germany had been making great strides; but it was seriously affected by the reaction which followed. "Religious Instruction" monopolised, in some parts of Germany

the largest space in the curriculum, and interest in educational principles *per se* seems to have flagged to a considerable extent. Not wholly, for the German mind even in its most unphilosophical periods cannot brook an entire separation from its favourite pursuits, and thus a barren empiricism, such as we in Britain love and pride ourselves upon, was never quite possible in Germany. But there is clear evidence that the days of the Holy Alliance, of Louis Philippe, and of '48 were not days of energetic educational thought.

Moreover we must remember that Herbart's somewhat technical terminology may have been a drawback to the popularity of his system.

But the revival of Herbartianism came at length, and had its seat at Jena.

Karl Volkmar Stoy was born at Pegau in Saxony, 1815. After studying at Leipzig and Göttingen, he became, in 1839, a teacher at Weinheim, and four years later was made "privat-docent" in philosophy and pedagogy at Jena. In this University he delivered, for many years, the lectures on Education which ultimately made his name, and that of his master Herbart, famous throughout Europe. Students visited Jena from all parts of the world, even America sending its contingent.

But Stoy saw that, in order to effect permanent results, some facilities for practical teaching would have to be offered to the students of Education who had gathered around him. Accordingly a pedagogical society, at first consisting of eleven members, was formed, and this ultimately grew into a "Seminar" with school attached. Here lessons were given, criticisms proffered, and conferences held.

Stoy was more than an educationist; he was a warm-hearted philanthropist as well. His sympathies for the indigent of Jena were so keen that, partly out of his own resources, he founded and equipped a schoolhouse for poor children. Fruit culture, gardening, etc., were undertaken; excursions organised; gratuitous instruction given. Stoy was a "second Pestalozzi".

But, like Pestalozzi, he was not to live without being the object of criticism. Although in 1845 he had become Professor

at Jena, and in 1857 had received the honourable title of "Schulrath" in recognition of his many services, yet in 1866 he felt called upon to remove to Heidelberg, annoyed at certain attacks which had been made upon his Seminar. This latter institution, like that which Herbart had founded at Königsberg, fell to pieces when the master's hand was withdrawn. But in 1874 he was recalled to his old sphere of labour, and his return was the signal for a certain revival in the success of his Seminar. During the closing years of his life he came to be recognised more definitely than ever as one of the leading exponents of educational Herbartianism. He died in 1885.

He and his followers had taken up a position of friendly but not slavish adherence to Herbart's doctrines. They often objected to their master's somewhat obscure and technical terminology. The "Interest" doctrine—worked out by the Zillerians¹ into a veritable gospel—occupied a more modest place in the programme of the Stoy-Herbartians, and appeared in the form of a doctrine of "elaboration of the thought circle," quite Herbartian in its way, but not daringly ambitious or propagandist. Even the "formal steps" doctrine was freely criticised; not because the followers of Stoy denied its value, but because they feared it would become a fetish, and check all freedom and spontaneity in lesson-giving.² They laid much stress upon the personality of the teacher, and also upon so treating or "concentrating" the material of Instruction that related elements might be brought together, and thus time and power be saved by making use of psychological laws of "similarity," etc. But Stoy and his followers rejected the "concentration"³ doctrine in Ziller's form, and likewise the fabric of *Gesinnungs-unterricht*,⁴ historical "culture-stages," and so forth. "The notion of 'concentration,'" Stoy said, "has

¹ See p. 56.

A fear justified by the action of many young and enthusiastic Herbartians.

² See below, p. 54.

³ "Character-forming Instruction"—a technical Zillerian term. See note, p. 58.

been taken possession of by the forces of superficiality." "What is new in Ziller's proposals is not good, and what is good is not new."

4. *The Revival of Herbartianism—Friedrich Wilhelm Dörpfeld (1824-93).*

Dörpfeld was born at Wermelskirchen, Rhenish Prussia, in 1824. After an education in the schools of the locality he occupied several successive posts as teacher previous to entering on the main work of his life. It was in 1848 that, though still young, he was appointed, at the initiative of others, to the office of Principal or Rector of the Lutheran schools in Barmen (Rhenish Prussia). Other more lucrative posts he might have sought, but he never did so. His conviction of the true dignity and future independence of the educational profession was unusually intense. Though he was quite aware that the rewards it proffered were mainly subjective, we find him expressing his conviction of this dignity in a letter to his betrothed (a clergyman's daughter), who had not hesitated to suggest that there were better things in the world than schoolmastering.

Dörpfeld occupied his post for thirty-two years with success and ever-increasing influence. The educational works which came from his pen were extremely numerous and obtained a wide circulation.¹ In 1872 the Minister of Education (Falk), interested in Dörpfeld's efforts to bring about a unity in school work, officially invited him to put his views before an influential educational conference. "Concentration" was then, thanks to Ziller and Dörpfeld, "in the air". The compliment paid to Dörpfeld—an elementary schoolmaster—was, as he recognised, no small one: "Ein Schulmeister im Salon des Ministerhôtels—das war in Preussen ein fast erschreckendes Novum!"

¹ They are now published in ten volumes (Bertelsman, Gütersloh). The most famous are: *Thought and Memory* (five editions), *Outlines of a Theory of a Teaching-Plan* (two), *Didactic Materialism* (three), *Two Pressing Reforms* (three). Dörpfeld's literary activity has given rise to several thousand printed pages.

In 1880 ill-health caused Dörpfeld to give up his work at Barmen. He retired on his pension, and died in 1893.

He was a religious man, yet, like most Herbartians, he often took up an independent position relative to matters of Church and theology. He objected to the school being placed under the direct control and inspection of ministers of religion. Towards the end of his life, grieved at the alienation of the cultured classes from Christianity, he sought to discover an ethical common-ground on which all good men could stand, one that was independent of theological opinions.

As an Herbartian—though a critical and by no means bigoted one—he urged the need of “concentration,” but interpreted this in a somewhat different sense from Ziller. Indeed, he freely criticised Ziller’s proposals, though he recognised the brilliance and suggestiveness of his contemporary’s work. Like Ziller, he urged that the elementary school (people’s school, *Volksschule*) should not confine its operations to the “3 R’s”. Two of the “3 R’s” (Reading and Writing) are, *per se*, mere dexterities, and do not contribute directly to the knowledge and character of the pupils, while the third (Arithmetic) is a “formal” study and therefore, though highly necessary, is also deficient on the same ground. Apperception and many-sided Interest never get a fair chance in such schools. The most important of all subjects were, on Dörpfeld’s view, those which add to the mental and moral riches of the soul; subjects dealing with nature, man, and God. In quite the second rank come dexterities and formal studies.

His greatest service was probably his insistence on the need of a *Lehrplan*, a definitely thought-out scheme of studies in which every subject should have an organic place. He had no sympathy or patience with a loose *aggregate* of studies such as is indicated on the average British Time Table. In his own way he was as eager for “concentration” or unification as Ziller himself. Not only should the whole curriculum be unified, each department should undergo the same process. Bible and catechism, for example, should fit into each other and constitute a unity, the movement of thought being *from* biblical

stories to catechism, i.e., from concrete to abstract. Character-formation being the supreme aim of Education, "Religious Instruction," though not of a narrow dogmatic type, should have a central place in the curriculum, or rather should occupy the central place in company with the two other knowledge-departments above mentioned.

With respect to the other Zillerian doctrine, that of "culture stages," Dörpfeld occupied a position of friendly criticism. He saw that to limit, as Ziller suggested, each year's course to a definite historical circle would bring about a vivid and deep comprehension of the material; and the understanding of the child would broaden out securely and steadily as the historical matter advanced from step to step. But, on the other hand, the Zillerian plan left little or no room for recapitulation, and the material of the earlier stages would be easily forgotten when the later stages were being studied. Moreover, these earlier stages were less morally rich than the later ones. Some schools, again, did not possess eight classes. Dörpfeld therefore suggested a combination of the "culture-stages" method with the rival plan of "concentric circles," and strongly objected to the Zillerian exclusion of the New Testament from the lower classes. He criticised likewise the strange preference Ziller sometimes showed for the employment, in class, of a book rather than the living voice of the teacher, and while not wholly condemning the proposal to substitute fairy tales for Bible stories in the early years, he questioned the advisability of proposing so violent a change when other less contentious reforms were pressing for attention.

We have seen that he protested against the elevation of purely "formal" instruction¹ to the educational throne. He protested equally against "didactic materialism," the doctrine which only regards the quantity of subjects or of matter learnt, and ignores

¹ The view according to which the main function of Education must be to encourage certain *habits* of exactness, initiative, and so forth, even though little knowledge may be acquired. The extreme advocates of the "classics," and the extreme advocates of "heuristic methods," are, as we have seen, believers in "formal Education".

the mode of learning and the connection of subjects. In *Denken und Gedächtnis* Dörpfeld has given to the world what is, with perhaps one exception, the best exposition of the apperception process. He did much, also, to clarify the doctrine of the "formal steps".

The history of Education presents few men who have had so clear a view of the opposite dangers which beset the path of the teacher.

5. *The Revival of Herbartianism—Tuiskon Ziller (1817-82).*

Tuiskon Ziller was born at Wasungen (Thuringia) in 1817. After a careful education at the hands of his father, a Protestant clergyman, he proceeded to the gymnasium (grammar-school) at Meiningen, and subsequently to the University of Leipzig. At the latter he studied philology, and also became acquainted with the philosophy of Herbart through Hartenstein and Drobisch. But he was no narrow specialist; almost every available object of study attracted, to a certain extent, his versatile mind. But the death of his father occurred and this made Tuiskon the chief support of the family. Accordingly he became a teacher in the gymnasium at Meiningen and laboured at this work for five years—apparently with success, his moral earnestness and energy winning for him the high esteem of his pupils. The fact that Ziller was no mere theorist unacquainted with scholastic practice deserves to be kept in mind.

Returning to Leipzig, he took up juristic studies, and after a brief period of political activity became a "privat-docent" in Jurisprudence (1853). But his interest began to turn more and more to the working out of the Herbartian principles of Education. In 1863 he became a subordinate Professor, and his inaugural address bore witness to the nature of the task upon which he had now embarked. Its title was "The Present-day Efforts for Educational Reform according to Herbartian Principles."

But it was in 1856 that he published his first important pedagogical work, *Introduction to General Pedagogy*, which, however, was far eclipsed in power and popularity by the epoch-

making work of 550 pages, *Foundation of a System of Educative Instruction*¹ (1864), a work of which Dörpfeld boldly says that in originality, penetration, and richness of thought it is without a rival in pedagogical literature.² In 1857 he had published *The Discipline of Children*, while in 1876 followed his *Lectures on General Pedagogy*. This work has reached a third edition.

“Educative Instruction.” The phrase conveys no meaning to English minds. But a reference to section 2 will make things clear. If the goal of Education be, as Herbart contends, Morality or Character, and if the chief means to this end is Instruction, then any Instruction which conduces to Character is “educative,” and any Instruction which does not conduce to Character is non-educative. “Educative Instruction”³ is Instruction which, by way of many-sided Interest, makes for Character. Here we have the keynote to Ziller’s work and the source of the Herbartian zeal.

Like Herbart and like Stoy, Ziller had no intention of confining his pedagogical labours to lectures and authorship. A “Seminar” with practising-school was brought into existence (1862). But difficulties were many. The University gave no support to the project of training teachers, for teaching, in Germany as in England, had always been a sort of “poor relation” among the professions. The State was equally backward in encouraging the reformer. But Ziller was a man of unbounded energy, egotism, and self-confidence; aided by two citizens of Leipzig he succeeded at last in his worthy project. Criticism lessons were given; conferences were held; enthusiasm grew. Clearly this man had a magnetic personality, otherwise he could never have generated out of the materials at his disposal the life and energy which were soon to manifest themselves in extreme forms. The institution itself consisted of two or three moderate-sized rooms on the ground-floor, a limited

¹ *Grundlegung zur Lehre vom Erziehenden Unterricht*. (2nd edition, 1884.)

² *Der didaktische Materialismus*, p. 3.

³ *Erziehender Unterricht*.

playground, a modest garden and—a cellar for the use of teachers! The gloomy steps leading down to the last-mentioned were jestingly compared by new-comers with the “formal steps” of Instruction, whose obscurity was supposed to rival that of the more material *escalier*. Ziller’s chief supporter was Dr. Barth, formerly head teacher in Stoy’s Seminar at Jena.

It was amid such unpromising surroundings that Herbartianism experienced its second birth. The extraordinary personality of Ziller was responsible for the powerful movement which arose. His moral Idealism and unconquerable enthusiasm drew to him many of the best students at Leipsig. He was an optimist and a prophet. He had no doubts. Education was to regenerate the world. He was a fervid Christian, yet no bigot. By the more narrow-minded among the Lutherans he was dubbed “rationalist” because he would not admit that the Bible gave the key to every science and because he refused to approve of it as suitable food for babes. “Free-thinkers,” on the other hand, despite the existence in Ziller’s system of a *souppçon* of Darwinism, despised him as a “pietist”.

More momentous in some respects than any of Ziller’s other achievements was his founding of the “Union for Scientific Pedagogy”¹ (1868). The publications of this society and the annual reports of its proceedings introduced Zillerianism to a wide circle of readers. But the chief significance of the matter lay in the *name* of the society. The claim of the Zillerians to be “scientific” teachers was pregnant with results. Those who refused to acknowledge the supremacy of the new Leipzig gospel protested vigorously, often bitterly, against the claim. But Ziller’s party have stuck to the name. Nay, not content with thus *implicitly* reflecting upon the methods of non-Zillerians, they have gone so far as to dub their critics “vulgar pedagogues,”² “mere practitioners,” “mercenaries,” “people

¹ *Verein für wissenschaftliche Pädagogik*. Stoy and his adherents belonged to it, but many of them gradually seceded.

² Dr. Wesendonck (*Die Schule Herbart-Ziller und ihre Jünger*) believes that this dyslogistic phrase originated among the Stoy section of Herbartians.

whose mental horizon ends with their noses," "ignoramuses," and "literary nullities" to whom "Pedagogy is an El Dorado of Dilettantism!"

The truth is that most reforming movements, especially such as are inspired by a warm and worthy enthusiasm, easily come to manifest signs of arrogance and bigotry. The Zillerians felt themselves called to save Germany by the preaching of a new educational gospel. They felt that their motives were good; they believed that their methods were philosophical and scientific. Around them they saw apathy and empiricism. They criticised; their criticisms were thrown back upon them; they retorted; the tone of both parties became more and more bitter; the reformers were not unjustly dubbed "bigots" and "fanatics"; they retorted upon their critics the perhaps equally just charges of apathy, ignorance, and narrow professionalism. And thus the controversy has gone on to the present day.

Herbartianism, with all its faults, is a *system*, apparently the only educational system in existence which has at the same time a definite psychology, a vast and fairly coherent mass of literature, a considerable number of journals devoted to its cause, a series of great names—above all, the power of rousing enthusiasm! It has a clearly defined aim: it knows its mind: it is in earnest. Unfortunately its arrogance has been almost unbounded, and has alienated thousands of teachers who, had they not been scolded, might have become supporters. But the story of the controversy between the "scientific" and the "vulgar" pedagogues will be told in a following section and need not here be anticipated. Let us return to Ziller.

His Union soon numbered five hundred members, and its influence extended into Austria and Switzerland.¹ Ziller's success, be it noted, was not the result of his own eloquence or of any extraneous assistance. He had even to struggle for the correct oral utterance of his thoughts; he was deaf. His Seminar was—what we have seen! Clearly, then, the

¹Where an Herbartian journal was established—*Swiss Pages for Educative Instruction*.

influence of this man was due either to the force of his ideas or to the force of his personality, or to both. A Zillerian, wherever he goes and whatever his faults, is always an enthusiast.

In 1881 the Leipzig Seminar celebrated its twentieth birthday. From various parts of Germany came past students anxious to show their esteem for the institute and its chief. But soon after this an apoplectic stroke reduced that chief to comparative inactivity. He struggled on with the production of the current Year-book of his Union, and died at his task (1882).

6. *Outline of Ziller's Doctrines.*

Even more emphatically than Herbart, Ziller held to the view that the true end of Education is moral. He went so far as to define it as the establishment of the "Kingdom of God on earth," conceived, of course, after the manner of a cultured Protestant Lutheran.

Herbart's psychology was, as we have seen, a presentational psychology. "Action springs out of the circle of thought"; hence the main work of the educator is the formation of this "circle of thought". But every circle has a centre, and if the pupil's "circle of thought" is to be orderly and truly effectual in the production of virtue, its *centre* must be especially rich in "educative" material. Here we come upon a characteristic Zillerian doctrine; at the very centre of all Instruction must lie "Gesinnungs-unterricht,"¹ character-building Instruction.

But what kind of Instruction is specially "Character-building"? Instruction of an historical, biographical, or narrative kind, including "sacred" history, and, for very young children, fairy tales and sagas. Ziller's emphasis on the character-forming function of such material is to some, though not a great

¹ There is no possibility of an exact English translation of this phrase. It is a technical phrase, peculiar to Herbartianism. Its meaning will become clearer as we proceed. Perhaps "humanities," as Dr. Findlay suggests, may be the best translation.

extent in agreement with the old "humanistic" doctrine. This material, then, must be the very centre of our curriculum.

But our Instruction must form a unity if Apperception is to take place and Interest to be created. It will never do to allow our *Gesinnungs-unterricht* to be separated by hard and fast lines from other subjects. We must unite all our instruction together by means of innumerable connections, and especially unite it to the central matter. In this way the pupil's "circle of thought" will become a real unity, and hence action also will become regular and precise. On the other hand, if the child has various "circles of thought" his character must necessarily be devoid of stability.

[This "concentration" doctrine is Zillerian; it cannot be found in Herbart, though possibly it can be deduced from his doctrine that large, unbroken masses of thought are necessary for moral action. The reader must note the significance of the result thus attained. Certain subjects (*e.g.*, Mathematics) will cease to be cultivated in the school as *independent* departments of activity; they will have to be attached to the central matter and be dominated by this. Ziller's critics strongly objected to such a proposal, and succeeding Zillerians have gradually abandoned or modified it. Herbart certainly never contemplated a positive degradation of Mathematics. On the other hand, Mathematics undoubtedly gains in interest, during the early stages, by being kept in close connection with the concrete.]

Another characteristic Zillerian doctrine is that of "historical culture stages," supposed to be in part a scientific corollary from Herbart's "apperception" teaching. Matter has to be presented to the child of such quality and amount as to be readily assimilated or "apperceived". Hence what is to be presented to the child of six must be very different from what is presented to the child of twelve. The child goes through definite stages of development and these stages, according to Goethe and others,¹ are identical, in

¹ *E.g.*, Modern biologists *par excellence*. Spencer says, here agreeing in principle with Ziller: "The education of the child must accord both in

epitome, with the stages through which the race has gone historically. The two lines of development run parallel. Hence if we are to expect easy and ready "apperception" on the part of our pupils, we must reproduce, in our school instruction, the stages of race development. The teacher must present to very young pupils matter similar to that which primitive man understood; with older pupils matter corresponding to later stages of civilisation; and so on.

[This sweeping doctrine—in essence perhaps more Fröbelian than Herbartian—is, no doubt, "scientific" in conception, though the precise proposals of Ziller have awakened fierce criticism.]

Coming to details of the material recommended by Ziller for *Gesinnungs-unterricht*, we find the following:—

1st school year,	12 of Grimm's Märchen (Fairy tales).	
2nd	„	Robinson Crusoe.
3rd	„	The Patriarchs.
4th	„	The Judges.
5th	„	The Kings.
6th	„	The Life of Jesus.
7th	„	The Apostles.
8th	„	The Reformation.

} Together with "secular" history selected in a similar manner.

This selection is regarded by Ziller as corresponding to eight stages of racial development, and therefore as also suitable for the instruction of children at eight different periods. The above material has to form the very centre of the school curriculum. The fairy tales represent the youth of the world; Robinson Crusoe represents primitive man learning the use of tools; the patriarchs represent the nomadic stage, and so forth.

[There is here ample ground for criticism. Is the matter suitably selected? Is it right, say Protestants, to exclude the Bible from stages (1) and (2), and to give only one year (6) to the life of Jesus? Catholics will object to stage (8) and "secularists" to any use of the Bible.]

mode and arrangement with the education of mankind considered historically. In other words, the genesis of knowledge in the individual must follow the same course as the genesis of knowledge in the race."—*Education*, p. 67.

Ziller and his followers enthusiastically accepted Herbart's scheme of "formal steps" and improved on it.

Ziller also accepted the "Interest" doctrine and elaborated it greatly, showing¹ how Interest is a "protection against passions," "an aid to one's earthly activity," and a "salvation amid the storms of fate". In fact, Interest is an important stepping-stone to, or ingredient in, Virtue.

7. *Reaction and Controversy.*²

We now approach the most critical period in the history of Herbartianism, the years 1884-6.

For a time all had gone well. Stoy at Jena, and, still more, Ziller at Leipzig had won for Herbartianism or neo-Herbartianism a position of influence. In the Rhine provinces Dörpfeld as an independent-minded Herbartian and a practical educationist of no mean ability, had exerted an influence scarcely, if at all, less than that of the two professors further east. Adherents of Herbartianism were reckoned by hundreds and probably numbered thousands. Though distinctively Protestant in inception, the new creed obtained some adherents among Catholics; Vogt, the successor of Ziller in the Presidency of the "Union for Scientific Pedagogy," was a Catholic, and Willmann, a Professor at Prague, also belonged and belongs to the older church. Though Germany was the headquarters of the system, almost every country of Europe (and some outside of Europe) had its contingent of Herbartian students. In the work entitled *Herbart and the Herbartians* (published by Beyer and Söhne, Langensalza) over a hundred quarto pages, containing nothing but a list of Herbartian literature, German, French, Italian, Roumanian, English (or rather mainly American), Bohemian, Dutch, Armenian, Danish, Swiss, Croatian, and Hungarian, bear

¹ In an exposition extending over two hundred pages of his *Grundlegung zur Lehre vom ersiehenden Unterricht*.

² It was during the controversies mentioned in this section that Dr. Klemm arrived in Europe. He refers to them in his work *European Schools*. "I left the bookstore with an armful of pamphlets and books, and poorer by thirty-five marks" (p. 40).

witness to the cosmopolitan nature of the movement. But the four countries into which the Herbartian influence more especially extended appear to have been Switzerland, Austria, Hungary, and America.

Why this popularity? Because, as already pointed out, Herbartianism was a *system*, and there was no other well-marked educational system in existence, though fragments of systems were plentiful. Herbartianism had its great names and great ideas; above all, it had force and enthusiasm. Possibly, too, its technical terminology, though repellent to many students, was attractive to others, and the enemies of the system have even accused its supporters of a love of obscurity for its own sake, or for the sake of the philosophic depth which obscurity is supposed to suggest.

But internal dissensions and external attacks were now imminent. The more moderate Herbartians led by Stoy gradually found themselves more and more outnumbered, within the "Union for Scientific Pedagogy," by the Zillerian extremists. The Herbartian press (which at present numbers eight or nine journals) was even richer in production then than now, but it was very largely in the hands of Zillerians.¹ Doctrines like those of the "historical culture stages" and "concentration centres"—doctrines not very distinctly found in Herbart's own works—won but little acceptance from the more moderate section, but were enthusiastically championed as the only orthodoxy by many of Ziller's own followers. Among these latter were Vogt, Rein, the two Wigets, Barth, Thrändorf, Just, Zillig, Ackermann, Niederley, Beyer, Bliedner, Grabs, Lange, Flügel, Pickel, Thilo, Staude, Conrad, and Florin, while among the Herbartians or semi-Herbartians who refused slavishly to follow Ziller were Dörpfeld, Sallwürk, Strümpell, Kern, Frick, Wiessner, Schumann, Credner, and Fröhlich; some of these would be regarded as followers of Stoy.

¹The Year-books of the Union were edited by Ziller; *Pädagogische Studien* by Rein; *Erziehungsschule* by Barth. Stoy's own journal, *Allgemeine Schulzeitung*, expired in 1882.

The great offence which the Zillerians committed was, as we have seen, to claim to be alone "scientific". This word was inscribed on the name of their Union and on the covers of their journal. Their leader had pronounced the vast majority of German teachers to be "vulgar pedagogues," "mercenaries," and so forth, and the German schools to be, for the most part, "un-educative" (in the Herbartian sense). That leader died in 1882 before the storm burst in full fury. On his death his Seminar, like the previous ones of Herbart and Stoy, ceased to exist; but the "Union for Scientific Pedagogy" still held its ground, Professor Vogt of Vienna, a Catholic, but a devoted Zillerian, taking the place vacated by Ziller, which, in justice, ought, perhaps, to have fallen to the veteran Stoy. But the breach between the moderate and the extreme sections was now clearly marked.

As early as 1880 Dr. von Sallwürk,¹ of Carlsruhe, though himself a member of Ziller's Union, had protested, in an anonymous work entitled *Herbart and his Disciples*, against the arrogance of the extremists and their efforts to obtain patronage from the State. This was a signal for a number of similar attacks. In 1881 Dr. Bartels, speaking at a teachers' conference in Carlsruhe, raised objections to "concentration" and other doctrines of Ziller, declaring them to be artificial and impracticable. Dr. Sander, of Breslau, raised similar protests, while praising in no stinted terms the industry and enthusiasm of Ziller. Fröhlich, another member of the Union, expressed (1883), in a work entitled *The Scientific Pedagogy represented in its Fundamental Doctrines and elucidated by Examples*, his disapproval of the arrogance of the Zillerians. He, like Sallwürk, had once been a follower of Ziller, but his zeal had cooled, and had given place to a critical, though still respectful, attitude of mind. Especially did he protest against the "concentration" doctrine as containing "a whole nest of

Now one of the most eminent educationists in Germany, editor of Herbart's works, contributor to the magnificent *Encyclopædisches Handbuch der Pädagogik*, etc.

singularities".¹ The "historical culture stages" doctrine and the doctrine of *Gesinnungs-unterricht* also came in for criticism.

Even enthusiastic and avowed Zillerians had not scrupled to modify the proposals of their master. In 1878 and the following years appeared the important work of Dr. Rein and his colleagues, *Theory and Practice of Instruction in the Elementary School according to Herbartian Principles*.² In this work, perhaps the most comprehensive and laborious which has proceeded from the Herbartian school (besides a copious historical and general introduction it gives complete courses for all eight school years), we find Ziller's scheme already altered in several important respects. The possibility of having *one* single centre of instruction was abandoned; that is to say, a perfect system of "concentration" was admitted to be impossible. Even Ziller himself had shown signs of wholesome and increasing modesty, and had admitted (*e.g.*, in the Year-book of 1881, and earlier in a reply to Andreas, 1878) that "concentration" in the original sense could not be carried out, and that each subject of instruction must retain its own character, and not be entirely subordinated to the claims and methods of *Gesinnungs-unterricht*.

But a more pronounced opponent than any hitherto mentioned was now coming forward. Dittes, in 1870, had interrogated Ziller as to certain obscurities in the "Year-book" of the Union. Ziller's reply (in Stoy's *Schulzeitung*, 1871) is declared by an anti-Zillerian³ to have been "angry" and "offensive".⁴ Other controversies followed between the two; and in 1881 Dittes, in his journal *Pädagogium*, called attention to Sallwürk's attack (see above), and in 1884 to that of Fröhlich. Dittes, who was a Vienna educationist of no mean standing, was especially indignant at the Zillerian claim to be alone "scientific".

He now devoted himself to a thorough criticism of the Herbartian principles. His chief articles upon the subject appeared

¹ Ein ganzes Nest von Sonderbarkeiten.

² *Theorie und Praxis des Volksschul-unterrichts nach Herbartischen Grundsätzen.*

³ Wesendonck. *The Schule Herbart-Ziller*, p. 33.

⁴ "Geharnischt" and "widerwärtig".

in *Pädagogium*, 1885-6. They were the signal for a whole series of attacks and counter-attacks distinguished by no small degree of acerbity on both sides.

Fröhlich, who had hitherto been treated with frosty indulgence by the Zillerians, now, on the appearance of Dittes in the field, came in for his share of condemnation. Zillig, one of the ablest of Ziller's followers, replied to the ex-Zillerian in the pages of *Pädagogischen Studien* (1884); while the pens of Rein (*ibid.*), Beyer (*Erziehungsschule*), Thrändorf (*ibid.*), and Vogt (in the "Elucidations" of the "Year-book") followed suit in the Zillerian defence. The controversy was a typical one. Dittes, in the opinion of Thrändorf, was a "pope" "hurling thunderbolts," etc.; in the opinion of Vogt, guilty of "crafty mendacity,"¹ etc., and deserving, in consequence of his "radicalism," to see his journal (*Pädagogium*) confiscated by a respectable Government which wages war against socialism, anarchism, and other destructive forces.

There was really nothing in the articles of Dittes to have called forth such language. He was scrupulously respectful towards Herbart, freely and frankly admitting the value of certain of his proposals. Not a word of abuse or ill-taste can be found in his seven or eight articles. Why then the severity of the Zillerian rejoinder?

We must take the Germans as we find them. They love controversy. Their minds are alive. They are strong partisans. Their polemical vocabulary is ample. Their methods are such as would scarcely be possible in England. Whether, when they accuse each other of "mendacity," "ignorance," "folly," etc., they are to be taken quite seriously, may be doubted. But certain it is that the amount of educational literature in Germany is so enormous as to betoken an interest in Education of which we in England have not the faintest conception. Now interest in a subject easily degenerates into fanaticism, and when, as with the Herbartian movement, a deep moral motive is present, this fanaticism may take extreme forms.

¹ Arglistige Verlogenheit,

In these controversies the best of the argument was often on the side of the Herbart-Ziller party. But truth compels the confession that most of the ill-manners was also on the same side. The reason we have seen. The zeal of these men was so intense as to generate bitterness and intolerance towards those who, less earnest, as they thought, than themselves, were engaged in pouring the cold water of criticism upon the new Gospel. "Away with your petty criticisms! Men are perishing." Some such feeling as that here represented lay at the base of Herbartian intolerance.

Probably if a school of educational workers were to arise in *our* country animated by the same spirit of moral reform which pervades Herbartianism, history would repeat itself. Apathy, ignorance, professional "touchiness" and conceit, would all be thrown into the scale against the new movement. "Who are you that you should try to teach us who have been schoolmasters for thirty years?" would be the cry from thousands of teachers who, in all their lives, had never given, or perhaps had never had the opportunity to give, an hour's serious and independent thought to their professional work. Small wonder if the new enthusiasts responded with accusations of narrow-mindedness and unintelligence, or dubbed the critics "vulgar pedagogues," "mere practitioners," "people whose mental horizon ended with their noses," and so forth. The latter label, indeed, would not be inappropriate if fixed upon some present-day schoolmasters, who, as Professor Adams says,¹ can be shown to be, with all their modesty, "arrogant and intolerant empirics".

Considerations such as these throw light upon Herbartian intolerance, though without entirely excusing it. A body of moral and educational reformers faced by the problem of comparative apathy among teachers, and yet conscious of a high mission, almost inevitably developed a tone of arrogance and contempt. Their earnestness blinded them to the value of the work of non-Herbartians; they became morbidly sensitive to criticism, and could see nothing in it but the selfish cry of time-servers and mercenaries, "Trouble us not".

¹ *Herbartian Psychology*, p. 5.

8. *More Controversy.*

To resume our historical survey.

Little need be said as to the progress of the Herbartian movement in Switzerland. The Protestant cantons were somewhat receptive, and one of the ablest of the Zillerians, Theodor Wiget, founded and edited a journal in the interests of the new Gospel.¹ A critic appeared in the person of Kuoni (1883).

About the same time a conference of Saxony school directors discussed the question, "How far are the Herbart-Stoy-Ziller principles to be applied in the higher schools?" and reports came in from various sides. On the whole the verdict of the conference was favourable, though Herbart's psychology was condemned as one-sided and "unchristian," and certain of Ziller's proposals, such as "concentration," came in for criticism.

Simultaneously with the *Pädagogium* articles of Dittes appeared an able work by Dr. Bartels, entitled *The Applicability of the Herbart-Ziller-Stoy Principles of Teaching to Instruction in Lower Schools*.

Bartels saw the good points in Herbartianism, but showed that many of its doctrines were not by any means absolutely original. He put in a word for the doctrine of "concentric circles"² (the polar opposite of the "culture epochs" doctrine and strongly opposed by Zillerians). He approved of the "formal steps" doctrine, though he saw that it could easily degenerate into rigid formalism. The "culture steps" doctrine he attacked. Finally he claimed that the Zillerian proposals could not possibly be carried into complete execution. "Not pretty words but *deeds* do we wish to see." He was answered by Göpfert.

Readers of the present work have probably now learnt enough upon the subject of the Herbartian controversies in Germany.

¹ *Swiss Pages for Educative Instruction.*

² The doctrine that the youngest pupils should be taught a little matter which is to be increased and recapitulated as they go up the school, the instruction widening out, so to speak, from a fixed centre. The Zillerians select *special* matter for each year.

In truth the story is a long and, to some extent, a wearisome one. The same points which were agitated in 1882 are being agitated at the present moment, the same arguments are being brought forward, the same charges being made, now as then. Wearisome, truly, and yet interesting in a way, for such a wealth of controversial zeal and such irrefragable indications of interest in education are simply unintelligible in our country. We cannot imagine what these Germans have to write about. But they *do* write, and they *do* think; and though much of their writing and thinking is but going over old ground it is not old ground to British readers.

There is little need to consider the controversies which followed upon the time at which we have arrived, though one which centred round the name of Dr. Just of Altenburg (an able living Zillerian) might have merited some attention.

Rissmann's name should also be mentioned. Though he has contributed no large work to the Herbartian question, he has vigorously attacked the Zillerians in a series of articles which, commencing in 1880, have appeared in various journals for years past. His arguments are the old ones: that the Zillerians are arrogant, their theories insecure owing to the comparative neglect of the teachings of experience, the claims of society are ignored in favour of those of the individual, and so forth. Other anti-Zillerians who wrote during the critical years of Herbartianism were Willmann (an Herbartian but not a bigoted one), Wesendonck¹ (a frequent contributor to Dittes' journal, *Pädagogium*), and Ostermann. The latter writer published in 1884 a very important and valuable criticism of the psychology of the Herbartian school under the title, *The Chief Errors of the Herbartian Psychology and their Pedagogical Consequences*.² This was a very necessary piece of work; for though Herbart's psychology had often been criticised by professional philoso-

¹ The present writer is much indebted to Wesendonck's articles for information on the history of the Herbartian controversy.

² *Die hauptsächlichsten Irrtümer der Herbartschen Psychologie und ihre pädagogischen Konsequenzen* (Schulztesche Hof-Buchhandlung, Oldenburg).

phers, and though incidental criticisms had appeared in pedagogical books and articles, apparently no writer had attempted a complete popular investigation of the whole psychological side of Herbart's work. Ostermann performed his task well. He showed how impossible it was to resolve the whole mental life into a presentational series: how, if the attempt be made, it results in an undervaluing of the other sides of mental life (Feeling, etc.) and also an undervaluing of physical Education; and how the later psychologists of the Herbartian school have substantially departed from the purely presentational standpoint of their master. He draws the inference that this standpoint is clearly an impossible one. His work is one of the few which are absolutely indispensable to the student of the Herbartian question.¹

And so the controversy has gone on down to the present time. Men come forward with attacks upon Herbart's psychology or Ziller's "culture steps" doctrine: they retail the old arguments; they receive the same answers. What happened in the case of Ostermann happened more recently in the case of Professor Paul Natorp, of Marburg, who, in 1897, delivered a course of eight pedagogical lectures during the vacation at that University. He took for their title, *Herbart, Pestalozzi and the Present-day Problems of Educational Doctrine*; ² dealt with the question mainly from the philosophical standpoint; claimed (as a Neo-Kantian) that Will rather than presentations should receive the chief stress in any educational doctrine, and finally urged that Pestalozzi's standpoint was sounder and more philosophic than Herbart's. Natorp's work is more important from the standpoint of theory than from that of practice in

¹ The Herbartian defence against Ostermann fell to Pastor O. Flügel. In 1887 appeared his *Ostermann über Herbarts Psychologie* (Beyer, Langensalza); Ostermann replied with *Zur Herbart-Frage* (Schulztesche Hof-Buchhandlung, Oldenburg, 1888); Flügel followed in the *Zeitschrift für Exakte Philosophie*, 1888; and Ostermann gave the final touches in the *Pädagogischen Jahresbericht*, 1888.

² *Herbart, Pestalozzi und die heutigen Aufgaben der Erziehungslehre* (Fromman, Stuttgart).

the narrower sense, and he hardly mentions Ziller. This is always a mistake ; for the Herbartian system is *par excellence* a pedagogical system, and on its excellence as such it must stand or fall. Doubtless its philosophical "foundations" have to be reckoned with, but it is a mistake to suppose that the imperfection of these supposed foundations is necessarily traceable also in the superstructure. Historically, we have seen, Herbartianism began as a pedagogical system, and its philosophical principles were *sought for subsequently*. Possibly, therefore, considerable modifications in the presentational doctrine of the founder may be made without any danger to the system as a whole.

This fact is not, perhaps, adequately recognised even by leading Herbartians. At any rate Natorp's attack, like the previous attacks of Dittes, Ostermann, and others, gave rise to spirited rejoinders from the leaders of the school. These rejoinders appeared in the *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Pädagogik* of 1899, and came from the pens of Willmann, Flügel, Just, and Rein.

Among other recent opponents of the new school of pedagogy may be mentioned Bergemann and Linde, both of whom have made suggestive criticisms, though most of these may be found, if sought for, in earlier writings. Still, a student interested in the most recent treatment of the problems may be referred to these two writers, who show a welcome tendency to avoid metaphysics.¹

9. Present Position of Herbartianism in Germany.

The present tendency of the Herbartian movement is in the direction of a practical grappling with the detailed problems of school life. From Herbart's "reals" to the teaching of

¹ Special mention should be made of Linde's *Der darstellende Unterricht* (Brandstetter, Leipzig) and Bergemann's *Die Lehre von den formalen und den kulturhistorischen Stufen* (Haacke, Leipzig). Both writers have also contributed voluminously to *Neue Bahnen* and other anti-Herbartian journals.

Drawing is a far cry. The Herbartians feel this. They still enter, on occasion, into the metaphysical territory, but their main interest is, as it should be, the improvement of school method. In one department of school work their labours have been specially notable—the department of Religious Instruction. Whatever opinions may be held on this subject, all will agree that if Religious Instruction be given at all it should be given as well and as thoughtfully as possible. The Herbartians, in their zeal for character-forming, have noted the inefficiency and absurdity of much of the teaching given under the ægis of the Lutheran Church. Thus they have attacked catechism-teaching and mechanical memorising as unpsychological, and have advocated a more careful selection of material than is customary. Especially have Ziller's proposals roused keen discussion, and improvements are bound to follow. Dörpfeld, too, was a prominent advocate of reform in Religious Instruction.

The result is that from the Herbartians have come, of recent years, many first-class school-books dealing with this subject. The three-volumed work of Dr. Staude (*Preparations for the Biblical History of the Old and New Testament*) has gone through eleven or twelve editions; a laborious and thorough work it is; orthodox, yet suggestive. But Thrändorf and Meltzer have gone further than Staude, as, for example, in their work, *Religious Instruction at the Middle Stage of the Lower School and in the Lower Classes of Higher Schools — Preparations on a Psychological Method*. Their "method" is not only psychological, for the existence of modern critical problems is by no means unrecognised in this work, and great theological writers like Wellhausen are frequently referred to. The second volume of this work is devoted to the prophets, an almost wholly unexplored region for English teachers and pupils.

Still more revolutionary are the works of Dr. Heyn.¹ These are for the teachers of the highest classes in schools. There is absolutely nothing in English which is comparable, in learning,

¹ *Geschichte Israels, Geschichte Jesu.*

in skilfulness of treatment, and in rich suggestiveness with these works. The youths who are instructed on Dr. Heyn's plan must become equal in knowledge of the Bible to the majority of English ministers of religion. Let us picture for the moment boys in our Grammar Schools being inoculated with Holzmann, Nippold, Wellhausen, Weiss, and Harnack! Such a procedure may be wise or unwise; it is certainly striking.¹

The works of Staude, Thrändorf, Meltzer, and Heyn are types of the kind of school-book now being yearly brought out by the Herbartians. Each lesson is worked out on the "formal steps" principle. But merely to mention the various works which have appeared on the subject of biblical teaching *during the past four or five years* would fill several pages of this book. Five or six works on the life of Jesus appeared almost within a single year, any one of which would excel in boldness and thoroughness of treatment any school-book we possess on the subject.

Religious Instruction is not the only subject at which the Herbartians are working hard, but it is perhaps the one in which their efforts appear most original. Articles and books come almost daily from their press dealing with every department of school activity. Metaphysics, psychology, and ethics are left to Pastor Flügel and other recognised veterans who have survived the older battles; the younger Herbartians are "practical men," only, unlike the "practical" teachers of some countries, these young Herbartians *have* principles of their own. In the present-day Herbartian movement Theory and Practice have at last met on equal terms.

"What then," it may be asked, "is the future of Herbartianism?" The question is no easy one to answer. There is much difficulty in ascertaining the precise number of adherents which Herbartianism possesses even if we consider only its native country. The difficulty arises from two facts. First, as

¹ Some selections from Heyn are to be found in the present writer's book published last year (*The Reform of Moral and Biblical Education*).

we have seen, a teacher may belong to an Herbartian Society—even to the most extreme society, Ziller's Union—without being committed to an approval of all the proposals put forward by the leaders of the movement. Secondly, there is every reason to believe that many teachers are in sympathy with Herbartianism who are quite unconnected with any organisation. These two facts tend, of course, to neutralise each other. Of the two, probably the second is the more important. However, there seems every reason to believe that several thousands of German teachers draw their inspiration from Herbart and his followers, Stoy, Ziller, and Dörpfeld. Several hundred belong to Ziller's Union, several hundred more to the Westphalian and Thuringian Societies, several hundred more to other societies.

Are the Herbartian teachers of the elementary or of the secondary grade? Of both. Herbartianism has a peculiar adaptedness to elementary schools. But in Germany, as in England, teachers in such schools are for various reasons not so able or willing to adopt new proposals as teachers in higher schools. Still an appreciable influence has been exerted by Herbartianism upon the lower grades of Education, though possibly a still greater influence has been exerted upon the higher or secondary grades.

The second test of the condition of present-day Herbartianism is its literary output. This has been already mentioned in referring to Religious Instruction. But a few further rough statistics may be given.

Quoting from *Die Herbartische Pädagogik in der Litteratur* (a supplement to *Herbart und die Herbartianer*), we find that from 1895 to 1899 about 200 books or articles came from the Herbartian School dealing with *general* pedagogical questions; about 160 dealing with the various parts of *Gesinnungs-unterricht*, especially biblical teaching and history; considerable numbers dealing with drawing, languages, geography, science, and especially mathematics. Other books and articles deal with discipline, athletics, the philosophy and history of Education, and so forth.

The German Herbartians alone produce certainly ten times

as many serious contributions to educational literature as all the teachers of Britain. Under "serious contributions" there is no need to include "reading-books," "exercises in arithmetic," and so forth.

New men have taken the places vacated by Stoy, Dörpfeld and Ziller. Dr. Rein maintains the Zillerian banner at Jena; and though Dr. Frick, once "the best-hated pedagogue in Prussia," and the head of the great "Francke Stiftungen" at Halle, is no more,¹ men like Ackermann, Just, Ufer, Lange, Sallwürk and Beyer live on, and others are rising to hand down the Herbartian—in some cases the Zillerian—tradition. Though its pages are not confined to Herbartian writers, the *Encyclopädisches Handbuch der Pädagogik* is really a magnificent tribute to Herbartian zeal.

10. Herbartianism in Britain.

In the British Isles Herbartianism—mainly in the form of Zillerianism—obtained a precarious foothold some years ago. Precarious; for the origin of the movement was scarcely recognised and its philosophical meaning almost wholly ignored. Still, one is bound to recognise in the scheme adopted some time back by the Halifax School Board an honest attempt to unify or "concentrate" the curriculum. Thus the history and geography of Scotland were taught in connection with each other; ancient weapons of war (used at Bannockburn, etc.) were to be drawn by the children, while maps of the Scottish river-basins, plans of battles, composition themes, reading-books, and pieces for recitation were all to be made or selected in accordance with the same general scheme. Praiseworthy though the attempt was, it does not appear to have won the favour of the teachers; whether this fact is a reflection on the scheme or on the teachers need not be discussed. In other places a more partial "concentration" has been or is being attempted; com-

¹ For details of Dr. Frick's work see De Garmo's *Herbart and the Herbartians*, and Klemm's *European Schools*. For Dr. Rein's work at Jena consult De Garmo, or Miss Dodd's *Introduction*.

position themes are being selected from the subject matter of other lessons ; history and geography, sometimes literature also, are kept more or less in relation to each other. But, on the whole, though Professor Armstrong may pour contempt upon the plan of "chopping our lives up into three-quarters-of-an-hour sections, during each of which we do something different," and may urge the necessity for assimilating scholastic procedure to the methods of ordinary life,¹ the rigidity of the time-table seems to defy serious attack. Partly this is due to governmental necessities, but largely also to lack of culture and want of mental elasticity on the part of teachers.

In the higher departments of educational work we see distinct signs that the rigid barriers once existent even between kindred subjects are being broken down, and that the need for grouping together such subjects is becoming recognised. The Matriculation Examination of the University of London has borne witness to this tendency, as, for example, when history and geography were grouped together, and "general elementary science" rather than any definite branch of science was prescribed. Workshop practice, "Sloyd," etc., are being made to bear upon the needs of the physical laboratory;² reading books are becoming less "scrappy"; the partitions between different branches of mathematics are, thanks to Mr. Branford,³ Professor Perry, and others, being removed, and possibly before long the absurdity of employing a science teacher distinct from the teacher of mathematics will become obvious. The increasing importance now being attached to a general subject like "Nature Study" also witnesses to a growing feeling that knowledge should be unified to the highest possible degree, and, indeed, one of its advocates has suggested it as a focus for the curriculum.⁴

The other Zillerian doctrine—that of "culture stages"—has

¹ Professor Laurie says somewhere in his *Institutes*, "life and the school should be never disjointed".

² Findlay, *Principles of Class Teaching*, p. 359.

³ *Journal of Education*, September, 1898.

⁴ Professor Patrick Geddes. See the present writer's *Student's Herbart*, p. 74.

also obtained some recognition, though possibly the impulse in this case has not come exclusively from Germany, but has rather resulted from the general spread of evolutionary thought. Certain it is that Herbert Spencer proclaimed the essential features of the doctrine some years before Zillerianism became influential in Germany. In point of fact the claim for priority is here rather ridiculous, as the doctrine is traceable in many writers who lived long before either Spencer or Ziller; in Goethe, in Lessing, even in Clement of Alexandria.

But the books which, written in English, bear the clearest signs of Zillerian influence are not often English books, except in such cases as that of Miss Dodd's *Introduction to Herbartian Principles of Teaching*, where the influence is admitted on the title page. They are American. Dr. Adler's book,¹ for example, and the recently published collection of essays on Religious Education edited by Bishop Potter,² could scarcely have been produced in a country like England, where neither teachers nor professors of Education concern themselves with problems of the kind therein discussed.³ Canon Bell's *Religious Education in Secondary Schools*⁴ shows what might be thought to be (when looked at through a magnifying glass) a few traces of Zillerianism, as when, for example, he points out that the Old Testament has a certain affinity with the moral nature of young people. Much more distinctly is the "culture stages" doctrine recognisable in the new movement for reformed mathematical and science teaching. Men are beginning to preach that the child in its educational development must, to a certain

¹ *The Moral Instruction of Children* (Arnold).

² *Principles of Religious Education* (Longmans). See Dr. Stanley Hall's essay and especially the words already quoted: "The child has to repeat a great many pre-Christian stages of evolution in its own life," for "Christianity came late in the history of the world." We must "bring the stress of teaching Christianity a little later than we put it". Clearly, Ziller has his up-to-date followers!

³ Professor Adams's little *Primer on Teaching, with Special Reference to Sunday School Work* (T. & T. Clark) is a recent and welcome exception to this statement.

⁴ Macmillan.

extent, recapitulate the history of the race, discovering anew the composition of the atmosphere, passing from empirical mathematics to abstract, and so forth. The doctrine is not without its difficulties; but it is also not without a rich and almost immeasurable suggestiveness.

But, after all, "concentration" and "culture stages" are Herbartian doctrines only in a derived sense. Absolutely Herbartian are the doctrine of the formal steps, the doctrine of many-sided Interest, and the emphasis upon the value of humanistic subjects (history, literature, etc.). How fare these in Britain? The answer is disappointing.

True, the five steps of Instruction are used in several of the training institutions connected with Universities or University Colleges, and recently a disappointing book of lessons supposed to be drawn up along Herbartian lines has been published. But, on the whole, this undoubtedly valuable part of the Herbartian system has been neglected, and probably will continue to be neglected until the nation and until boards of managers definitely ask for new light and new methods.

The great central Herbartian doctrine of "many-sided Interest" has exerted practically no influence beyond a superficial one. It may have helped to make lessons easy and "interesting," but this is not Herbartianism.¹ "Instruction requires toil on the pupil's part." The vital moral bearings of the doctrine have scarcely been thought of, and even our most brilliant writers on the system seem fearful lest, by straying into this ethical region, they will earn the painful reproach of being "fanatical". The lady writers on the subject here show a good example, but, on the whole, confession must be made that the proclamation of the gospel of "many-sided Interest"—a gospel of moral reform and spiritual regeneration—has been feeble and unworthy.

Strangely, sadly, unaccountably obtuse have we been to the last Herbartian doctrine here to be mentioned—the doctrine of *Gesinnungs-unterricht* or "character-forming Instruction," the

¹ See the *Student's Herbart*, pp. 51-53.

doctrine which sees enormous and unique value in fairy tale, legend, history, and literature. With a national history far surpassing that of Germany or America in continuity and in capabilities for moral instruction, we are content to remain uninspired by its lessons, unmoved by its great names, ignorant of its movements, deaf to its voices. A true educationist, when told of recent revivals of "patriotism," can but smile sardonically when he contemplates the damning facts that Alfred the Great and Earl Simon are practically unknown in the land they loved; that it is the hardest possible task to get a "patriotic" audience (or any other audience) to read the history of their own land, still more that of any other land; that the elementary schoolmaster, called upon to conduct an Evening Continuation School, may babble "Commercial Arithmetic," but will scarcely even dream of opening the sealed book of English literature, though brought down to our very alleys in a penny form¹; that our very Churches, though professedly worshipping "whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honourable, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely,"² show by their weekly bills of fare that the "whatsoever" is, for them, pitifully poor; that the secondary schools of Britain teach more Greek and Latin than English, and that the English they teach is sometimes technical and uninspiring; and that our very M.P.'s would, in the opinion of an eminent authority, make fewer mistakes if they knew a little more history.³ Astounding, unaccountable, well-nigh criminal is our neglect of the subjects which, above all others, are culture-giving and character-forming. But it is of a piece with our whole conduct. With one voice we hail "Religious Instruction" as peculiarly "sacred," and proceed to fence it off and deprive it of interest; with another voice we hail all other Instruction as "secular," and proceed to degrade it to base utilitarian ends. Pitman's shorthand displaces history! "commercial arithmetic" displaces literature!

¹ Mr. Stead's *Penny Poets*, etc.

² Philippians iv. 8.

³ Address of the President of the Royal Historical Society, 20th February, 1902.

Only from one standpoint is the outlook satisfactory; Herbartian writings are now fairly copious in Britain, and are steadily increasing in number. Mr. and Mrs. Felkin deserve the gratitude of all educationists for their pioneer work¹; thanks mainly to them Herbart can now be read in English, and their excellent introductions have done much to make his doctrines known. Miss Mulliner's book² is not so well known as it deserves to be; Miss Dodd's³ is also a good piece of work on constructive lines, written with the ardour of an enthusiast. There are translations of Ufer, Rein, and Lange (in each case by Americans); there is Professor De Garmo's *Herbart and the Herbartians*⁴ with its admirable account of the labours of Herbart's followers, Ziller, Rein, Lange, Stoy, and Frick, and of the progress of the movement in America; there is the little *Student's Herbart*⁵ by the present writer, with its regressive treatment of the whole question; above all these are two books of marked originality, that of Professor Adams and that of Dr. Findlay. The former⁶ it would be superfluous to praise; it is unique. The latter,⁷ except where, incidentally, the author's knowledge of the life of Nicholas Nickleby shows signs of excusable rustiness, is also admirable in every respect—nay, in certain matters markedly original. It is the very book which British Education needs; mainly Herbartian, as when it lays stress upon the *content* of the mind, the process of apperception, the use of the formal steps, the value of history, and so forth; but boldly departing from Herbartian doctrine where the latter reveals its weakness, namely in that department of scholastic work which deals not with the conferring of ideas, but with the imparting of skill in speech and in other directions.

¹ Herbart's *Science of Education*, and *Letters and Lectures* (Sonnenschein); also *Introduction to Herbart's Science and Practice of Education* (Sonnenschein).

² *Application of Psychology to Education* (Sonnenschein).

³ *Introduction to the Herbartian Principles of Teaching* (Sonnenschein).

⁴ Heinemann.

⁵ Sonnenschein.

⁶ *Herbartian Psychology applied to Education* (Isbister).

⁷ *Principles of Class Teaching* (Macmillan).

But nowhere in Britain is there an Herbartian school, training college, or institute. Nowhere, at least, except in Manchester, where Miss Dodd, with the usual enthusiasm of a Zillerian, has succeeded in founding a practising school in connection with the Day Training College of that city. It is significant that Day Training Colleges, unless an Herbartian happens to be in charge, have to exist without such an institution.

11. *Herbartianism in America and Elsewhere.*

Far more impressive is Herbartian progress in America than in Britain. The reader cannot help having been struck by the fact that a number of the works above mentioned are by Americans. The truth is, as Dr. Eckoff says,¹ "American educators have begun to live, move, and have their being in an atmosphere of Herbartianism". That this has its dangers is obvious from the complaint raised by some critics that "soft pedagogy" is too prevalent west of the Atlantic, and there is little doubt that, in the hands of extremists, Herbartianism can become deficient in strenuousness and backbone. But, on the whole, the new movement is working wonders. It makes teachers into enthusiasts, and any movement that can accomplish such a task as that must be almost infinitely valuable.

In 1892 a "Herbart Club" was organised at Saratoga, and consists mainly of teachers. The works of Lange and Ufer and Herbart's *Psychology* have been translated by members of this club. Professor De Garmo, one of its leading spirits, has also published several valuable works of his own upon the subject.² Dr. McMurtry and Colonel Parker have contributed to the theory and practice of "culture stages" and "concentration"; to the latter of which American history somewhat lends itself (periods of settlement, etc.). *Hiawatha* is extensively used in American schools, and its use is to an extent defended on Zillerian or

¹ *Herbart's ABC of Sense Perception*, p. xiv. (Arnold).

² His latest, *Interest and Education* (Macmillan), presents some special features of importance. See pp. 96-7.

Herbartian principles. Dr. Dewey's name should, of course, be mentioned also. But it would be superfluous to expatiate further upon the progress of the movement among our cousins.

Nor is there special need to refer to its progress in other countries. If we are to judge by the bibliography of Herbartianism, Austria, Holland, Scandinavia, Hungary, Switzerland, have all received stimulus, while, on the other hand, Latin and Slavonic nations have paid but little attention to the movement. It represents the one great effort of the Protestant and Teutonic world to make Education simultaneously into a Science and into a Gospel. Say what we will, criticise how we like, it is a movement to be reckoned with.

PART III.

HERBARTIAN LITERATURE IN ENGLISH.

It has been thought well to give, as supplementary to the preceding historical sketch, notices of the chief works in English which are, partly or wholly, Herbartian in spirit or origin.

Such works may be divided into three groups :—

(1) Translations of the writings of Herbart and his followers ; such translations are generally prefaced by expository introductions, and may, to this extent, fall in group two.

(2) Expositions of Herbartian principles, and of the Herbartian movement in general.

(3) Works which, though based largely or wholly on Herbartian principles, represent independent efforts at construction ; works which are genuinely national, though they may owe much inspiration to foreign writers.

As witnesses to the progress of the Herbartian movement, the third group is the most important, and the first the least important of the three. The pioneer work of translation undertaken by Mr. and Mrs. Felkin was necessary, but, once accomplished, had to give place to more constructive efforts in the direction of nationalising Herbartianism. Britain will scarcely borrow the Herbartian system *en bloc*, hence the most significant books on the subject are, at the present moment, those like Dr. Findlay's, in which we see the system arraying itself in garments not obviously foreign.

In the following notices special attention will therefore be given to the several books belonging to the third class, less attention to those of the second class, and least attention of all

to those books, however valuable in themselves, which are but translations of German originals.

(1) TRANSLATIONS.

The Science of Education; Its General Principles Deduced from its Aim: and the Æsthetic Revelation of the World. By J. F. Herbart. Translated from the German with a Biographical Introduction by Henry M. and Emmie Felkin. (Sonnenschein.)

This book is indispensable to the genuine student of education unless he is able to read Herbart in the original; it is the translation of Herbart's masterpiece, *Allgemeine Pädagogik*. But the work would be difficult for a beginner, though the translators have added a useful and able introduction.

Letters and Lectures on Education. By J. F. Herbart. Translated from the German and Edited with an Introduction by Henry M. and Emmie Felkin. (Sonnenschein.)

Herbart's letters, here translated, are those he wrote to Herr von Steiger, the father of the three pupils placed under his charge during the years 1797-9. They represent Herbart's earliest thoughts on educational matters, but are otherwise unimportant.

Herbart's lectures, on the other hand, represent his most mature thought. They were delivered only a few years before his death, and many years after the composition of the *Allgemeine Pädagogik*. They are considerably easier in every respect than that work.

Outlines of Educational Doctrines. By J. F. Herbart. Translated by A. F. Lange. Annotated by Charles de Garmo. (The Macmillan Company.)

This work, despite its title, is really a translation of Herbart's *Lectures*, and is thus a duplicate of the last work. With so much Herbartian territory still untrodden (e.g., the works of Dörpfeld) it is to be regretted that two authors should undertake the same task.

Still this translation is a good one ; moreover Dr. de Garmo's notes touch upon some of the recent advances in American pedagogy.

Herbart's A B C of Sense-Perception and Minor Pedagogical Works. Translated, with Introduction, Notes and Commentary, by W. J. Eckoff. (Appleton, New York ; Arnold, London.)

This is a translation of several short works and addresses produced or delivered by Herbart a few years after the composition of the Steiger letters. They are specially interesting as dealing with Herbart's early views upon Pestalozzi ; the educationist is feeling his way towards a more complete and scientific system than that of his great contemporary and inspirer. The chief work in this volume (*The A B C of Anschauung*) deals with the teaching of mathematics.

The Application of Psychology to the Science of Education. By J. F. Herbart. Translated and Edited with Notes and an Introduction to the Study of Herbart by Beatrice C. Mulliner. (Sonnenschein.)

These letters were written during Herbart's Königsberg period, and represent much more mature views and wider experience than the Steiger letters, the early works published at Göttingen, and even the *Allgemeine Pädagogik*. Many of the passages contained in them were subsequently employed in Herbart's *Text-book of Psychology*. The present volume will be, perhaps, more attractive to the majority of students on account of Miss Mulliner's able Introduction than on account of the letters themselves. The editor has illumined the subject with many wise remarks and pertinent references ; she writes with ardour and force.

A Text-book of Psychology. By J. F. Herbart. Translated by Margaret K. Smith. (Appleton, New York ; Arnold, London.)

Important for the student of Herbart's psychology, but repellent, owing to its very condensation, to the average student.

Outlines of Pedagogics. By Prof. W. Rein. Translated by C. C. and Ida J. van Liew, with additional notes by the former. (Sonnenschein.)

This is a translation of *Pädagogik im Grundriss* by the prominent Herbartian upon whom has fallen the mantle of Ziller. It is brief, but clear and admirable, and will convey to most readers a favourable impression of modern Zillerianism. The translator, in a few brief notes, has helped to show the attitude of American thought towards the movement.

Introduction to the Pedagogy of Herbart. By C. Ufer. Authorised Translation from the Fifth German Edition under the auspices of the Herbart Club. By J. C. Zinser. Edited by Charles De Garmo. (Heath, Boston ; Isbister, London.)

C. Ufer is a prominent German Zillerian. His work, here translated through the activity of the American "Herbart Club," is similar in size and tone to Prof. Rein's.

Apperception. A Monograph on Psychology and Pedagogy. By Dr. K. Lange. Translated by members of the Herbart Club. Edited by Charles de Garmo. (Heath, Boston ; Isbister, London.)

This magnificent work on the psychology of Apperception, and on the pedagogical consequences and the historical development of the doctrine, needs no praise. No other book, except possibly Dörpfeld's *Denken und Gedächtnis*, has ever dealt so ably with the subject. At the same time the translator's terminology is confusing in one place, the word "perception" standing for what most British psychologists would call "sensation".

(2) EXPOSITIONS OF HERBARTIANISM AS DISTINGUISHED FROM TRANSLATIONS.

An Introduction to Herbart's Science and Practice of Education. By Henry M. and Emmie Felkin. (Sonnenschein.)

This important work is probably the one from which most

British students of Herbartianism have derived their first knowledge of the movement.

Beginning with a brief account of the present influential position of the Herbartian system, the authors pass on to a discussion of the psychological basis worked out by the founder. This, and the following chapter on ethics, are both difficult, and may repel many "practical teachers" who are pining for mere "hints"; though the writers have illuminated the somewhat technical discussion with many a pertinent quotation, the question presents itself whether a better procedure would not have been to put the educational problem in the foreground and to have worked backwards to psychology and ethics, somewhat after Herbart's own fashion.

In chapter iii., where "practical pedagogy" is reached, the meaning of "educative instruction" is expounded and the great doctrine of many-sided Interest introduced. Then comes a very full section on the "formal steps" and another on the "dual theory of the concentration centres and historical culture epochs," that is, upon Ziller's development of Herbart's principles. Voigt's criticism of this development is given in great fulness and will be found highly valuable, as will also the full examples of Zillerian procedure.

The writers translate *Zucht* by "Discipline" and *Regierung* by "Government". While carefully pointing out (p. 156) the ambiguity in the word "Discipline" (used by many British teachers in the sense of mere "preservation of order") they use it in preference to "Training" as a translation of *Zucht*. This is perhaps a mistake. It is better to translate *Zucht* "Training" or "Moral Training," and *Regierung* "Discipline".

Herbart and the Herbartians. By Charles de Garmo.
(Heinemann.)

This book is similar in size and design to the last. Its exposition of Herbart's own doctrines is, however, less full, but this is compensated for by a good treatment of some of Herbart's chief successors, Stoy, Ziller, Dr. Rein, Dr. Lange

and Frick (Dörpfeld is strangely omitted), and by four chapters on the development of Herbartianism in America. The chapters on Stoy and Frick are specially noteworthy, inasmuch as these two Herbartians are practically unknown to British readers. Stoy, as already pointed out, was the leader of the moderate and orthodox Herbartians, as distinguished from the more revolutionary Herbartians who followed Ziller. Frick was the head of the great "*Francke Stiftungen*" at Halle, and in that capacity worked out the application of Herbartian principles to secondary schools, in which Zillerian "concentration" would be obviously difficult.

An American educationist, whose name is not so well known in Britain as it should be, Colonel Parker, worked out (partly, no doubt, under Herbartian influence), a scheme of "concentration," very different, however, in principle from Ziller's. Readers will find details of this in Dr. de Garmo's book.

The Student's Herbart. A Brief Educational Monograph dealing with the Movement Initiated by Herbart and Developed by Stoy, Dörpfeld and Ziller. By F. H. Hayward. (Sonnenschein.)

This brochure differs from most expositions of Herbartianism in several respects. It is brief. Its thought moves regressively: starting with the problem of moral evil the author works backwards to the need for Herbartian Interest, and then again backwards to Apperception. Lastly, it contains a brief summary of the supposed weaknesses of Herbartianism.

(3) ORIGINAL WORKS SHOWING THE INFLUENCE OF HERBARTIAN THOUGHT.

The Herbartian Psychology applied to Education. By J. Adams, M.A., B.Sc. (Isbister.)

There are not many British books on education that deserve the adjective "brilliant". A William James may write sparkling *Talks with Teachers*, but William James lives in the stimulating atmosphere of the Western Continent. The above work

by the Professor of Education in the University of London is British, yet it sparkles. It is, in its own way, unique.

"Herbartianism," says the writer, "has weaknesses, and some of its rivals have points of superiority; yet it seems to me the best system for application to education." "It does not follow that the writer is a Herbartian. It is enough that he finds this system fits most readily into his own experience, and seems to him best suited to explain educational facts to others."

Prof. Adams has little patience with the humdrum empiricism of the average schoolmaster, which impudently claims to be "practical" and based on "experience". "One main aim of this book is to induce the cave-dwellers to move their heads. It is unwillingness to turn round and look about them that marks the true cave-dweller. Many teachers are content to play with the little black puppets of their school world, and sturdily refuse to look beyond the school walls, or even to admit that there is a beyond. . . . Certainly all that *they* know about education has been known long ago." "The modest schoolmaster is an arrogant and intolerant empiric. . . . Such teachers haughtily resent any attempt to enlighten them."

The author proceeds to discuss the relation between psychology and education, reviewing, in passing on towards Herbartianism, the systems of Locke and Fröbel.

He points out—it needed very much to be pointed out—that Herbartianism and Fröbelianism are, in appearance at any rate, diametrically opposed. Herbart practically starts, not with the mind, but with ideas.

The soul which he posits is "no more a real soul than it is a real crater of a volcano. It has absolutely no content. . . . What Locke did for innate ideas Herbart did for innate faculties. . . . What he has taken from the soul he has transferred to the ideas; . . . these have a vitality all their own."

The author follows with a lucid explanation of the apperception doctrine, one of the best expositions, in a brief form, to be found in our language. He shows how this doctrine goes beyond mere associationism; "the associationist explains very

clearly why each of the ideas has come into the dome of consciousness in which it is found, but he neglects to explain why the same idea does not follow the same word in each case". It is a case of "apperception masses," not of mere associational links. Again, "if Herbartianism did nothing more than emphasise the fact that no two people ever have exactly the same idea, and particularly that no master and pupil can ever have the same idea, it would justify its existence". The cry for "things, not words" would only "substitute one fallacy for another; things are not a whit better than words in ensuring that the same idea shall be called up in two minds. . . . The average child *does not see* what the master is showing him. . . . The Herbartian has none of that reverence for hard facts so characteristic of the 'plain man'." In other words, the "apperception masses" of each individual, even of each child, vitally influence the cognition of any new experience; "unlike most psychologies, Herbart's has an obvious and immediate bearing upon education," and indeed (though Prof. Adams merely hints at this and does not work it out into detail) upon morality and conduct. "If the idea that the soul ought to choose is not there to choose, what can the soul do but choose amiss?"

Chapter v. deals with "Formal Education" and is immensely valuable, in view of the pretensions, alike of classical teachers, of advocates of "heuristic" methods, and of admirers of the "three R's" as the main pabulum of the primary school. These three classes are united in discounting knowledge or ideas, and in laying stress upon certain activities. "There is a prevailing impression . . . that it really does not matter very much what one learns. The culture comes all the same. It is not the *what*; it is the *how*." Prof. Adams exposes the fallacy of all this. The great thing is ideas, apperception-masses. Education in crime is "formally" as high as education in the classics; orchard-robbing, for example, calls out prudence, forethought, caution, observation, firmness, and so forth. "The soul is not a mere knife that may be sharpened on any whetstone, and when sharpened may be applied to any purpose.

The knife takes the character from the whetstone." "We cannot separate the mind from its content. . . . Above all, it is certain that we cannot exercise the mind *in vacuo*. . . . The choice of subjects is important; a subject must be chosen for its own sake, not for the sake of its general effect in training the mind."

Then follows another chapter on the apperception doctrine; the limitations of "observation" are pointed out; and then come several other luminous chapters, not very distinctively Herbartian.

In his final chapter, that on Interest, Prof. Adams discusses the relation between Interest and Attention, and between Interest and Apperception: he shows, from the Herbartian standpoint, the folly of imposing drudgery on children in order to "train" them for the battle of life—the theory which largely dominates the procedure of didactic "formalists"; "the theory of interest," he says, "does not propose to banish drudgery, but only to make drudgery tolerable by giving it a meaning": in relation to this he again lays stress—as every Herbartian does—on a worthy content for all studies; "it is not necessary to go to Rome in order to learn Latin, . . . but it is necessary that it should be learnt as something having a meaning in itself, not as a mere exercise".

The author concludes the most racy book on education in the English language with an indication of how Herbartianism may be destined to join hands ultimately with Fröbel's more organic view of life. "The latest word of the Herbartians deposes interest from its place as the first principle of education and makes it rank second to the principle of self-realisation. Interests must be tested by their effect on the child's development, viewed in connection with its place in the organic unity of the world in which it has to live."

Primer on Teaching, with Special Reference to Sunday School Work. By J. Adams, M.A., B.Sc., Professor of Education in the University of London. (T. & T. Clark.)

Herbartianism in the Sunday School! In this little book Prof. Adams applies educational principles—including the

Herbartian "formal steps"—to the work of Biblical teaching. Probably the most valuable chapter is the one in which the "steps" are expounded and illustrated; and the section on the Socratic method, with illustrations in Prof. Adams's characteristic style, is excellent.

We find, as we should expect, the usual Herbartian emphasis on ideas; "they do seem to have a power of their own". "Temptation consists in the effort of an idea to realise itself." We find likewise the Herbartian emphasis on creating healthy interests rather than on denouncing evil; "we must fight evil indirectly by supplying ideas of good". "The kind of apperception masses in the mind really determines what kind of mind it is." Apperception and Interest are therefore vital. "The business of the teacher is so to arrange the ideas in the mind of the pupil that apperceptive attention to desirable things will be aroused." Even the sowing of almost *chance* ideas may result in a subsequent harvest; "very often the teacher must introduce ideas into the mind of the pupil, not so much for their immediate importance as for the use to be made of them at some future lesson".

Herbartian though he is, and strong opponent of purely "formal" teaching, Prof. Adams recognises some value in the "training" ideal of the formalists. "The process of working for the rule gives the mind a certain amount of training. The mind is a better mind because it has done this particular bit of work."

Principles of Class Teaching. By Dr. J. J. Findlay. (Macmillan.)

Though he admits his indebtedness to Herbartian writers like Prof. Rein, Dr. Findlay would object to be labelled "Herbartian". The label might be regarded as implying an absence of originality. Nevertheless, an examination of his book reveals the fact that, though it is an original and valuable contribution to British educational literature, its merits are entirely those which distinguish Herbartian books. If Dr. Findlay is not an Herbartian there are no Herbartians in existence.

Character-forming is the end of education ; every subject in the time table must be challenged as to its power of helping to worthy living. " We acknowledge the final supremacy of the ethical ideal." Technological subjects may be admitted into the upper classes of the school, but the teaching of them must be distinguished from education proper. Currency arithmetic should be excluded except from upper classes. The school must no longer be subjected to the " vulgar ideals of the nineteenth century". Surely this is the voice of Herbart !

Dr. Findlay is a humanist, though other claims than those of humanism are recognised. For each month or six weeks we should select "some central theme of great humanistic interest" capable of easy correlation with other groups. He approves of fairy tales for the young, but prefers to regard them as luxury rather than as staple food.

Two doctrines, each of enormous educational importance, stand out clearly in Dr. Findlay's book, the two doctrines upon which Dörpfeld laid stress. Our writer is under no obligations to the Westphalian schoolmaster, but he has arrived at the same results.

The first doctrine is that the conferring of skill or dexterity (*e.g.*, in language, in writing, etc.) obeys a different set of educational laws than the conferring of knowledge ; the " formal steps," which are valuable in the latter procedure, are inapplicable to the former. " The chief error of the strict Herbartians seems to lie in their attempt to regard the Arts as subservient to the same laws of method which apply to branches of knowledge. Music, Drawing, Reading are all brought by Ziller and Rein under the scheme of the Five Steps." " While in Instruction we proceed from sense-observation to perception and conception, in Performance we proceed from sense observation or (to use a more convenient term) from *contemplation* to active imitation." But for their proper task, the conferring of knowledge, the five steps are admirable, though they have their dangers ; " the followers of Herbart in Germany have here achieved results which cannot be assailed except on minor points". Dr. Findlay's account of the steps is one of the clearest and most judicial in

the English language; he summarises them thus: "first observation, then varied observation, comparison with earlier observation, and finally—as the crown and completion of these particular experiences—the new, higher form of thought". He conveniently uses the word "Section" as equivalent to the German "method-unit".

The second doctrine which is prominent in Dr. Findlay's book is that the "knowledge" subjects, being those that awaken the keenest interest and build up the "circle of thought" (all action springs out of this "circle"), must be more central in the curriculum than formal subjects and dexterities. This was precisely the contention of Dörpfeld,¹ and Dr. Findlay works it out in a more systematic way than has ever yet been attempted in English. There must be a worthy "content" to our studies, worthy and rich ideas. Mere mental gymnastic is of little use unless employed upon such a worthy "content".

The following quotations will illustrate Dr. Findlay's view on this question:—

"Cleverness and skill in the forms of Art degrade the worker unless his mind and heart are filled with worthy 'content' associated with those 'forms'." If there is anything worthy of study in the life and literature of the French people let us learn French; if there is nothing worthy we might as well learn Fiji; the latter would be as much a gymnastic as French. "The subject-matter of language teaching must be derived from the topics familiar to the child's circle of ideas," *e.g.*, the Humanities and the Occupations; "the advantage of correlation is obvious". Grammar, likewise, can scarcely claim independent treatment as an abstract science; it is rather to be subordinated to practical language exercises; it is a mistake to divorce it and panegyrisé it as a mental gymnastic. Similarly philology must be subordinated to literature; "the decay of the faculty-psychology has led to a distrust of language teaching as a special medium for mental discipline". So with music, drawing, and other more or less "formal" subjects; unless

¹ *Grundlinien einer Theorie des Lehrplans.*

they are associated with a worthy subject-matter or "content" their value is slight. Dr. Findlay "distrusts the cultivation of any art merely for its own sake". We must (in music) start with songs possessing a worthy content; an interest in the technique of the art comes later. "The teacher of art must be permitted to take the child step by step through the exercises necessary to attain skill, but in the choice of models and of subjects he is bound to submit to the suggestions offered from the Humanities, the Occupations, Nature-study, etc., of the general syllabus."

The above remarks are wholly in the spirit of Dörpfeld; subjects which convey "ideas" must form the centre of the curriculum. Many of Dr. Findlay's other suggestions are in the direction of "concentration" or "correlation". He is up in arms against any syllabus—overcrowded, as is usually the case—whose parts are scrappy and disconnected. "One lesson per week in Drawing or Science is bound to spell failure, especially if these pursuits are conducted without relation to other studies." Isolated biographies are of little use. It is "hopeless" to teach the Bible, or anything else, in scraps. Geometrical Drawing is officially separated from theoretical Geometry! Miscellaneous scrappy "Readers" are rightly being discarded in favour of books called Historical, Geographical, or Science Readers, which correlate the acquirement of the art of reading with some other branch of study. "Concentration" will help the teacher in various ways, and conduce to that "unity of the pupil's life" which is the final goal of teaching. The teacher of science or history must not ignore such things as composition. History and literature should be brought together and treated together; they form the Humanities. Natural science depends partly for its success on being correlated with practical work in workshops. The educational value of practical pursuits is not sufficiently recognised; "the elementary school of the nineteenth century has created a gulf between the pursuits of home and the pursuits of school which must somehow be bridged over". Sloyd is now being adapted to the needs of the Physical Laboratory.

"We advocate the doctrine of Concentration as a practical and essential contribution to the theory of the curriculum." At least in the case of young children, "results are decisive enough to enable us to speak confidently of the advantages of a scheme of study which centres round one theme". But for older children "the utmost we can do is to be prepared for such associations as present themselves—to put our mathematics, for example, on a basis of Physical Science, our Arts of Expression into relationship with the Humanities, and our Arts of Representation into relationship with the Humanities and with Nature Knowledge".¹ Still "concentration" has its limits; "some pursuits cannot by any ingenuity be brought into the "circle".

Dr. Findlay has been criticised for attacking the "frankly empirical" tone of most British works on education. But his standpoint is the inevitable one for any educationist influenced by Herbart. "We can only establish education as a professional pursuit by devoting to its study the same elaborate care, the same spirit of devotion to our profession, as we witness in other callings which have won the confidence of the public." We must seek "a scientific basis for our work". Every new course of study must present "a new scientific problem". Difficult pupils should especially awaken in the professional teacher a sense of professional pride. "There is an immense field of exploration awaiting teachers who have a psychological equipment."

School and Home Life. By F. G. Rooper, M.A. (A. Brown & Sons.)

Though the name of Herbart is scarcely mentioned once in this volume of high-toned essays, the ideas of Herbart and his followers are everywhere to the fore. One essay ("The Pot of Green Feathers") is an exposition, carried out in a fresh and untechnical manner, of the doctrine of Apperception. Though the book makes "no claim for originality," it is stimulating and inspiring.

¹ This sentence, which summarises much of Dr. Findlay's book, is one of the most important in recent British educational literature.

There are so few educationists who are in earnest over the moral aspects of education that Mr. Rooper's words—which remind us of Ziller's claim that many-sided Interest is "a protection against passions"—are doubly welcome. "You want to combat drinking and gambling. . . . Many youths (though not all) may be induced to avoid such temptations . . . if you only provide them with other occupations." Mr. Rooper, in this connection, sees much value in manual dexterities, but his argument is obviously applicable to the whole curriculum. "All teachers are missionaries by profession" is a bold statement, but Mr. Rooper makes it, and it illustrates the spirit of his book.

Many of his best suggestions concern manual training, Sloyd, the kindergarten, etc.; manual work he regards as a necessary part of the curriculum, not for technical, but for educational reasons. But Mr. Rooper remains essentially a humanist and an Herbartian. "I believe that an intelligent study of the Bible and Shakespeare, and of classical English writers, is incomparably more important than . . . manual training." Only through literature can imagination and taste be developed. Cruelty is largely due to defective imagination. Children must be "assisted to admire heroism in all its forms". Fairy tales, fables, allegories, etc., are therefore of immense value. "If any one thinks that it would be better if the child's mind could move only in the sphere of the exact, I would reply (1) that this does not seem to be nature's process; (2) that looking to the mode of growth of the mind it does not seem even possible; and (3) that if you try to keep the child's mind to exactness you may clip and pluck the wings of imagination. Now without imagination there is little advance in knowledge, little discovery in the sphere of morality." But no "treatise on elementary ethics" is advisable for schools.

Mr. Rooper's Herbartianism is still more obvious in his suggestions for concentration or correlation. Dislocation in one's thought-masses results in inconsistencies of character; the child does not grow up "a single self"; "a man may become like a musical box which can play two quite different tunes".

Isolated thoughts are powerless ; apperception must take place before thoughts can rouse interest or exert influence. " The main fault of the present routine in Standards I. and II. is the isolated way in which each subject is treated." The teacher must " find ways of connecting together, not merely the parts of one study, but different studies with each other ". The science of number must be kept in close connection with natural history, history, geography, and even stories dealing with family life ; the intelligent apprehension of number has been hindered by the isolation of its study, an isolation which was opposed by Fröbel's system. Early reading lessons should be based on object lessons rather than on " readers ". Object teaching, language teaching, drawing, and modelling should be mutually connected. Reading, writing, and speaking should similarly be interwoven. Songs should be connected with children's studies and occupations. Natural science, philology and art should be treated as one subject for young children. Art and literature should illustrate each other, *e.g.*, a picture may serve to concentrate a number of studies. Studies in natural history should contain conduct lessons. The motto for evening schools should be, " Concentrate your studies, group your instruction round one central subject ".

Not mere external " discipline " or " training " will make a perfect man. Like every Herbartian, Mr. Rooper lays stress on moral insight and therefore on instruction. " Good habits are not by themselves a complete education." His own scheme of " concentration " would " tend to humanise children ". What studies are pre-eminently character-forming? Not the three R's ; they cannot be regarded as the essence of elementary education, and indeed they can be better taught if the curriculum is not confined to them. " For the three R's, I substitute Nature and Human Nature as the epitome of educational studies. Of these twins neither should be neglected, although the latter is the more important." Pupils must be made acquainted " through literary studies with the best side of human nature ". Stories from Grimm, stories from history, and so forth, are of supreme character-forming importance.

The value of formal grammar is not great; even as a guide to speech it leads astray as often as it helps. But practice in actual composition is immensely important.

In the important essay, "Drawing in Evening Schools" (based partly on the researches of M. Passy), Mr. Rooper traces out the bearings of apperception upon elementary drawing, and shows how easily the senses are misled when a drawing "type" pre-exists in the mind.

Mr. Rooper, in all the above suggestions, is in full conformity with Herbartianism. His conformity is less when he bestows genuine though not lavish praise upon the classical curriculum of public schools. "The teacher (in such schools) mistrusts the growth of a receptive attitude in his class." Composing in Greek or Latin encourages independent mental activity. It is a mistake for the teacher to make the lesson *too* easy. [Herbart himself would agree with this, though some modern Herbartians tend towards "soft pedagogy".] Mr. Rooper is, however, strictly Herbartian when he points out that "feelings are linked together, not directly, but through the mediation of thought," words which remind us of the dictum that "action springs out of the circle of thought".

Every Herbartian boasts proudly of being "scientific"; he is no despiser of "theory," no worshipper of "common-sense". Nor is Mr. Rooper. "Common-sense is not the ordinary judgment which every one possesses, but the rare judgment of which every one approves." "I believe that the studies of German writers on education help to solve such (educational) mysteries;" there exists "an inexhaustible gold mine of educational philosophy" for those who choose to burrow into it.

Introduction to the Herbartian Principles of Teaching. By Catherine I. Dodd. (Sonnenschein.)

Miss Dodd sees how disastrously un-educative (*i.e.*, non-formative of character) most of our schools are, and enthusiastically advocates reform along Zillerian lines.

The book possesses one defect. The authoress too closely identifies the Herbartian movement with the narrower Zillerian

movement; Herbart is described as an advocate of the "culture epochs" doctrine (which, except to a limited extent, he scarcely was; in fact his presentational psychology was out of sympathy with a doctrine essentially one of heredity); "the Herbartians" (instead of "some Herbartians") are said to "place history as the centre of all the subjects to be studied". Except for this defect—due to the fact that great Herbartians like Dörpfeld have not yet attracted the attention of British authors to the extent that Ziller has—Miss Dodd's book is admirable, and immensely more inspiring and suggestive than the "school-management" books studied by most teachers.

The great feature of the work is the strong case it presents for the teaching of fairy-tales, history, and literature; in fact for the *Gesinnungs-unterricht* of the Zillerians. "True history teaching should place before all the children in the country noble and great men, and so help to raise them to a higher moral level. . . . If striking examples of goodness, courage, truth, and falsehood from the pages of the Bible or profane history are put before children they form their own moral judgments very readily. . . . Our Arthur, Alfred, Richard the Lion-hearted, and Cranmer might become part of the life of every English child if we gave history the position it merits in our primary schools."

She recommends the use, when possible, of *original historical sources*; the giving of some definite ideas concerning *general* historical sequence; and also the touching, lightly but really, upon the history of other countries than our own. With history goes literature. "The reading of literature in school has a high moral influence," and yet "rarely do children acquire either the power of reading aloud intelligently or a taste for good literature".

Great stress is, of course, laid upon "concentration," interpreted along Zillerian lines. Isolation and scrappiness are the bane of biblical and similar teaching. Miss Dodd's detailed suggestions for "concentration" in the lower classes are excellent; *Robinson Crusoe*, the story of the Armada, are to form centres for the attachment of various material. But *why* "con-

centrate"? One readily sees various advantages; interest is increased, not merely transitory interest, but true permanent interest; memory is strengthened, and a logical memory is developed; the pressure of an overwhelming number of subjects is taken off the time-table. Concentration will help us to proportion our subjects according to natural relationships existing between them, and to get rid of quantities of irrelevant subject-matter which text-books are constantly offering. "Isolated ideas are feebly impressed and easily forgotten."

The "culture-stages" doctrine is advocated; "children are psychically nearer to remote ages than to the present". Like every Herbartian, Miss Dodd also attacks the exaggerated importance often given to "formal studies". "They are only means to an end." "We read because we want to get at ideas."

Nature Studies and Fairy-Tales. By Catherine I. Dodd.
(Nelson.)

Miss Dodd is the best English writer on the fairy-tale question, and her suggestions relative to the employment of such tales, together with nursery rhymes, Greek legends, and similar matter, would have been referred to in connection with her *Introduction*, except that in the present work she has dealt much more fully with the question. There can be no doubt as to the excellence of the scheme she has worked out for the lower classes of schools. Fairy-tales offer so many points of contact with "nature" that there is every reason for combining their study with the study of nature, in other words, of applying here the principle of "concentration". Drawing and plaster work are also suggested as further applications of the concentration principle.

The book contains a whole series of lessons and suggestions which will prove of great value to the teacher of junior classes, while for educationists in general Miss Dodd's lengthy and able defence of the use of fairy-tales, and her history of the fairy-tale question cannot fail to be of interest. She makes use of the "five steps" of Herbart and Ziller.

Interest and Education. By Charles de Garmo. (The Macmillan Company.)

This book marks an advance from what may be called the *primitive* Interest doctrine, which ignores, or passes lightly over, the innate outward-going tendencies of the child, to the more advanced form of the doctrine, which eagerly avails itself of these tendencies. The work thus represents a kind of synthesis of Herbartianism with Fröbelianism, and also, be it added, with the "heuristic" doctrine, and with Spencer's doctrine of the primary importance of life-preserving studies. In fact the Herbartianism of the book is observable mainly or solely in the emphasis on Interest.

This "Interest" is to be a form of "self-expression". "This mental activity, taking root first in the instincts and impulses of the physical nature, and developing into conscious desire for the realisation of certain ends, is at bottom nothing but the effort to express self in accordance with the varying ideals implanted by physical nature, or developed by growing insight into the ideal nature of the man." "Interest is a feeling that accompanies the idea of self-expression. . . . It has its primary root, in inherited impulse."

Great stress is laid on the active side of mental life. "Our greatest lack . . . is the meagreness of opportunity for vigorous outgoing motor expression." The writer is in one place grimly humorous. "It is some comfort to the teacher to know that . . . he cannot wholly spoil a thoroughly active mind, or entirely counteract the influence of the outside world of achievement. Yet our school education should be of a character actively to promote the qualities that lead to survival." "Education has to give permanent and strong interests in the realities of life."

The view that lays stress on self-expression corrects two opposite errors, (1) the theory of effort, "that the sheer dead lift of will is the only sure means of getting the child to the goal and the only way whereby his mind can be trained to do the hard things that are sure to confront him in later life"; (2) the method of coaxing by means of pleasurable excitations.

The "heuristic" element in Dr. de Garmo's book is seen in

combination with the Interest doctrine. "As soon as school work assumes the form of problems to be solved by the self-activity of the pupils, we have at once a concrete application of the doctrine of interest." But the school has not to engage in "mere shadow or imitation discoveries".

Notes of Lessons on the Herbartian Method. (Based on Herbart's Plan.) By M. Fennel and Members of a Teaching Staff. (Longmans.)

It is painful to have to criticise this book. Except for a brief preface, to the correctness of which no exception can be taken, the book contains scarcely a trace of Herbartianism from beginning to end. The "five steps" employed by the "teaching staff" are, for the most part, not Herbartian steps at all. "Recapitulation," here given as the "fifth step," is not recognised as one at all by the Herbartians; a "step" implies progress, not movement over the same ground. Again, Ziller's doctrine that the aim of the lesson should be clearly stated to the class at or near the beginning of the lesson, is apparently misunderstood by the authors, though a saving clause has been introduced into the preface. Thus we find as the aim of the first lesson in the volume, "To exercise imagination of class and lead them to know the origin of English Prose and Poetry". Conceive of a Zillerian saying to his pupils: "Now children, the aim of this lesson is to exercise your imagination!" In a so-called "object lesson" on a horse (the lesson should really be called an "information lesson," for the object is only shown in a picture) the "application" (step four) consists of such mere *information* as that when alive the horse is the chief beast of burden in temperate climates. This may be an "application" of the horse, but it is not an "application" of the knowledge acquired in a lesson; in short, the writer wholly fails to grasp the meaning of "application" in the Herbartian system.

Clearly Herbartianism, like Fröbelianism, will have to be saved from those supposed friends, who, with inadequate knowledge of its principles, seek to guide others in the application of them.

PART IV.

THE CRITICS OF HERBARTIANISM.

SECTION I.

DITTES.

(1884-86.)

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Glöckner. *Pädagogische Studien*, 1886, p. 193.¹

Thilo and Flügel. *Dittes über die praktische und theoretische Philosophie Herbarts* (Beyer, Langensalza)..

In the history of the Herbartian question the Dittes controversy is one of first importance in view of its magnitude and virulence. It sprang up during the two or three critical years when from almost every side fierce attacks came in, and when the two leaders of the movement, Stoy and Ziller, could no longer engage in the task of defence. Herbartianism, moreover, was torn by internal discord. Men like Fröhlich and Sallwürk had apostatized from Zillerianism; Stoy, before his death, had definitely broken with the extremists, and these, in response,

¹ In this same number is an article, entitled, "Dr. Dittes as Director of the Vienna Pädagogium," intended to show that Dittes was a man "without character, without conscience, and without fidelity to duty".

had developed an acerbity and touchiness which were exceptional even in the painful annals of German controversies. The criticisms offered by Dittes were studiously moderate in tone; the retorts of his antagonists were the opposite. He was guilty of "crafty mendacity" and unintelligence, and deserved to have his journal confiscated for its "radical" tendencies. Dittes, it should be remarked, was a prominent Vienna educationist.

The first article in *Pädagogium* (1884) was a review of the work of the ex-Zillerian Fröhlich. "Where," asks Dittes, "is this boasted 'scientific pedagogy' about which even its adherents quarrel? It seems like the machine of which some one said, 'It is very good, and has only one defect, that it doesn't work'."

The 1885 articles were more important.

Beginning with Herbart's psychology, Dittes shows that the doctrine of "reals," according to which the soul is absolutely simple, devoid of faculties, etc., is quite useless. In fact, the metaphysical doctrine of Being is a fatal stumbling-block to Herbart's system. He constantly oscillates between *appearance* or *happening* and real Being. Ordinary mental processes are mere *appearance*; the "real" soul is already "ripe" and incapable of development. Herbart cannot deny experience, but he reduces it to a fiction.¹ Real knowledge lies beyond man's grasp.

Dittes then reviews Herbart's ethics, dealing successively with his emphasis on the "æsthetic judgment," with the avowed absence of a single unifying idea,² and with the inability of the ethics to give practical guidance. He then proceeds to criticise the "five moral ideas". Logically, Her-

¹ One must omit most of the metaphysical discussion. Dittes' result is probably correct. Herbart here appears as a Kantian. But still we can learn much from the phenomenological side of his work.

² Herbart expressly warned men against trying to make ethics into a sham unity. Our judgments *are* disparate and must remain so. But Thilo contends that Herbart's ethics really has a unity, inasmuch as it is based on the æsthetic judgment passed on will-relations. All harmony rests on diversity.

bart's system of ideas suffers from the defect that the first (Inner Freedom) stands for a relation of Will to Insight, not of Will to Will. The real content of morality is given by the other four, and we cannot get a fifth idea out of the relation of the Will to these four. Thus, the first idea is not co-ordinate with the others.

*Idea of Perfection.*¹—Unless a Will be *morally* good, its Perfection (in Herbart's sense), that is its Intensity, Extensivity, and Concentration, arouses no approval. We do not praise a strong-minded robber. Herbart's second idea stands rather for physical and intellectual than for moral eminence.²

Idea of Benevolence.—But why should *my* Will devote itself to the Will of another person? Surely only on the ground of welfare? Am I to support the will of a robber?

Idea of Right or Law.—"Strife displeases." Does it always? May I not *rightly* strive to save something imperilled? Were prophets and reformers wrong in stirring up strife? Must an assaulted person do nothing?³ Significant that when Herbart's countrymen were struggling against Napoleon, he himself remained in his empty Königsberg classroom. He was consistent with his doctrine that "strife displeases"! His fourth idea is too rigid. We must not forbid strife altogether.

¹ Better, "Breadth and efficiency of Will". The word "Perfection" scarcely suggests Herbart's meaning.

² This raises a vastly important point. Herbart regarded each of his five ideas as unmoral when taken *alone*, in abstraction. He explicitly says (*Lectures*; § 17) that the second idea is not in itself adequate to determine virtue, "for that can never be done by any one practical idea alone". But Herbart regarded strength and breadth of character as a vital element in the complete moral life. Here comes in his stress on many-sided Interest, a notion closely related to the second moral idea. We do not value hardness in a diamond if the latter be devoid of brilliance. But each quality is valuable in the other's company. So with Ruskin's Ideas of Relation, Ideas of Power, etc. *Abstraction is not separation*. Thus the objection of Dittes has been anticipated. The same kind of answer is to be made in connection with the Idea of Benevolence.

³ Again the same answer. There are *five* ideas; any *one* is an abstraction.

Idea of Equity or Fairness.—Is it true that every deed, good or bad, must be recompensed after its kind? Does an uncompensated good deed displease? Surely not! It shines with an added brilliancy. Again, evil deeds do not displease because *unrequited*, but because *evil*. One evil deed recompensed by another! Herbart himself admitted that the difficult idea of Equity may conflict with that of Benevolence.¹

Again, can "Taste" be a sure foundation for morality?² Surely one person's "Taste" may conflict with another's! Have the ideas any *force*? No, they are powerless, as indeed is Herbart's entire system of Ethics, which is "devoid of every trace of heroism and energy".³

Then, as to Herbart's *pedagogy*; does this rest securely, as he says, on his ethics and psychology? In point of fact his psychology gives us only a presentation-mechanism which awakens nothing but horror and which excludes soul-life and real development. The "soul" itself remains stiff and impotent. Herbart's ethics likewise give us nothing to aim at. The moral ideas, as already said, have no force.

Again, the distinction of *Regierung* from *Zucht* is of dubious validity. The former appears almost as a stranger living at the cost of its two companions, *Zucht* and *Unterricht*. *Regierung* is said to care only for the present while *Zucht* cares for the future—surely an unnecessary distinction, for *all* Education must look after both present and future. If *Regierung* is uneducative why mention it?⁴

¹The fifth idea is certainly a difficult one, but yet it seems to exist. What else do we mean by approving of Gratitude and (as Butler did) of Resentment? Let us remember again the *abstractness* of Herbart's ideas; they are not to be taught as such to children.

²Herbart merely means "immediate Intuition". The ideas are not products of reasoning. They are based on "insight".

³Surely it is important to *apprehend* the moral law, though it is equally important for our inclinations and habits to conform to it (*Lectures*, § 9).

⁴The reply of Just is conclusive. Herbart's distinctions are useful to be *known*, but need not be carried as such into practice. Herbart's classification shows the educator where the needs lie, and prevents the errors which spring from mental confusion. A "good disciplinarian" is

Herbart came nearest to the true view when he said that the Idea of Perfection suggested soundness of body and mind, a "coming to the full" of a child's powers. Why did he not follow out this Pestalozzian concept, "the harmonious development of all powers"? Herbart answers that the second idea does not stand for the whole of Virtue. The reason is that he has narrowed it down.

He lived remote from the world and did not know children, hence his error that Virtue is the only end of Education; hence also his dragging in of æsthetic and religious culture under "Interest"; likewise his reduction of Feeling and Will to presentations, and his superficial treatment of the culture of the dispositions and of the body. We cannot say he actually forgot any of the chief ends of Education, but his subordination of them to Virtue made their treatment irrational.¹

Herbart's psychology excluded any sensible survey of mental life. Facts like race, nationality, and sex were ignored.

He laid great stress on Virtue as the end of Education. But has he, with all his stress on "educative Instruction," shown us the path to Virtue? No; towards the end of his life his confidence in Instruction grew faint. It is necessary, he tells us, that what is learnt be *felt*. Individual differences may hamper our task; the things learnt may be forgotten; the environment may corrupt, and all our precautions be in vain.²

not necessarily a good educator. Herbart expressly says: "In practice, *Regierung* and *Zucht* combine" (*Lectures*, § 42).

¹ Just retorts that when Dittes divides Education into æsthetic, moral, etc., he is really assuming separate faculties and separate exercises for each faculty. But this gets rid of all unity in Education, and may even result in a conflict of studies, and the creation of distinct "circles of thought". Moreover such a division encourages Egoism; Intellect would be encouraged apart from Morality. [There is truth on both sides. Certain *practical* distinctions must be made; but still the Herbartian doctrine is useful as laying stress on the unity of all education. It is a great mistake to isolate different departments, e.g., "sacred" subjects. Let us have *one* "circle of thought" if possible.]

² That Herbart became less enthusiastic towards the end of his life was not surprising. We must remember that the *General Pedagogy* was a

His original view of moral Education was spoilt by his perverted notion of the origin of the Will; he overestimates the value of intellectual culture and therefore of Instruction.

What a heterogeneous mass of conceptions he gives us! He tells us that the teacher must bring singly to actuality the two members of Inner Freedom (Insight and Will); then the two must be connected. Then, as a fourth step, Effort is to actualise morality permanently. As further factors come inclinations and habits.¹

At one moment we hear of "many-sided Interest" as the goal, at another of "Perfection".² Good maxims are said to come from the æsthetic judgment, but this, on its part, only works powerfully when woven into the total Interest.

Whence come the five moral ideas? Herbart says the soul is absolutely simple, even without faculties; how then can it give rise to these ideas? Are they their own father? And how can they fuse to a unity?³

Herbart speaks of children passing judgments on others

juvenile book. Glöckner retorts on Dittes that though Herbart may have come to admit the feeble influence of Instruction, he equally emphasised the weak influence of Zucht or Training; and he never denied that the Will was rooted in the circle of thought.

¹ Just replies that Dittes is again regarding distinctions drawn for clearness' sake as separate *stages*. Moral Insight is not formed apart from Feeling, and this is brought about by the observation of images of human action. The æsthetic judgment is not cold, but involves a feeling of sympathy with the perceived acts. All the several tasks of moral Education really go on side by side. *Attempt* and *Action* give rise to Will, and this renders *Training* necessary. [Herbart expressly says, "We can seldom wait for the development of the æsthetic judgment"; *Lectures*, § 27. Dittes has here again, as in his criticisms of the Moral Ideas and of Regierung and Zucht, regarded abstract *distinctions* as *separate stages*, quite contrary to Herbart's intention.]

² The second moral idea is undoubtedly connected closely with many-sided Interest. But Glöckner rightly replies that Herbart never put forward either of these notions as the complete goal of Education.

³ Glöckner replies, "The ideas arise along with their objects. Every action must be different for each different experience. If the soul were not simple we might then rightly ask, 'Whence the fusion?'"

before themselves—thus, of judgment apart from moral disposition. But the writer has never seen such a naked judgment in children.¹

The moral ideas, Herbart tells us, are without force. If so, whence comes the motive force? By the ideas becoming involved in *Interest*, we are told; Training must be connected with Instruction. But yet Herbart constantly tells us that the Will is rooted in presentations; so whence comes the real and original *spring* of the moral life? Even Interest (rooted in presentations) cannot yield it. His doctrine is false to facts and also to Christianity, which says that action springs from the *heart*, not from the circle of thought.²

The presentational doctrine is false. A child has numberless pleasures, pains, desires, etc., before presentations.³ Again Effort is not always directed to the freeing of checked presentations; on the contrary, it often aims at *freeing from* some disagreeable presentation.

Herbart's whole scheme of mental statics and dynamics is false, and, therefore, his scheme of "educative Instruction" is false also. Character-strength, with him, rests on "great masses of thought-material which work a deep resultant feeling". Christianity says, "Blessed are the poor in spirit"! A poor peasant wife may have a finer character than the most learned professor.⁴ Alas for men if the most precious of things is dependent upon deep thought! Again, it is not true that opposed presentations always darken and check each other; they often clarify each other.

The longer Herbart lived the more he came to see that other

¹ Just retorts, "Then Dittes must know children very badly. Any mother or teacher will confirm Herbart." [But Dittes probably means, "Will the judgments spring up *spontaneously*?"]

² Dittes' criticism is here probably sound. If we accept pure presentationalism and deny any original tendency to *act* we cannot explain volition. But see *Introduction*, pp. 30-1.

³ Glöckner, following Herbart, answers that a feeling may be presentational at basis, *i.e.*, due to a multitude of obscure stimuli. [But no one can prove this.]

⁴ Glöckner politely replies that even the Devil can quote texts for his purpose. A "learned professor" may be "poor in spirit".

agencies besides Instruction were of moral value ; hobbies, home training, habituation, etc.¹ But though Herbart's views became more sound, he never abandoned the doctrine that punishments and rewards, which imitate nature, do not serve for moral bettering.²

Herbart is also unfortunate with his "Interest" doctrine. He rightly says, "Interest is self-activity," but he ought to distinguish its two elements : (a) activity ; (b) satisfaction. His classification of Interests is also illogical. He mixes up *forms* of Interest (Empirical, Speculative, Contemplative) with *contents* of Interest (objects of experience, etc.). Above all he never tells us the real *origin* of Interest ; his psychology prevents him. Was there, or was there not, a germ of Interest before the objects of Interest came to be known ?

Reform of Herbart's Interest Doctrine.—We can classify Interests, says Dittes, according to either *form* or *matter*. *Formally* we should have Empirical, Speculative, Contemplative, Mnemonic, Productive, etc. Herbart himself has mentioned a Systematic and a Methodic Interest. We could also speak of an Analytic and a Synthetic Interest. According to *Matter* or *Content* we could classify Interest as Æsthetic, Religious, Historic, Agricultural, Practical, Scientific, etc. There is also Personal Interest (in health, etc.).

Herbart was not the discoverer of the Interest doctrine. Comenius, Pestalozzi, Niemeyer and others had anticipated him. Thus Niemeyer urged teachers to excite indwelling forces. But these men rightly regarded Interest as depending on a spontaneous force of the mind, as the development of a natural germ. Herbart's special mechanism does not really explain Interest at all.

He makes good remarks on Attention and Apperception. This is the best part of his work. But Comenius long ago

¹ Such things, says Glöckner, come under *Zucht* and *Regierung*. Herbart never discounted them.

² Nor do they, says Glöckner. They serve to warn and admonish, but equally well bad men and good. [Herbart is here in opposition to the doctrine of "natural punishments" advocated by Spencer and others.]

had urged that all Instruction should conform naturally to the pupil's standpoint. Even Herbart's best work is injured by perversions and exaggerations, which mostly arise out of his false mechanical view of presentations.

In the scheme of "Formal Steps" the terms "System" and "Method" are ill chosen; and the terms "Analysis" and "Synthesis" are used waveringly. The Herbartian pedagogy not only rests on untenable foundations, and is a failure in its outlines, but it is also extremely deficient, obscure, and confused in its definitions and terminology. Its originality consists mainly in its unsuccessful elucidations of old thoughts, and in the introduction of new names and classifications which, for the most part, are badly brought forward, have no value, scientific or practical, and are also precisely adapted to cause a complete confusion of concepts and language. The terminology would prevent any communication with parents, boards of managers, etc.

Herbart's suggestions for dealing with classics, mathematics, and geography (*e.g.*, his recommendation to connect this last one with other subjects) are good. But he has not dealt with modern languages, drawing, and singing. His remarks on religious Instruction are obscure. Virtually he hands the subject over to the theologians. Its culmination, he says, lies in Confirmation (accompanied by a special confession) and the Holy Communion (a sign of general brotherhood). He recommends Plato's *Krito* and *Apology* for strengthening religious impressions. (What will religious people say?) He says nothing of fairy tales, neither does he tell us whether schools should be sectarian, unsectarian, or governmental. At times he says some hard things about Church arrogance, but he finally leaves the Church in an almost impregnable position. His metaphysic is really incompatible with Religion, hence he bases religion merely on practical needs, *e.g.*, the need to keep the mind humble.¹

¹Glöckner shows, by quotations, that Herbart's piety was warm and sincere.

SECTION II.

WESENDONCK.

(1885.)

Reference.

Wesendonck. *Die Schule Herbart-Ziller und ihre Jünger vor dem Forum der Kritik.* Pichlers Witwe und Sohn, Vienna and Leipzig, 1885.

THE above work is, in part, a critique of Herbartian and Zillerian (chiefly the latter) ideas, but its main interest lies in its scathing exposure of the controversial methods of the Zillerians. The author shows that, with all their zeal and merits, these men have very bad manners. Among other things, they accuse their opponents of being "vulgar pedagogues," "mere practitioners," "ignoramuses," "nullities," "people to whom pedagogy is an El Dorado of dilettantism," and "people whose mental horizon ends with their noses".

Wesendonck commences with an historical survey of the Herbartian movement, dealing in some detail with the work of Stoy and Ziller. He criticises Ziller as follows:—

He was not devoid of merits. He had much knowledge, much boldness, and a warm love for man. But he did not know the capacities of the average child, nor the distinction between the desirable and the attainable. That is to say, he was impractical, and must therefore not be accepted as a pope.

When he approved of putting the whole Bible into the hands of children he was wrong; many parts are unsuitable, indeed unreadable.

His proposal to make the elementary schools schools for the poor only, was thoroughly bad. It would degrade these schools, and generate pride, envy, etc. Separate schools for different ranks would be not only unadvisable, but far too expensive for any State. Still special schools for neglected or peculiar children are useful.

His condemnation of French as an uneducative language is

unjust. Ziller was prejudiced against *modern* languages and only approved of giving a smattering of them for practical purposes, *e.g.*, to future merchants. If such languages are to be postponed to the University stage they will never be learnt properly.

He rightly demands that Syntax be learnt inductively during the course of reading, but he is wrong in demanding the same for Etymology. Surely, to learn the conjugations, etc., in this way would be wearisome and distracting. What a vast amount of reading would be necessary, and how insecure the knowledge would be! The first thing should be a rapid glance at the conjugations, *then* reading. Herbart was here more sound than Ziller.

The Zillerian curriculum is overcrowded, including such things as reading foreign handwriting. In higher schools musical and theatrical exhibitions are to take place. But where are the buildings, utensils, etc., to be obtained? Who is to bear the expense? Ziller recommends that in the accessory classes of upper schools medicine should be taught to future physicians, Hebrew to future theologians, etc. But surely a school should be on general lines; pupils may not yet know their future calling. Science would do the theologians more good.¹

Ziller expected vast knowledge from his teachers, *e.g.*, knowledge of foreign forms of speech (and even their constituents) which have been introduced into the vernacular.

He objects to a merely "popular" style of teaching. But many subjects must be taught "popularly" or not at all. Teachers would have to live to the age of Methuselah to satisfy Ziller's demands.

Ziller's "concentration" plan would really lead to a breaking-up of connected matter. The pupil would only acquire scrappy

¹ Ziller is often attacked from two sides. Some critics contend that a school should "prepare for life;" these protest against his claim that schools should "educate," *i.e.*, form character. Others protest against his admission of professional subjects in upper classes. The two objections neutralise each other. Ziller was right in laying the main stress on "Education," but he made quite sufficient concessions to utilitarian demands.

knowledge, not connected views of a subject. Only the "concentration" material at the centre will get justice, and children will even get tired of this owing to its constant recurrence. To use the story of the "seven little goats" for purposes of arithmetic, geography, etc., is only to make children hate the story. Why, after all, this craving for "concentration"? The child hears all kinds of matter and yet does not lose his personality. Besides, where is the "concentration" in using *twelve* fairy tales? And is there any proof that this plan of "concentration" aids character?

The fairy tales are useful aids to imagination and feeling, but have little bearing on morality. They are partly survivals from pagan mythology, partly later in origin; they certainly do not represent any *one* "culture epoch". But even if they did, is it necessary to lead Christian children through heathen and Jewish stages?¹

Some of the fables positively shock our moral or æsthetic feelings; others appear silly even to the young; in other cases the lessons deduced from them are beyond children's capacities, *e.g.*, "Don't judge according to appearances". (How, then, is a child to judge?)

Again, as Fröhlich has shown, the Robinson Crusoe stage is not suitable for children of seven, for things like sea, shipwreck, etc., are beyond them. The desire for travel comes about the age of twelve, and then the story has much value. But it represents a stage of culture far in advance of the patriarchal, and is also morally in advance of it. What folly, therefore, to put it *before* the patriarchal period!

Whole stages are missing from Ziller's scheme, *e.g.*, the pre-language stage, the stages of fetichism,² polytheism, etc. His scheme is not even orthodox; where does the fall of man come in? The *present-day* stage is left out altogether, though the

¹ Yes, says (in effect) Dr. Stanley Hall. See p. 71.

² Dr. Stanley Hall in his daring contribution to *Principles of Religious Education* recommends "nature study" for Sunday Schools, as corresponding to the stage of fetichism in the race.

most important of all. Is the boy of fourteen a man already? Apparently so, if the eighth stage is the final one.

Is the life of Jesus a "stage," properly speaking? Is it to be "lived through"? In any case its importance is underestimated in the Zillerian scheme. Moreover the eighth stage (the Reformation) is a stage of heresy for Catholics.

In Ziller's plan there is an absence of recognition given to such principles as nationality, patriotism, the rights of man, the limitation of the absolute power of rulers, the extension of state power in the interests of members, tolerance, love of men in general. Ziller's selection of historical material is arbitrary.

Again his distinction between "educative" and "uneducative" instruction is artificial; all material, properly handled, ought to be educative. There should be moral ideas in it all, though the pupils may not be conscious of them.¹ But some departments are better than others for moral purposes. History (religious and profane) is especially good, but fables (we have seen) are not so good as Ziller thinks them to be.

His attempt to teach modern history contemporaneously with ancient is impractical, and violates true concentration. No wonder some of his followers wish to teach history partly backwards, partly forwards.

Ziller sometimes appears like a theologian of the Middle Ages in his overvaluation of the Jews, Greeks, and Romans, and in his admiration for Latin.

Another defect of Herbartianism is its cumbrous terminology. Instead of "Regierung" why not say "outer guidance"; instead of "Zucht," "inner guidance"? Moreover, the distinction between these two and between them and Instruction was known long before Herbart. That Instruction should not only give knowledge but also form character is no new discovery. The whole Herbartian school suffers from verbosity

¹This is nonsense. The only important *moral* part played by mathematics is that the study may possibly function as a life interest. But history deals with man *as such*. Ziller's distinction, though only a rough one, is quite justified.

and arrogance. The reader of the writings of the Herbartians requires a special dictionary, and must discount their claims to be the only educationists.

Generally it may be said that the Zillerians overestimate the value of Instruction, owing to their adherence to Herbart's presentational psychology. Parental love, family love, imitation, personality of the teacher, influence of companions and books, are far more influential.

Still, the Herbart-Ziller system has certain excellences, among which may be mentioned (1) its insistence on many-sided Interest as contrasted with dry knowledge or skill, and on the rousing of involuntary attention; (2) its insistence on the view that Instruction must be "educative" (*i.e.*, from character); but supreme authority must not be given to any *one* kind of instruction-material; (3) the apperception doctrine; (4) the articulation of Instruction; here come in the "formal steps" which are useful but must not be slavishly followed; moreover they are not exclusively Herbartian; (5) Ziller's grand design of forming a teaching-plan, in place of a mere aggregate of studies; he carried it to absurdities, but he deserves praise for aiming at it; (6) Ziller's recommendation of conversational rather than catechetical methods; Dittes and others have, however, made the same recommendation; (7) Ziller's emphasis on the dignity of the educational calling. But he and many other Herbartians think too much of home education and regard schools mainly as auxiliary agents, though upon them he sometimes puts too great demands. Moreover his thoughts were fixed too much on the upper classes of society.

Wesendonck's work, as already said, is largely devoted to an exposure of the controversial methods of the Herbartians. Vogt, successor of Ziller, comes in for special castigation. Because Dittes had written a critique—one quite free from offensive personalities—Vogt must needs accuse him of "mendacity," "hostility to all science," "plagiarism," "impiousness," "party spirit," and so forth, and urges that the State should suppress all forms of "anarchism," such as those represented by the

"radicalism" of Dittes and his "terrorist" followers. Yet Vogt was head of a union aiming at "educative Instruction," i.e., Instruction that makes for character!

SECTION III.

BARTELS.

(1885.)

Reference.

Bartels. *Die Anwendbarkeit der Herbart-Ziller-Stoy'schen didaktischen Grundsätze für den Unterricht in Volks- und Bürgerschulen.* Wittenberg, 1885, 1888.

It was to Dr. Bartels, director of the "Bürgerschulen" of Gera, that Stoy sent the epigrammatic message which proclaimed the breach between the moderate and the extreme (or Zillerian) followers of Herbart. "What is good in Ziller is not new, what is new is not good."

Ziller's doctrines (says Bartels) are defective on the practical side. Herbart himself had recognised the important part played by practice. Speculation and psychology are not the only things necessary for pedagogy. We may recognise Ziller's services, yet deny them to be very Titanic.

The Herbartians build their system on ethics and psychology. This is good, but insufficient. *Religion* has independent worth and goes far beyond the "moral ideas". Man has to be made into God's image; he must be "saved"; this is not the same as being fed with a number of Interests. Even Ziller, though going beyond Herbart in recognising the claims of religion, did not sufficiently emphasise the need of Christian faith.

The defects of Herbart's psychology have been adequately exposed by Ostermann and others. Whatever Herbartians may say, the soul *has* faculties, and cannot be resolved into a presentation-mechanism. Attention cannot be explained on Herbart's theory; though occasioned by presentations, it is

something more than they. Herbart's view results in an exaggeration of the power of education.

"Educative Instruction."—The Herbartians lay great stress on this "Instruction which forms Character," and strongly condemn much Instruction and many Schools as really "un-educative". Very good! But Luther, Comenius, Locke, Pestalozzi, Niemeyer, Diesterweg had all urged that Instruction should make for Character, and Diesterweg's views were very similar, on this subject, to those of Herbart.

"Schools do not Educate."—The old fashion was to give the "Three R's," *plus* religious Instruction in the form of indigestible biblical and catechetical material. Then science came to the front, and there occurred a heaping-up of new subjects—"didactic materialism"—but no principle of selection. Hence "Interest" was not aroused, for the material was not arranged in accordance with the child's natural capacities. But "Interest," say the Herbartians, is the one great essential; it is an *end*, not a mere *means*; self-activity must be roused.

"Good," says the critic, "but not original." Pestalozzi, Niemeyer, Diesterweg saw this. Moreover, the Herbartians lay exaggerated stress on Instruction, and depreciate such influences as personality, family, and environment.

"Culture stages."—Here the Zillerians go quite beyond Herbart. Ziller claims that language shows that a similar development took place in race and in individual, and this is one of the supports of his doctrine. But does he ever really *prove* that the individual goes through the stages of the race? Never! Men like Fröhlich claim that though there are analogies there is no real parallelism. Is it possible to believe that there are eight stages of racial development capable of being represented by the eight arbitrarily selected stages of a German elementary school? Strange! Dr. Staude, though a Zillerian, has admitted that the stages of child development cannot be very exactly defined, and Sallwürk has attacked Ziller's plan at many points. He has asked, for example, whether the Protestant German Empire and the Lutheran catechism necessarily represent the highest hitherto attainable stages of human pro-

gress. And is not a scheme seriously defective if it is only applicable to Protestant children ?

Sallwürk's book created a sensation, and Rein, in his reply, had to modify his master's scheme, and lay stress on *national* rather than cosmopolitan "culture stages". Dörpfeld likewise, though an Herbartian, has only accepted the "culture stages" doctrine on condition of its being combined with the "concentric circles" plan.

Let us consider Ziller's proposal to use fairy tales as the centre of the first year's instruction. These tales may be useful, but they cannot take the place of religious Instruction proper. They are *imagination*- and *feeling*-material, and work æsthetically, not morally.¹ Moreover, some of the objections to the biblical stories (*e.g.*, that they represent sons who deceive their parents) hold good of certain fairy tales. Few of the tales recommended by Ziller have moral value ; some are positively pernicious, and represent wrong acts being rewarded. But how grandly reward and punishment are represented in the Bible ! And how hollow the moral lessons deduced from the twelve fairy tales ! Still again, how absurd to subordinate *all* Instruction in the first year to these twelve stories, a plan which unnaturally splits up Instruction ! Use the stories, but not as material for moral, arithmetical, and other Instruction. Avoid, moreover, stimulating the fancy too much.

Biblical narratives are by no means too difficult for young children ; indeed, they are so natural, truthful, simple, and impressive that they readily seize the juvenile mind. Fables are known even to children as being fictitious, and should not be used for religious Instruction. Doubtless biblical stories require some preparation, but this has already been provided in Christmas and other festivals.

Then as to Robinson Crusoe. The high claims put forward on behalf of this story (that it is full of moral value, etc.) cannot be justified ; moreover the story ought not to belong to the

¹ This is precisely what the wiser Zillerians would admit. The child is too young to be fed with moral or religious material in the ordinary sense.

second school year, it would do better for boys of thirteen craving for adventures; Crusoe, too, is an eighteenth-century hero, largely fictitious; he does not represent a "culture stage" earlier than the patriarchal. He knows agriculture, the compass, etc.; no child at the age supposed possesses the requisite apperception-material, and if he did he would get tired of Crusoe, Crusoe, for a whole year. Far better would it be to let the children "begin at home" than to try to make them assimilate all the geographical and other matter presented in the Crusoe story. Herbart, like Rousseau, approved of the story, but not for seven-year-olds. Besides, why should such young children have to "subject nature to their service" as Crusoe did? In fact the case for Crusoe is far weaker than for the fairy tales.

Less need be said of the other school years, for which the Zillerians definitely select biblical material. But the problem still rises; is there the parallelism between racial and individual development? Do the "culture stages" correspond to real apperception stages of the child's mind? Especially wrong is the giving of only one year to the life of Christ, and the long time spent on the Old Testament. Are the "judges" any advance on the "patriarchs"?

What about schools in which the year's course is not completed—as happened even at the practising school in Leipzig! Various hindrances may prevent a child from reaching the first class. Surely a scheme should meet contingencies like these! Again, what about a school without eight classes? In a four-class school are we to *drop* stages, or alternate them thus: 1880, Fables; 1881, Robinson; 1882, Fables; and so on? But the latter plan means that Robinson must sometimes precede Fables!

Religious Services.—As the Zillerians reject biblical history for the earlier years they compensate for the loss by means of religious services which, however, are not supposed to take the form of "Instruction". But who can deal, *e.g.*, with the life of Jesus without giving "Instruction"? Moreover, to separate devotion from Instruction is scarcely conformable with the doctrine of "Concentration". Again, these services will

necessarily be either beyond the younger children or below the older ones—hence weariness.

“*Concentric Circles.*”—The Herbartians are severe on this plan, that of making each “school year” take up much the same material as the previous one, but amplifying it in ever widening circles. In preference to this the Herbartians recommend a chronological order (“culture stages”), and claim that “concentric circles” involve weariness and satiety owing to constant repetitions.

But (says the critic) this plan of “circles” has long been approved by great educationists, like Comenius, and even Herbartians like Dörfeld and Lentz approve of it, though in conjunction with the rival plan. It is quite right to begin with some simple facts and then make them more definite as the age of the pupil increases; thus we keep the old material safe and sound (which the Zillerians are in danger of *not* doing) and add each year fresh material. The old apperceives the new.

Ziller’s plan allows of all kinds of thought-wanderings, as when the mention of Bremen is supposed to awaken such Interest as to justify a geographical discussion. Surely we ought to go “from near to far”. Instead of following this sound principle, Ziller allows quite young children to learn about the geography of the East, and to discuss all kinds of difficult matters (like hereditary succession, in connection with the Judges). The plan of “concentric circles,” on the other hand, allows of a gradual advance.

If the Zillerians protest against everlasting repetition, *we* protest against *neglect* of repetition. Again, the plan of “culture stages” can only properly be applied to eight-class schools, that of “concentric circles” to any schools; and thus even if a boy has to leave school before reaching the top class this is not so serious a matter in the second case as in the first.

“*Concentration.*”—The Herbartian psychology ignores the unity of the self; hence an artificial “concentration” has to be brought about. All educators admit that knowledge should be unified as far as possible. But instead of effecting this, Ziller’s plan really brings about *disunion*, for each department of study

that is subordinated to the central one receives only a scrappy treatment. Thus geography has to follow the fortunes of the patriarchs and so forth, instead of pursuing its own natural course. Ziller has tried to deny that this is the outcome of his proposals, but in vain.

It is quite right to connect together *related* material. But the tendency of Ziller's plan is towards a merely *external* connecting, as when the burial of the patriarchs in the limestone hills of Canaan is used as a peg on which to hang a lesson on the properties of chalk. Surely each subject should be allowed to awaken its *own* interest. Many even of his followers have modified his plan so as to introduce *several* "centres," and to give independence to science, etc. Moreover the supposed parallelism between Jewish and profane history is quite imaginary.

Still, the Zillerians deserve credit for having insisted on the idea of "concentration". Lessons should fit into each other and throw as much light upon each other as possible. All *natural* and *useful* connections should be made use of.

The Formal Steps.—This is the best part of the Herbartian system, though it is not original. Comenius had drawn up a very similar plan: *Example, Explanation, Rule, Exercise*. The teacher must not become *enslaved* to Herbart's scheme. The first of the "steps" is often unnecessary, and the giving of the "goal" is not always possible.

SECTION IV.

OSTERMANN.

(1887.)

Reference.

Ostermann. *Die hauptsächlichsten Irrtümer der Herbart'schen Psychologie und ihre pädagogischen Konsequenzen*. Oldenburg and Leipzig, 1887.

No part of Herbart's philosophy has been more violently attacked than his psychology; a work dealing with the "Critics

of Herbartianism" ought therefore to include a discussion of psychological problems. Ostermann's attack was on these lines, and also touched upon pedagogical matters.

Herbart thought himself driven to the assumption of a multitude of absolutely simple "reals," devoid of "faculties," etc., by the contradictions which experience offers, *e.g.*, the contradiction involved in the view that a single *thing* can possess a multiplicity of qualities.¹

From the interaction of these hypothetical "reals" arise (on Herbart's view) presentations or ideas. Once a presentation has arisen it persists unchanged until disturbed by others. With these it may enter into various relations.

(1) Two *similar* tones (*e.g.*) may *fuse* to a stronger tone.

(2) Two disparate sensations (colour, smell, etc., of an orange) may *complicate* or *unite*.

(3) Two contrary presentations may check each other so far as they are opposed, and *unite* so far as they are not checked.

No presentation is ever destroyed, though it may be driven below the threshold and then merely *strive* to be presented. The amount of checking it experiences depends on (1) its own native strength; (2) the degree of opposition exerted by other presentations.

Apperception occurs when a new presentation is passive relatively to old presentations.² *Attention* is largely dependent on Apperception; it is the energetic and lasting self-maintenance of a presentation in consciousness.

Ostermann offers various criticisms of the above doctrine. Even supposing that the "simple" soul is able to generate presentations, how can these latter persist after the ceasing of the conjunction which brought them forth? Herbart regarded the presentations as immortal, but the analogy of the first law of motion is not to the point ("A body persists . . ."), for

¹ Ostermann's discussion of Herbart's metaphysics must here be almost entirely omitted.

² Don Quixote's fixed ideas seized hold of a new experience (windmills) and interpreted or apperceived it,

presentations are inner states, not, like motion, external qualities of a body. Surely a presentation generated out of the interaction of "reals" must cease when the interaction is over.

Herbart was wrong when he regarded all presentations as having definite intensities and definite amounts of mutual opposition. The memory-image of a thunderclap is of very different intensity from that of the sound itself. Again, Wundt has shown experimentally that two contrasting impressions (black and white) do not only not check, but actually aid each other. So also with *concepts*; what easier than to think of opposites? Herbart, in fact, forgets that though the presentation-contents may be opposed, the mental activities they call forth may not be opposite at all.

What is the nature of the supposed "checking" between two presentations? He regards it as a kind of mutual mechanical pressure. But is this a tenable view? True, the soul, in experiencing the two opposed presentations, *a* and *b*, may strive to remove this opposition by getting rid of one of them. But can *a* and *b* resist each other? Are they independent existences? *Herbart's view destroys the unity of the soul.*¹

Again, what meaning can be attached to the statement that the checked presentations show a "striving to be presented"? We can understand it if we regard it as a *material tension*. But presentations are mental states; how, then, can they be in unconsciousness? Herbart was driven to this view by the stringency of his metaphysics; being forbidden to assume "faculties" he had to assume that presentations always exist, even in unconsciousness. But on our theory they need no more exist than the note of a musical string need always be sounding; *the conditions of reproduction exist*, but not the note itself. Even the physiological view would be better than Herbart's,

¹ This conclusion is probably a true one. Still, we must not forget that Herbart's metaphysical "real" or "soul" is supposed to be existent all this time.

for it provides a substratum (nerves, etc.) for presentations. But Herbart will neither allow of this nor of any activity of the soul itself. With him, each presentation is virtually a little soul, and the total soul-activity is divided up into presentation-activities; thus there is no unity, and we cannot understand how presentations come ever to be united. Really this union is the work of the soul, but Herbart has to assume links between the presentations; each of the latter, however, is, for him, an entity in itself.

He conveniently allows that the action and suffering of the presentation are also the action and suffering of the soul. Thus we appear to have a double series of events.

The doctrine of mutual "checking" involves either that the presentations are separate entities or that one part of the soul checks another part. Each view destroys the unity of the soul. Or can it be that the whole soul checks itself? Again, how can the soul itself be "unalterable" if all these processes take place in it? Herbart insists that the metaphysical soul takes no part in mental events!

There is no possible way of explaining mental life if we assume that each presentation has a content and activity of its own. No theory of "fusion" will suffice. In all mental processes there must be present a unitary principle which compares, relates, etc., the different presentations. We cannot explain Intelligence and the forming of general ideas as a result of the reproduction, fusion, and checking of a multitude of similar presentations. The concept itself cannot be "presented"; it is abstract, and stands for certain *relations established by thought*. Thus the concept "animal" grasps in itself all different animals.

Herbart has a theory of "collective presentations"¹ which he regards as stepping-stones to concepts proper. But if such presentations existed we should be unable to revive the *older*

¹ Generally called "generic images" by English psychologists. Such an image (e.g., of "man") is supposed to be the vague residual image left after a number of individual images of men have been superimposed.

single ones, for their special traits would have been suppressed. Throughout the whole of Herbart's system the unifying function of the soul is ignored.

Equally unsatisfactory is his treatment of Feeling and Desire, which are supposed to arise out of presentations according as the movements of these favour or hinder each other. Herbart infers that pedagogically the presentations are the most important mental elements, while joys and sorrows are but transitory. Even *sensible* feelings, according to Herbart, rest ultimately on minute presentational units. There is no "Feeling" faculty, or "Desire" faculty; all depends on the interactions of presentations. Desire is an advancing movement, Feeling a resting condition.

But surely (says Ostermann) Feeling belongs to the soul, not to presentations. The Herbartians transfer the effect of the "checkings" to the soul itself. But in reality what one presentation loses in activity another must gain. There is no gain or loss for the soul *taken as a whole*; why then should it experience pleasure or pain? Or is there a constant oscillation of pleasure and pain corresponding to the checking, etc., of presentations? Surely we must posit a faculty of Feeling, which is quite as original a function as Presentation. Presentations may stimulate this faculty into operation, *but there must first be the faculty itself*. How otherwise would such an idea as that of danger give rise to any feeling at all? Of course the faculty is not separate from the soul itself. Herbart's attack was directed against a *false* faculty doctrine which separated the "faculties" from the soul.

There are many sensory pains, etc., which come into consciousness without any presentational content. Can Herbart deny or explain this?¹ Again, feelings differ in colouring as well as in intensity; compare avarice with æsthetic feeling. Ballauf and other Herbartians admit this, but it is not reconcilable with Herbart's own doctrine.

Again, if it be true that those presentations which rise to the

¹ He posits minute presentational elements as the basis of such pains, etc.

highest clearness bear the most lively feelings, we should expect the study of mathematics to be intensely emotional. Facts tell a different story. Again, the *clear* image of a distant friend awakens melancholy, not pleasure. The Herbartian theory ignores the *content*, or *significance*, or *worth* of presentations, and considers their quantitative relations only. Later Herbartians, like Ballauf and Strümpell, have tended to admit a "Feeling" faculty, thus being really faithless to Herbart.

The Herbartians are right in emphasising the close connection between Desire and Presentation; we cannot desire what we cannot think of. But we do not desire what is actually present, whereas, according to Herbart, each desire is bound to a present content.

Certain cases of mental disturbance mentioned by Nathan prove that the Will can control the course of presentations, and is therefore not a mere product of them.

The Will and its Freedom.—Will (according to Herbart) is Desire *plus* Certainty. Desire is a product of the presentation-mechanism; so also must Will be. But if moral action is dependent on an estimation of value (as Herbart affirms), how can this be reconciled with the mechanical view? He holds that the moral judgment must, in order to prevail, be connected with a strong unified mass of thoughts, whose mechanical strength will overcome all opposing ideas. Good! But where is the rôle of the moral judgment?

Even his notion of a fusion of repeated volitions (after the manner of the formation of concepts) does not lift us out of the realm of mechanism. Freedom, in fact, is entirely excluded from the system. No doubt he speaks of Inner Freedom (= volition according to the moral judgments) but even this seems to depend on the mechanical strength of presentation-masses. Where is responsibility? He dismisses the question with a few words. Practically, he says, we must not go beyond the Will in passing judgment. But as he resolves Will into a mechanical process, he really gets rid of responsibility. We may admit that the question is a difficult one, but somehow we must preserve responsibility.

The "Faculty" Doctrine.—Herbart was right in protesting against the *vulgar* "faculty doctrine," which destroys the unity of the soul, brings on the scene empty powers apart from concrete mental life, and substitutes for a scientific explanation of mental facts a mere appeal to a suppositious "faculty". But Herbart has not succeeded in explaining mental life in terms of presentations, and by analogies derived from mechanics. Moreover, certain phenomena point to a distinct "memory faculty" as possessed by certain prodigies. Again there are specific *differences* of memory. We must assume that the soul has other modes of expressing itself than Presentation, though we must not assume any faculty separate from the soul itself.

Pedagogical Results.—Because of his presentationalism, Herbart lays great stress on Instruction and upon the forming of "large unbroken masses of thought". The energy of the moral judgments depends upon their being connected with strong thought-masses.

Is this view tenable? The fact is, there must be an *original* unity such as is not provided by Herbart's system of separate presentations. The "concentration" doctrine does not bring about a unity, for we are never told how the presentations can fuse. Nor are we given any explanation of the moral life; for whence comes the notion of *worth* if the whole mental life consists of presentations? Still, the "concentration" plan has much *intellectual* value; it impresses facts on the memory and conduces to culture; it may even *indirectly* help character. But character depends mainly on disposition, not on presentations.

The peculiar "concentration" and "culture stages" doctrines of the Zillerians are highly artificial, and would probably have been condemned by Herbart himself, for he cautions us against aiming at an artificial unity, and against disrupting what ought to be connected.

The "Interest" doctrine is said to be the most important one in the Herbartian scheme, and to have great moral significance. But on examination we find that Interest is a form of "involuntary attention," and depends upon the strength of pre-

sentations. Thus we are brought back to a mechanical view. At times we are told that Interest finds complete satisfaction in the *present*; at other times that it compels to continuous self-activity and advance. In fact the Interest doctrine cannot be reconciled with Herbart's mechanical scheme. It is impossible to regard Feeling as a transitory modification of presentations.

The Herbartians lay stress on the need of Imagination. Actions must be thought about, pictured; model images of actions must be formed. In this way (we are told) practical hindrances will be conquered when they arise. There is truth in this, but, after all, reflection will not ensure vigorous action. Strong Will depends mainly on natural endowment and on practice in overcoming difficulties.

Even the Herbartians feel at times the need of calling forth energy, as when they recommend that at the beginning of each lesson its goal should be stated, so that, in this way, the pupil may exert all his powers. But where *are* these powers? How can we explain them if each presentation has a definite maximum of energy, and there is no real energy of the *soul* itself? The only hope of the Herbartians is in "concentrating" many presentations. But in reality Will power arises through conflict, habit, natural endowment, etc.; moreover, physical exercises contribute to it, as the English have recognised.

But a Will must not only be strong, but directed to the Good. Here again Habit is important, but there must also be Education, and a rousing of Interest in what is good. But Interest is rooted in Feeling, hence Education must confer more than mere enlightenment. How are we to touch the *heart*? Through actual occurrences, human life, example. *The main thing is not Instruction, but Inspiration.* Stories from history, songs, poetry, etc., are useful; Instruction, when given, must attach itself to concrete foundations, to definite situations, events, etc.¹

¹ Needless to say, all Herbartians would agree with this; they lay immense stress on history, poetry, etc.

The Herbartians reply that mere appeals to Feeling have no permanent effect, for feelings are but transitory modifications of presentations. But their psychology is wrong. Feeling is as original as presentations, and leaves behind a permanent after-effect—Interest. Still, there may be *excess* even here ; and the Herbartians are right in emphasising the close connection of feelings and presentations.

Herbartianism has furthered educational science ; it has protested against catechetical methods ; it has urged the importance of rousing independent and connected thought. But its goal is one-sided ; it neglects physical education ; its terminology is artificial ; its selection of fairy-tales for moral purposes is a mistake, for these tales are not moral ; its emphasis on “concentration” is overdone ; and its followers tend to become blind followers of their master’s prescriptions.

SECTION V.

RICHTER.

(1887.)

Reference.

Richter. *Die Herbart-Zillerschen formalen Stufen des Unterrichts, nach ihrem Wesen, ihrer geschichtlichen Grundlage, und ihrer Anwendung im Volksschulunterrichte.* Hesse, Leipzig, 1887. Second edition, 1898.

THIS work is a “gekrönte Preisschrift,” an essay which won the prize offered in 1886 by an educational institute in Dresden for the best work on the subject, “The applicability of the Herbart-Ziller formal steps to instruction in elementary schools”.

The author goes into the whole question with German thoroughness ; shows who were Herbart’s predecessors (Comenius, etc.) in the task of working out the “formal steps” ; compares Herbart’s treatment with Ziller’s ; and finally arrives at the result that they are, on the whole, a sound contribution

to pedagogical practice inasmuch as they rest on the laws of learning, and lighten the task of teaching and acquisition.

More valuable, however, than these portions of the work are the author's remarks on the limitations and dangers of the "formal steps". But the reader must remember that the general verdict of Richter—into the exact grounds of which we cannot here go—is favourable.

The chief danger which the author urges is a familiar one—that mechanical teachers will apply the "steps" without judgment and discretion, and make them into a rigid scheme which will check rather than encourage thought.

Ziller himself has already pointed out certain limitations of his scheme. It is inapplicable to such material as is already abstract in form, *e.g.*, a scientific reading book, a grammar, a catechism,¹ an historical table, a portion of the Bible with direct didactic tendency (Sermon on the Mount, etc.). Such materials already represent worked-up results, hence they afford no opportunity of a movement from Anschauung to Denken (thinking), and so on. Similarly, the correcting or the repetition of exercises, and various accidental occurrences such as may happen on a school excursion, cannot, as a rule, be treated in accordance with the formal steps. So also with the acquisition of skill in writing, etc.

In point of fact, Ziller's excepting of catechetical instruction from the scope of the formal steps is not altogether valid. Even religious instruction should start from the concrete and work forward towards the maxims of the catechism, in full accordance with Herbart's procedure, which starts with Anschauung, goes on to Thinking, and finally arrives at Application.

The Zillerians attack the catechism violently, on the grounds that it omits any initial statement of the goal of the lesson, checks free activity by the way it throws out its questions, makes children use words they do not fully understand and

¹ The common teaching of the catechism proceeds on precisely opposite principles to the formal steps. The child learns the abstract statement, and then this is *illustrated* by concrete examples when possible.

judgments not arising from insight, and breaks up what should be in connection. This assault of the Zillerians is in part justified, but they ignore the fact that there may be a real use for the catechism.

They also undervalue questioning in general, and prefer to draw out children's speech by such words as "and," "but," etc. Here, again, this proposal may be useful in certain circumstances, *e.g.*, when a child is reproducing something already learnt; but again we must not lay down any rule.

Children have small powers of speech and of mental grasp; we *must* use questions; they help to impress facts. At higher stages questions involving long answers are good.

Some extreme Zillerians have even recommended that in teaching writing an attempt should be made to carry out the formal steps; letters have to be analysed into their elements, compared, and so forth. This is absurd. Writing, reading, drawing, singing are matters of *practice*, and must be treated as such.¹

Ziller it was, not Herbart, who used the expression "formal" in connection with the steps. The expression implies that the *material* is negligible. This is not so. The material of instruction must dictate its own methods of treatment.

The Herbartians underestimate the value of silent, spontaneous development. The *object* itself exerts power upon the pupil.

Ziller recommends the division of a lesson into method units, each of which is to be worked through in accordance with the formal steps. But if the units are very small, great artificiality and weariness result from such a treatment. Ziller tries to avoid this by recommending movements from one "method unit" to another and back again.

Let us rather consider the children's capacities in dividing

¹ Dr. Findlay has done splendid service by drawing a clear line of demarcation between "the acquirement of knowledge" and "the acquirement of skill". It is to the former process that the "formal steps" are applicable. *Principles of Class Teaching*.

up our material. One lesson may prepare the way for another; thus the latter may not require the "first step" (preparation) at all. Now one step, now another, may be omitted, and various other modifications of the scheme be made according to circumstances. Sometimes a lesson must be mainly synthesis (step two); sometimes "application" may be impossible without great artificiality (as when the Herbartians bring moral considerations on the scene which are only remotely connected with the rest of the lesson). We see clear signs of artificiality in the lessons drawn up by Rein, Staude, and other Herbartians, especially in dealing with the fifth step, which, with them, becomes either mere repetition or goes quite beyond the child.

The Herbartians are right in urging that abstraction must be preceded by apperception, but it is not true that abstraction must always follow apperception. The child may be too young to go beyond the stage of apperception. But the Zillerians seem to think that all the five stages must be run through on every occasion.

They also urge that the goal of the lesson should be held clearly in view from the first, and that it must be given by the children—a process which involves (says Richter) much guess-work and waste of time.

The Zillerians say that the goal must be actual, not a mere "next chapter," etc. But often we cannot follow out this prescription, for to do so would be actually to introduce the new matter, which is forbidden. The Zillerian rule has its utility, but often cannot be carried out.

Ziller also recommends that at the first stage many side-issues may be permitted to be suggested by the pupils; this is supposed to prepare the way for the new matter. But in point of fact the plan merely leads to useless discursiveness. Herbart has actually warned us against such a danger.

For the stage of synthesis Ziller makes the unexpected proposal that instead of the teacher presenting the new matter to the pupils it may be read by the pupils out of a book. Here he departs from Herbart, and men like Dörpfeld have rightly

protested against so reactionary a proposal. To think that a child, halting and stumbling as he reads, can properly assimilate the new matter is absurd.

Again Ziller recommends that exercises on the new material be imposed on individual scholars—not on the class collectively. But this means that most of the pupils will be doing nothing but listening. Surely, questions—on which Ziller does not look with favour—will engage the attention of the whole class.

As a substitute, Ziller proposes a kind of discussion or disputation; without this, he says, the pupils do not become fully conscious of what they know and can do. Strange proposal! This mediæval disputation method has long been banished from the Latin school; here is Ziller trying to introduce it into the elementary school! But how is the method possible with large classes? Where will discipline be? How are we to prevent chattering, or to draw forth the silent members of the class?

Ziller, like many educationists, objects to children learning ready-made scientific results from text-books, and recommends that they start from the concrete and work towards the abstract results. But he is inconsistent in permitting (at the stage of “system”) the attained results to be compared with the results in a book. If pupils are once allowed to use a book at all they will have curiosity enough to use it for other purposes.

At the last stage (“application”) Ziller recommends (in connection with the treatment of “*Gesinnungsstoff*”) that children’s imagination should be exercised on action; for thinking about action aids real subsequent action by helping to conquer possible hindrances. “What would you have done in Adam’s place? What would you have done in such and such dangerous circumstances?”

But is there much value in this? Moralising is of little use. Unless children have had considerable life experiences they cannot profit by such discussions; or they may even be led to think of actions of dubious value. It is easy to *imagine* action; but though spirit may be willing, flesh is weak.

Many of the “applications” recommended by Zillerians like Staude are quite beyond the mental capacity of children. What

is the use of discussing with them the social origin of revolutions or the rights and wrongs of polygamy?

It is important that the formal steps, when used, shall be used with due regard to the nature of the object taught, and of the pupil. Some children are more capable of abstract thought than others whose minds are of the *Anschauung* type. Some heads are "practical," others "theoretical". Then, again, differences of age are important. We must not with young children always insist on the third and fourth stages, for these children may be too young to "abstract" correctly. Conversely, older pupils we must not always force into infantile grooves by insisting on the first two stages.

After school days are over, new matter is not acquired in exact accordance with the "formal steps". The new often comes as already abstract. Schools must remember that they have to consider the future of their pupils, and must not overestimate the value of any scheme.

Then there is the teacher. The formal steps afford him useful guidance, and he ought not to give himself over to mere lawlessness. Still, the Herbartian rules are only general, and cannot give precise directions. In the same way a judge has to apply general laws to special cases. The best advice to teachers is—learn the rules first, and afterwards acquire the necessary freedom. "The letter killeth, the spirit giveth life."

SECTION VI.

VOGEL.

(1887.)

Reference.

Vogel. *Herbart oder Pestalozzi. Eine kritische Darstellung und Vergleichung ihrer Systeme als Beitrag zur richtigen Würdigung ihres gegenseitigen Verhältnisses.* Dr. August Vogel, 1887.

"HURRAH for Herbart!" "Hurrah for Pestalozzi!" are cries we hear on every side. It is important that we should decide as to the respective claims of these leaders.

Pestalozzi was a genial reformer whose life, except for one brief period at Burgdorf, seemed a failure. But he was a true pioneer. Though despised by many of his contemporaries, he is now regarded by mankind as one from whom progress received a new impulse. But a second impulse was required for the establishment and development of his principles.

Herbart was another educational philosopher whose views, like those of Pestalozzi, received but scant recognition in his lifetime, but who, nevertheless, founded a school of thinkers. Its earliest adherents misunderstood his system and engaged in conflict with Pestalozzi's followers; the former maintaining that Herbart was the first to employ psychology for educational purposes, the latter claiming that Pestalozzi had already done this.

Herbart's Starting Point in Psychology.—Herbart makes the "ego" the starting point in psychology and discovers a contradiction in it, a contradiction which rests entirely upon his assumption that Knowing and Being are irreconcilable; throughout his system, as the bitter opponent of Idealism, he seeks to establish this. We feel, however, Vogel maintains, that Being in its highest sense is known, and that the antithesis between Being and Knowing cannot be maintained; even Herbart is not prepared to uphold it logically; he states that the beginning of knowledge consists in ideas and that these rest on experience which teaches what things are. Man lives among ceaseless confusion of the different departments of Being and Happening, of appearances which are involved in change, and feelings consequent on these changes bring ideas home to him. The foundation doctrine of Herbart's Psychology is that feelings or perceptions are self-preservations of the soul, and this means that the soul is not originally a power for reflexion, it is not composed of real and ideal activity; but rather there must be postulated for its whole spiritual manifoldness, a sufficient number of presentations, and self-consciousness arises only from these and exists entirely in the relations among these; it is only a changed relation of the soul, yet inner experience sufficiently proves that the I and self-

consciousness do not remain, as it were, on the periphery of the soul as on accidental relation. They are rather that which constitutes the inmost germ of it, that which gives it its worth and supreme importance. If we take self-consciousness as the essential element from the idea of the soul, it fades away to an uncertain something which cannot form the centre of the whole inner life of a man in all its height and breadth. The necessary hypothesis for all spiritual and moral life and action is lacking in a soul without self-consciousness, and if the latter is a matter of accident entirely, every scientific explanation of the spiritual life is thereby rendered impossible.

The Soul, according to Herbart, is a Real Thing, and as such, a simple essence, subject to neither time nor space; it has talents and faculties neither to receive nor to produce anything, and its Simple Quale is and remains unknown.

That Time and Place must be excluded from a soul, as a simple essence existing for itself, rests on easily understood general metaphysical principles. But of greater importance is Herbart's assertion that the Soul in its absolute being can receive nothing from without, nor produce anything of itself, but that all mental life arises from the relations between several simple essences and the accidental union of these.

Now Herbart's real soul has originally neither presentations nor feelings, nor desires; it knows nothing of itself and nothing of other things. In it there are no forms of thought, no laws of willing and acting, and no sort of preparation, however distant, for these. Yet in spite of this impressive assurance, every Real essence of Herbart's, and therefore also the real soul, has a distinct peculiar quality through which the effects proceeding from the union of several essences are determined. Does Herbart then mean that while every effect can only spring from the union of several essences, one by itself exercises no effect? If he does not mean this, he must maintain that the Quality peculiar to a Real essence is present in the union, but vanishes in the non-union. But a quality which is neither a power, nor a faculty, nor anything else of this sort, must be nothing, and such a quality cannot possibly exercise

any influence in the union of several real essences—not even the apparent effect of Herbart's ideas—nor can the world of Being and Happening be explained by means of such essences. The union of essences which presupposes pressures and resistances, postulates some power of receiving and producing in the essences, which must be present not only in their union, but when they are isolated also.

Psychology and Physiology.—Further, it seems to us a doubtful proceeding to try and explain purely psychical events by such expressions as belong to mechanics and hydrostatics. May they always remain as pictures and analogies, not as true explanations! And when Herbart traces analogy between psychology and physiology, and asserts that as the latter constructs the body from fibres, so the former constructs the soul out of sets of presentations, and as in the one case the excitability of the fibres is a much disputed point, so in the other case is the excitability of the sets of presentations; this is again an indication of Herbart's mechanical comprehension of the soul's functions.

The now generally received hypothesis of the indivisible and therefore simple atoms unchangeable in spite of all apparent change, certainly explains many natural appearances more naturally than the older scientific propositions; yet directly it is taken over into the territory of the Soul, it sets itself in direct opposition to scientific axioms as well as to Experience.

Soul Evolution.—The soul is ever forming for itself higher and broader ideas, which furnish the undeniable essentials for the perfecting of the moral life. Least of all then should Herbart call the soul unchangeable unless he mean that all progress in soul-life is but appearance and deception, and this he seems to argue.

Herbart's Theories Preclude Possibility of Progress.—That the soul steps out of life exactly as it entered it, precludes all possibility of evolution, and makes the perfecting of the man, and, therefore, of the human race, an illusion and deceptive appearance only. Ethics and psychology are then unnecessary and impossible. A psychology which denies every power, every

faculty, and, especially, every kind of evolution of the Soul, cannot include in its survey the infinite rich life of the latter, and can never suffice for scientific investigation, or guide the teacher and moral educator.

With Herbart, the real Soul is at the basis of all psychological events, and in its accidental union with other reals, it suffers through the feelings some sort of disturbance, then Presentation results. We note throughout the term *disturbance*, not *exciting* or *inciting*. Herbart makes the Soul inviolable and incapable of change, but the man who sees in these outer causes the first beginnings of more and more perfect development of the human soul, the proper reason of which lies in itself, will not only not regard them as disturbances, but as necessary and blessed incitement to the further evolution of a soul that is capable of development, and only from this standpoint can the perfecting of the individual, as well as of the whole race, be logically accepted as possible. If Herbart wishes, as he does, not only to grant the possibility of this, but to declare and explain it, he must first of all renounce the rigid unchangeableness of the soul; unchangeableness and evolution form an irreconcilable antithesis, although this very unchangeableness and self-preservation premises a latent power of resistance, but we do not agree with Herbart when he says that this power disappears when opposing force is withdrawn. It rather is real and active, and is first perceived by us upon a given incitement. Otherwise, all independence and freedom is denied to man, that spark of the Divine Being which Nature called into existence according to her own laws, and without which all presentations due to other reals would be valueless to its own life and development. If it cannot be denied that the psychological course of soul-life, as far as it appears, is subject to laws, yet it must also be granted that it withdraws itself from these natural laws, just in proportion as it retires into the depths of its proper self.

As far as the spirit makes use of the wonderfully constituted organism of the body for its activity, so far, but only so far, is it lawful to apply the laws of statics and mechanics, as well as

mathematical calculation, to psychology. No laws of nature apply to the transcendental Being of the Soul. The man who thinks he can sound the depths of the power of the inner soul-life by an example in arithmetic is a materialist, and, therefore, an atheist.

Innate Special Faculty.—Herbart violently contests the existence of innate special faculty. We, however, contend that the faculties themselves are different modifications of the one soul, which is the same in all of them. Just as many coexist in the absolute, as the members in an organism, as ideas in criticism, so are the faculties related to the soul.

Even Herbart, in spite of his violent polemic against soul powers, cannot do away with the necessity of vindicating at least three powers for his real soul: Perception, Presentation, Reproduction or Memory.

With Herbart the only happening that takes place in the soul is self-preservation against disturbance, but Desire and Will are something quite different from self-preservation, since the soul in these conditions places itself in connection with the outer world. With Herbart the true life of the soul, if such it can be called, like the Buddhist-Nirvana, continues, in spite of all disturbance from without, to all eternity. That which otherwise would gladden the human soul or sadden it to death, leaves no trace according to Herbart's doctrine.

The Will.—In considering the Will we enter the domain of ethics, and if Herbart had extended his metaphysical and psychological hypothesis in this direction it would have been impossible for him to arrive at any fundamental ethical ideas. How could an essence without any powers or activities be made responsible for any thought or wish or deed? Yet responsibility is the base idea of all ethical considerations. Without spontaneous power, the soul is simply a sport for that chance which, according to Herbart, is supreme throughout the universe. He would have the soul in its inner being as little moved by the wildest combat of conflicting presentations as the centre of the earth by the thunder of cannon or the march of war-steeds. It is not the Intellect which thinks and

observes, not the Reason which weighs according to its own principles, not the Will which resolves, but presentations in their union become powers independent of the actionless, and, therefore, irresponsible soul.

Herbart's Idea of God.—If Herbart, in spite of all this, attributes five moral ideas—Freedom, Perfection, Benevolence, Right, and Equity—to the Soul, according to which it judges an expression of Will as being pleasing or hateful, moral or immoral, good or bad, this is indeed opposed to his whole system, though by it he obtains a bridge by which to pass over into the territory of ethics and aesthetics, which would be otherwise impossible—and here he is surely guilty of inconsistency, and according to his metaphysics God is also a simple real essence with simple quality, who like every other real soul can only arrive at thinking through union with other souls, and therefore cannot be the commanding intelligence or the Creator of Souls. Thus, in criticising Herbart's metaphysics, Vogel attacks first his premise that contradictions form the beginning and the end of all speculation, and that these contradictions lie in the forms of the data, as they are at first thought of by means of ideas.

His Elaboration of Ideas.—He contends that although the notional elaboration of the data or of experience, especially in the case of the beginner, becomes entangled in all sorts of contradictions, these do not arise from the data. Incorrect results in Science, as in life, rest for the most part on incorrect premises which have been obtained by a superficial or hastily concluded observation of the data, and only a small proportion are due to insufficient comparison of correctly obtained facts of experience or to purely logical mishaps. Motive for thought cannot be sought in the contradiction, but rather in the strong impulse which is woven into the very heart of man, to discover the law, which lies at the root of given appearances, *i.e.*, the truth, towards which insufficient experience can be no starting point at all.

"The Method of Relations."—Herbart's "*Method of Relations*" by which he seeks to expand ideas, leads too soon into the airy regions of purely metaphysical ideas, and away from

the necessary practical experience, and though professedly starting from the latter he soon rejects its authority as being burdened with contradictions which only thinking is able to solve, whereas these pretended contradictions should be eliminated at once by means of closer observation. With regard to Herbart's *ideas of Things* themselves and to the *idea of Being*, as a kind of fixing, it is easier to agree with him, and Kant had already established the same, but when he argues that the Real does not lie in the thing thought of, but in the thinking, he places Thinking and Being in irreconcilable hostility.

"*Accidental Helps to Vision.*"—He sets in motion with his "accidental helps to Vision" and his construction of Ideas an artificial apparatus, and does not lead up to real explanations. He leaves us to put "accident" in the place of real cause, but where chance reigns laws have no power, and where no law operates there is an end of science, the object of which is the discovery of laws in the apparent chaos of appearances.

Herbart's System in Opposition to Idealism.—Vogel feels that Herbart's whole system is the exact opposite of the idealistic in which the Ego is itself the only true Real and the principle of all things, therefore of the so-called objective world. Herbart does not recognise a Real in the Ego, but only a relation arising out of the objective presentations, whereas the Ego, as well as self-consciousness, can surely neither proceed from mere presentations of the Objective world, nor can these presentations exist without a presupposed self-consciousness. The Ego must be a thinking subject, and thinking without self-consciousness is a contradiction. Herbart seems to limit knowledge to accidental and soulless appearance, not to agreement of Thinking with Being, and instead of leading up to truth, seems to go down into the darkness of doubt, though it is only fair to say that Herbart at times commits himself to a contradiction and gives glimmers of the Actual.

Vogel's Summing Up.—In summarising his criticism, Vogel says, "We cannot recognise either Herbart's principles or the deductions therefrom as correct, and the wearisome tediousness of his expositions and terminology militates strongly against

their acceptance". The latter objection, however, Vogel brings also against Kant and Fichte. "On the other hand, the boldness of Herbart's thought in referring the whole psychic life to the presentation as the final cause, must exercise effect on every thinker who is seeking for final causes, and all hypotheses which throw light on the way to these, deserve our thanks and recognition. No one of them may be able to solve the problem of soul-life or the riddles of the world, but yet may serve to guide the restless, eager, investigating mind towards the solution of the most difficult problems that are presented to the minds of men."

Pestalozzi's Psychology: The Moral Life.—While claiming on the one hand that the animal instincts in man must be subdued in order that the human may evolve unchecked, on the other hand Pestalozzi argues that as human art is subordinate to man's spirit, its cultivation is imperative upon every individual, and the germ of the power for this lies in the inner soul of man and proceeds from the union of spiritual, moral, and physical powers, powers innate in man and endowed with the impulse towards development and perfection.

A Child's Powers.—The powers of a child are immeasurable, but for healthy evolution must develop in orderly, organic unity, the unity of an organism in which the God-like essence lives, an essence which is free and autonomous, and which though imbibing life from its sense-surroundings is not physically bound. At first it exists in germ only, and is subject to eternal, immutable laws which lie at the basis of all natural development; but divine love, and human love if it has a divine bias, is the mainspring which directs the uplifting of man's sensual and animal nature through his spiritual nature. Faith and love unify all his powers of knowing and acting, and are to man as an eternal evolving being, as the roots are to a tree, giving him strength to draw the nourishment necessary for his development.

Cf. Qui que tu sois, l'amour est ton maître,
Il l'est, il le fut, et il le doit être. (Dumas.)

Motive Powers of Development.—Pestalozzi next makes a fine distinction between animal thinking and animal art (dependent on the perceptions of our race from purely sensual contemplation), and human power of thinking (of which the highest results of the animal are no sort of proof, just as the highest technical excellence may be possible without creative power). The thinking of our race, as human thought, certainly does not proceed from a power which is connected with the delicate fibres of our flesh and blood. Our thought, in so far as it is truly human, proceeds from the divine power to subject our flesh to our thought, and is to purely animal thinking as darkness is to light, contradictory, and the latter leads to inhumanity.

Man's Innate Power of Effort.—Then Pestalozzi maintains that it is no incentive from without, no foreign will outside a man, which causes the development of his powers. It is *his own will, his own innate power of effort* which effects the awakening of his heart to feeling, his mind to thinking, or his physical powers to activity.

Moral Power.—By means of his *moral power* man raises himself to the position of highest dignity of which his nature is capable, to the divine.

Intellectual Power.—The *intellectual power* of our race Herbart regards as a power of the humanity of our nature, the component powers of which are those of *contemplation, speech, and thought*. The power of contemplation, if not unnatural, confused, or badly regulated leads a man under all circumstances to individual, clear presentations about the objects of his surroundings. Next comes the need of expression, and the gift of speech is immeasurably great, and is essential to the power of thought; it may be regarded as the chief help whereby the knowledge won through contemplation may be made general and fruitful.

Pestalozzi's Moral Teaching.—In agreement with Kant as well as with the philosophical idealism of later times, Pestalozzi is entirely opposed to Herbart from the point of view that the faculties and powers of the human soul do not spring from the influence of outward accident, but are rather innate and im-

manent, so that they constitute the proper inner essence of the soul. It is clearly seen that he regards the moral power as the highest, and as that which raises man above the animal and outwards to the eternal and divine, and he also clearly shows to what extent moral freedom is not a matter of free-will, but a law of order and harmony. Thus, Nature must obey her laws. She has no will. But I must not obey the law within me, if I do not will it: in this I am my own judge and therefore a nobler creature than all nature beside. Man finds himself pledged in both the sensual and the mental worlds,—in the one through his body—in the other through his will. The laws of both are in essence the same, because both command order and harmony in the worlds ruled by them; natures gifted with this Knowledge obey the law at first because they ought, and then because they wish to do so. Still though Pestalozzi shows that the laws of nature and of the spirit are one and the same, he does not transport mechanical laws of nature to the mental world, and he claims that the power of abstraction is the very essence of thought power.

The 'Soul' as Viewed by Pestalozzi and Compared with Herbart's.—Vogel thinks Pestalozzi's ideas more suitable as a basis for the moral ordering of the world and a natural education, in just the way that Herbart's seem unsuitable. Herbart's soul seems a dead thing, without life and effort; Pestalozzi's is the source of never-ending life. In the one case we have a soul which in its absoluteness neither requires nor is capable of development; in the other, one whose impulses endeavour to evolve the powers slumbering within it to infinite perfection. The one is a mechanism, the other an organism; the one repels all force from without as disturbance, the other in joyous and happy action grasps after what is beneficial for itself and its fellows. Scarcely greater opposites can be imagined, and they admit of no compromise; the educationist may decide for himself which is the most inspiring and to which of the two leaders he will entrust the soul of his pupil—Herbart or Pestalozzi.

Educational Theories of Pestalozzi.—From the starting point that the development of the man himself, the masterpiece of

creation, is the common need of humanity, Pestalozzi proceeds to distinguish sharply the training of the animal in man from the training of the human, and to enforce that when the highest perfection of the animal is attained this does not touch the boundary line of the evolution of the human. To satisfy man's nature only in regard to food, warmth, and rest is to make him sensual, selfish, and lazy.

The object of all education is therefore the raising of man's nature from the sensuous selfishness of animal existence to the height of blessedness possible for him through the harmonious building up of his heart, mind and art. The peace arising therefrom is the first requisite for all human development, and with Pestalozzi the only eternal foundation for this evolution of our nature towards humanity is *Love*, only through its sacred power does man rise to the divine that lies within him. The development of the man cannot come through a one-sided brain development; mechanical cleverness counts but little on the whole. Again it is:—

Qui que tu sois, l'amour est ton maître,
Il l'est, il le fut, et il le doit être. (Dumas.)

Love is essentially the centre, and true love proceeds only from true faith, that of a trustful human child in his Divine Father.

This basis of education naturally presupposes the free-will as the centre of all the powers, and thus the man must be educated to perform all his duties towards God, his neighbour and himself willingly, readily, cleverly, through the activity of his faith and love; he must be made intelligent for all the business of life and for every emergency, and accustomed to necessary activity and effort.

Still, however important training for vocation and position in life may be, education must not make this its all-important object; the perfection of man's whole human nature is its goal. The true nature of man is in itself neither good nor bad; its character depends upon whether it can freely develop according to its essence and destiny or not—no man ought therefore to say *man* is abject and depraved—it is only the men in whom the power and the right feeling of their human nature have be-

come annihilated through sensuality and negligence who are abject and depraved. Nature has done her work completely, man must do his ; she has placed within him in rich abundance the germs of all those powers which are necessary for our eternal and earthly destiny. What we have to do is to assist their natural development by bestowing upon them the enlightened love, the trained intellect and art of our race. Human art is in this like the art of the gardener under whose care a thousand trees bloom and grow, but to none of which does he give the germs of development. A teacher plants no power in man, nor does he give life or breath to any power, he only takes care that no external force shall check or disturb their natural development, and must be guided in so doing by what centuries of experience have taught our race of human power.

Again, though the educator begins with the individual and his special needs, he must embrace and have for his aim the whole of humanity ; the race, not the individual, is the cry of the Divine voice within us, in the hearing and following of which lies the true nobility of human nature ; man is not in the world for his own sake, but that he may perfect himself in the perfecting of his brethren. The art of training men is the highest, though the hardest, possible to man ; there is no calling on earth which calls for greater culture and greater skill and deeper knowledge of humanity and its needs. The means employed must always tend to strengthen and purify the moral-religious bond which unifies all man's powers. Faith must come about through faith, and thought through thought, not only through knowledge of what is believed and thought ; and love must come through love ; and all can come about only through the training of man's powers to the higher laws of his will ; a training which must be consistent for each individual with the degree of development to which he has already arrived.

The Development of Power.—The natural development of each power comes through the use of the same, through work and industry—therefore the physical activity of our race is the true, divinely ordained means for the development of the human nature in man. Industry forms the intellect and gives force to

the feelings of the heart, and in order that this development may proceed, encouragement is necessary, and in certain cases correction; hence Pestalozzi does not condemn corporal punishment, though he lays stress on the fact that the consistent daily and hourly conduct and example of those around them is the highest incentive for children—they cannot be kept in order by fear of corporal punishment, but should be moved to do right of their own free will out of gratitude and love, because it is right, and for the sake of their own advantage.

The Moral Power.—Only as a moral being does man advance to perfection, and the educator must strive to awaken, nourish and strengthen moral and religious feeling in the child. This is effected first by the mother's sacred care, in the steady, quiet satisfaction of the child's physical needs, as this begets trust and love, the foundation of morality; and man must love, trust, and obey man, before he loves, trusts, and obeys God. Moral instruction is not so much the Teacher's as the Parent's task. Man's struggle after perfection is the one thing, aided by Divine guidance, that is capable of destroying evil.

The Mental Power.—This is entirely one of the humanity of our nature, and hence its development is especially the educator's goal. The child likes to think as much as he does to walk, to learn as much as to eat, if only his instruction is as well prepared as his food. To make the child feel "I can do something" is the teacher's special task, and the feeling one of the child's greatest rewards.

The Science of Teaching.—This comprises three natural means:—

Simple Observation: Memory and Application of what is Observed: Imagination.—The real value of human knowledge consists in this, that a man who knows a great deal and can apply it, must be able to harmonise more than another with his circumstances and to develop himself uniformly.

Instruction therefore is Subordinate to Training.—Great simplicity should characterise the Teaching art, that is, all imparting of knowledge should start from the very simple, and lead by easy stages to what is difficult, keeping pace always with

the growth of power in the pupil, always encouraging, never wearying him. The range of subjects should be neither too wide nor too narrow. None of us need all Knowledge. The form of instruction is valuable in so far as it arouses the independent action of the child. Only that which is in full harmony, mental, spiritual, and physical, with the individual, is for that individual really truth. Catechising, therefore, is a most natural form of instruction, and only such material should be chosen as can appeal to a child's mind and give him real pleasure and interest. Natural objects, pictures, and illustrations are most essential to the forming of clear ideas in a child's mind, and to his being able to express the same. Correct sense-impressions lead to knowledge. The art of Teaching lies in showing right relations and associations, and in strengthening these impressions, and the power to express the same. Independent imaginative work follows naturally.

The Physical or Artistic Power.—Knowledge without the power to use it is a fatal gift to any man. The physical basis of the development of artistic power is instinct; but art is needed in directing this development. Just as the theory and practice of form and number may be regarded as the gymnastics of the mental power, so the mechanical exercise of the senses and limbs is necessary for the development of the art power. Here, again, the germs of the power are in man, and the development of mechanical skill by simple exercises leading to more difficult ones consistent with the circumstances of the individual child is all that is needed, till practice leads to correct performance, and then to freedom and independence in any art.

Unity of the Powers.—Again, the Moral, Mental, and Physical Powers are not contradictory, they are united by a sacred and organic inner bond towards a common end, *i.e.*, the evolution towards perfection of the humanity in man, and all art in training must work towards this goal, the ennobling and satisfaction of our human and Divine nature. Only that which lays hold of the man, and satisfies his heart, mind, and hand is truly advantageous to him. If one part suffers, all suffer with it.

Harmonious development is the key-note of Pestalozzi's theories, and though no one man can be said yet to have attained thereto, he would have us "press forward, if haply we may do so".

The Science and Art of Education: Herbart and Pestalozzi.—Vogel points out to us that those who wish to build a science of education on experience should be very careful to observe how many times it is necessary to try the same experiment with different gradations, before a resultant average can be obtained which is capable of giving a theory and a working hypothesis in the domain of those sciences, so essentially founded on experience, as physics and chemistry. Education, as a science, must be distinguished from the art of Education, for science is the orderly arrangement of precepts which constitute an harmonious whole, and in which the results are derived from axioms, and axioms from first principles; while an art is the sum total of exercises which must be united to bring about a certain object. Science, therefore, demands guidance from theorems proceeding from philosophic thinking, while Art demands constant action corresponding with the result to be attained; and the application of Science to Art is necessary before entering upon that action by means of which the final artistic result is to be attained. Nevertheless one must not expect to turn out an infallible master of any art by following a specific scheme of rules arrived at by such preparation, nor must one demand from it infallible directions as to treatment. One must trust one's power of discovery sufficiently to be able to do the right thing at the right moment, and if this be the case in mere technical art so much more is it so in that art of all arts, Education. Here, perhaps, individual actions of the trainer may seem insignificant, but the whole tenor of his treatment is of vital importance.

Great Insight into Human Nature Necessary.—Pestalozzi compares child-training to the gardener's art. Herbart rather calls attention to the distinctions between them dependent on the complexity of child nature. We feel the first requirement of the educator to be an exact knowledge of human nature, not within its ordinary limitations, but in its infinite capacity for development, and with this an understanding of the relations of

all kinds of knowledge to the various interests of humanity, and a tactful application of the same.

Government of Children.—In the government of children the great consideration is the training of the Will, so that it may not be the mere creature of wild impulses leading first one way and then another. Force may have present results, but true training makes for the discipline of the future. The best training is that of Love and Persuasion; sympathy is a potent factor, and also brings about the best present results, for though willing is more important than knowing, it has its root in thought and in instruction, which incites mental activity and interest, through presentations which depend, to a great extent, on experience and environment.

Foundations of Educational Systems.—These should be based on Ethics and Psychology, and if on the latter, Herbart's is wrong. Logically, the idea of training does not enter into his system, and yet he contradicts himself, for to carry out his system premises the existence of soul powers. The chief aim of education is, according to Pestalozzi, the elevation of our nature from the sensual selfishness of our animal self, to humanity through Faith and Love, while Herbart would inculcate Virtue or Morality. But it seems to us that Virtue and Morality are to Faith and Love as the stream to the source, as effect to cause, and as greater abstractions they may have less soul life and less power to excite Will. Spontaneous free-will must be premised if humanity is to be raised; Faith and Love make all things possible. Herbart practically denies the spontaneity of Will; and yet the human Will must be raised to resignation and to sacrifice for truth and right through Faith and Love. Pestalozzi holds that education can only draw out from the mind what is already there. It can arouse already existing powers, it cannot implant them.

Herbart denies to the man every faculty and every power which animals and plants possess. According to him the mind of man is constructed in accordance with outer circumstances, and it is thus the task of art to take care that this construction will follow lines which will cause the mind to correspond to the

purpose of man's being. As he makes the soul entirely without spontaneity, he renders it like any other machine, capable only of elaborating what it receives. It certainly adds to the responsibility of the educator, since in accordance with this theory it rests entirely in his hands whether the pupil becomes a reasoning person or a wild animal. This may be the logical conclusion from Herbart's psychology, yet, as a working hypothesis, his system has much to recommend it. The training of strength and breadth of Character, through many-sided Interest, is indeed the pre-eminent goal of the educator. Life itself, it may be urged, affords here and there opportunity for the unfolding of the human-divine powers, without the necessity for specific guidance, but it cannot be denied that a proper guidance, with regularly planned method, is a far more certain means for the accomplishment of the desired end, or should, at least, work hand in hand with life.

We owe an incalculable debt to Pestalozzi as the pioneer who penetrated to the profoundest depth of human nature, and laid bare its psychological organism, as well as the imperishable foundations upon which rest the means through which its powers may be developed. His Teacher and Pupil are friends, while Herbart's are rather Master and Scholar. Perhaps in practice both relations are needed, and instruction must fill the gaps left by experience and environment, and ensure concentrated attention and many-sided development.

SECTION VII.

SALLWÜRK.

(1887.)

Reference.

Sallwürk. *Gesinnungs-unterricht und Kulturgeschichte*. Beyer und Söhne (Langensalza), 1887.

DR. E. VON SALLWÜRK was the author of an important book, published anonymously in 1880 under the title of *Herbart und*

seine Jünger (Herbart and his disciples), which gave rise to animated controversies between the extreme Zillerians and their critics. Other works followed in 1885 and subsequent years; the most important of these is probably the one above. Sallwürk's own attitude is that of a moderate Herbartian severely critical towards Zillerian proposals. He is especially good in his treatment of the scientific foundations of the culture-stages doctrine.

Character-forming Instruction (*Gesinnungs-unterricht*) may take various forms.

(1) It may be *pragmatic*, making an attempt to provide the pupil with guidance and teaching for each contingency of life. But the worst of this method is that it deals largely with outward experience, whereas the child is a child and must be treated as such.

(2) It may be *organic*, following the development of the presentation world of the pupil, and advancing strictly from simple to complex.

(3) The third method may be called *genetic*, and is based on the maxim that the moral development of the individual imitates that of the race. Thus a course of instruction in accordance with general history would satisfy the needs of the child. But the advocates of this method have never yet proved the maxim upon which their method rests; moreover, one questions whether they have succeeded, without too much artificiality, in obtaining from history material for instruction which corresponds to the step-by-step development of the normal child.

After dealing with "Character-forming Instruction" along pre-Herbartian lines, Sallwürk proceeds to discuss the proposals of Ziller.

Ziller's most dangerous tendency was towards a hasty dogmatism. This is shown in his doctrine of culture stages as applied to the central matter provided for "Character-forming Instruction".

He proposes that after the early courses of fairy tales, Robinson Crusoe, etc., the children should be taught along two paral-

lel lines, profane history and sacred history ; German Sagas being taught along with the Patriarchs ; the Niebelungen along with the Judges ; the founders of the German kingdom (Henry I., etc.) along with the Jewish Kings ; the Reformation along with Jesus and the Prophets ; the War of Freedom along with the Apostles ; and the recent re-erection of the German Empire along with the Lutheran Catechism. Meanwhile for the higher schools Greek thought should be treated in a similar way ; thus the Odyssey would be taught simultaneously with the Niebelungen and the Judges, while Herodotus would accompany Kings, etc.

How much of this scheme is Herbart's own ? Very little ; only those portions which deal with the classics (Odyssey) and with Robinson Crusoe. Practically speaking, the scheme is Ziller's. Herbart himself put Thucydides *after* the younger Xenophon, thus reversing the historical order and showing how little he believed in the "culture-stages" doctrine.

The connecting together of secular and profane history may be morally useful as showing the advance of inner ethical ideas, but "concentration" would suffer, and, indeed, historical truth.

Let us consider Ziller's arguments. The child, we are told, has to begin in the child world of the fairy tales ; here he gets to know single things in their concrete forms. Then, in passing through the Robinson Crusoe stage (the conquest of natural hindrances) he learns the necessity for mutual help and for authority. Next he becomes like the tribal dependents of the *patriarchal* age. Activity springs up ; the powers of each individual in the community are valued and used ; national form is assumed (Judges period). There comes now a recognition of an ethical order among the free individuals of the State (Kings period). Then out of obedience there springs up *love* for the highest authority ; Christ appears and tries to bring God's kingdom on the earth.

Ziller tries to show the significance of this scheme from the point of view of Herbart's five moral ideas. But inasmuch as these ideas, however valuable, were deduced dialectically and not historically, they do not really correspond to Ziller's stages,

He correlates "Inner Freedom" with his fairy-tale period; "Perfection" (Vollkommenheit) with his Robinson Crusoe period; and Benevolence with his patriarchal period. All this is fantastic. If any one idea is first, it is that of "Right or Law," for we come into the world as members of society. However, Ziller, taking the three primary ideas and the five social ideas, obtained eight in all, and imagined that these corresponded to his eight culture-stages.

Again, though he speaks of "culture stages," his teaching course is really determined by one kind of culture only, namely, ethico-religious, and even that along Christian lines only, except so far as, in highest schools, the classics are studied. Surely art, science, etc., must be considered.

The child, before entering school, is already in part familiar with Christianity. How is it possible, then, to make a child "live through" the pre-Christian stages?

Ziller's followers have by no means slavishly adhered to his plan. Thus Willmann admits errors in the master's scheme, and Staude declares it to be a piece of audacity to assume that between the ages of six and fourteen the child passes through eight apperception stages, each stage demanding certain material and no more. It is inconceivable that the eight years passed in the elementary school should have such a philosophic basis.

Again, Staude criticises Ziller for leaving it uncertain whether children *do* in any case pass through the eight stages, or whether this only happens if we arrange our instruction properly. He also points out that the various stages cannot be definitely marked off from each other, and criticises the importance attached to the Judges period and to the periods subsequent to Christ; the time devoted to the study of Christ must be increased. But the fundamental weakness in the works of men like Ziller, Staude, and Rein, is that they never prove that the assumed congruence between racial and individual development really exists.

O. W. Beyer (*Ueber die Naturwissenschaften in der Erziehungsschule*) is an earnest writer upon the question of natural

science teaching. He is convinced that the above-mentioned congruence exists; embryology is a witness. But Ziller never thought of applying the culture-stages doctrine to the teaching of any subject except historical ones. Beyer goes further.

He calls attention to such facts as children's love of wandering, hunting, looking after animals, and so forth. He regards these as indications that the child is reproducing the hunting, nomadic and other primitive stages of development. In this connection school excursions, school gardens, school workshops, etc. (the last bear closely on the later *civic* stage) are important. There is something of the vagabond and of Robinson Crusoe in every child.

Accordingly Beyer proposes that an attempt be made to follow the different development-stages of human work, the making and preparation of food, the discovery of fire, etc. No doubt these stages were vastly important *for the race*. But have they any significance for the *individual*? Is there any close relation between them and his mental development, his presentational life? Is there really any mental stage in the individual corresponding to the discovery of fire?

Beyer thinks there is. He identifies the culture stages (stage of the use of fire, etc.) with the conditions of adaptation in Darwin's scheme, and believes that the earlier stages have left especially deep traces, because of their length. But is this so? Have the various culture-stages (hunting, agriculture, etc.) ever really modified the bodily structure?¹ And was there ever any precise separation between the stages?

Just as Beyer has applied the culture-stages doctrine to science teaching, another Zillerian, Menard, has applied it to art.

Examination of the Scientific Foundations of the Culture-stages Doctrine.—Ziller has never applied his doctrine to the entire realm of human development, only to the ethical. But surely there would be a certain charm in generalising the maxim, and, drawing inspiration from it, to carry on the work willed by Providence. Let us, however, examine it.

¹ Here Sallwürk touches on the great problem whether habits are transmitted to offspring.

The culture-stages doctrine implies that racial development is a real development, *i.e.*, a progression from a lower to a higher stage. But evolution is not always upward, though it is always in the direction of adaptation to environment. Organs have to become adapted to new conditions. Some blind animals possess rudimentary eyes in their early stages of existence; is the disappearance of the eyes an *advance*? Surely not, in the sense of the culture-stages doctrine, though in the sense of adaptation to conditions it *is* an advance. Culture is a question of the favourable or unfavourable relations in which the surrounding material world places those wrestling with it; culture itself may not alter the bodily or mental organisation; thus previous culture stages may not have been handed down to the human beings of the present day, and therefore education need not pay any attention to such previous stages. Only that which exists in the present conditions of culture, or that which is represented in present-day instincts, can be attended to by education. Moreover, the human race passed through many stages previous to the historic ones—hunting, nomadic, etc.—but we cannot trace them. Again, human culture has not been an uninterrupted advance: it has repeatedly doubled back or retrogressed; or an older culture, itself incapable of further advance, may have fertilised a younger culture. Thus oriental culture has influenced Greek rather than developed continuously along its own lines.

True, the development of the individual does not always proceed along one definite line; but we must not, for this reason, imitate the involved and perplexing procedure of racial development.

Enough has been said in connection with Beyer's proposals to show that we must not imitate the forms of *material* development, for these forms (the use of fire, etc.) merely demonstrate incidentally a mental and ethical advance, but are in themselves of no educational significance, however great their significance for the race as a whole.

Let us proceed to consider inner development.

Intellectual Development.—There are great difficulties here for the culture-stages theory; man was once quite devoid of science; are we to imitate this stage? The question of *speech* would

offer an extraordinarily good field for study; but even with advanced peoples, speech is still primitive and cannot express logical distinctions very clearly; thus in English, concretes and abstracts are not completely distinguished, and in most languages there is a confusion between *post hoc* and *propter hoc* (cf., the particles since, quum, nachdem, puisque).

Even if science could give us an account of man's intellectual development, education must not copy it, unless, with Rousseau, we wish to lead *out of* instead of *into* culture. Surely we shall teach European writing, not hieroglyphics; developed word-forms, not primitive roots.

Ethical Development.—In the realm of ethical thought there has been no change in the moral ideas, though much change in their application (marriage, etc.); from the first dawn of culture man seems to have had them. Thus family life, even in the crudest form, develops all the ideas.

Ziller's strange notion of developing the moral ideas one after the other (Inner Freedom at the fairy-tale stage, Vollkommenheit at the Crusoe stage, and so on) would involve a dissection of morality; nay, the pupils would for a long time live without morality, for Inner Freedom involves insight into *all* the other ideas, and therefore cannot exist alone. It is clear that the simple ideas cannot and ought not to develop step by step; and further, that the deduced social relations are beyond the capacity of juniors, so that the imaginary actions the latter are directed to consider would be fatal to earnestness.

Further Criticisms of Ziller's Plan.—The child's nature is rooted in the *present*. To insist that the child should live through past stages is to rely on superficial views of the culture-stages doctrine, and is, indeed, difficult to be justified by an Herbartian, who is supposed to lay much stress on the present relations of the pupils.

Again, can we parallel sacred history with the real culture development of man? The question culminates in this: Are the Protestant German Empire and the Lutheran Catechism necessarily the highest stage of human culture? It is difficult here to share Ziller's optimism.

Again, Joseph, David, etc., are introduced to the pupil after Robinson Crusoe has been accompanied over the world, and after questions like property, obedience, etc., have been introduced. In point of fact, Ziller puts Crusoe much too early, as some Zillerians admit.

The Zillerians criticise some of the Old Testament stories on various grounds, and substitute fairy tales for them in the first year. Thus the narratives of the Creation and Fall have to be withheld; all sorts of limitations, reservations, and exclusions are proposed. But, in reality, if the Old Testament stories are taught simply and undogmatically they will be found suitable enough, and better than the fairy tales; and, indeed, these latter are altogether too childish for children who have entered school.

We must not base extravagant hopes on the social culture of thirteen-year-old pupils who are still under home protection. We must undertake with them natural and remunerative tasks, and give them the right disposition to do their own appointed work; to go beyond this will be a mistake.

SECTION VIII.

HUBATSCH.

(1888.)

Reference.

Hubatsch. *Gespräche über die Herbart-Zillersche Pädagogik.* Kunzes Nachfolger, Wiesbaden.

THIS violent attack upon Herbartianism is in the form of conversations between a supposed juvenile enthusiast for the system and educationists of a disillusioned type. A certain vein of cynicism runs through this *critique*. Hubatsch is one of the few critics who see scarcely anything that is good in the proposals of the reformers, though he praises Herbart's strenuous consistency.

Herbart's psychology is rejected even by men who cling to his pedagogy. It sounds impressive owing to its technical terminology. But the ruin of the psychology involves the ruin of the pedagogy, for the two are closely connected. Herbart's notion of a simple soul and of a presentational mechanism, with quantitative laws only, is purely fanciful. The experiments of Munk, and facts such as the loss of words for certain ideas, show that the brain is concerned in all thought, hence a system which ignores facts like the brain is doomed. A psychology suitable for pedagogy must not ignore experience, physiology, etc.

Ziller indulges in prolix declamations but ignores important points. He was ignorant of man and of the world, yet he abused all opponents as fools. He said: "Woe to the schools where dexterities and knowledge are regarded as the highest goals to aim at, where 'practical' interests, future usefulness, etc., are primarily regarded, and not the impulse to know and will". Is this the utterance of a man who knows the world? Do we live in a Utopia? Ziller blames the schools for the absence of great men; but surely if any schools were able to produce useless and helpless men those schools would be Ziller's, with their constant feeding of pupils on character-material.

Following Herbart, Ziller recognised three classes of schools, *Gymnasia*, *Burgerschulen*, and *Volksschulen*. Each has to be transformed into an "educative school". No doubt he admits the claims of the future vocation, etc., but he protests against the mixing up of ideals. The "chief classes," devoted to "education" proper, must be distinguished from the "subsidiary classes" devoted to professional training. But surely Ziller forgets human nature when he draws this sharp distinction, and, in point of fact, the "subsidiary classes" would prove the greatest attraction.

Ziller has a dream of small school communities, unconnected with State, Town, or Church. How little he knows the world! State control is daily increasing.

He urges a diminution in school hours and in home lessons, and many breaks in the school lessons for open-air exercise.

This would be possible, he says, if teachers knew better how to employ the pupil's time . . . if . . . if . . . if "concentration," etc., were effected. Present-day teachers are no good; they have no missionary zeal. But Ziller is wrong. Teachers must limit themselves to definite narrow goals. If wider culture were possessed by them *criticism* would awaken, and there would be system no longer.¹ So long as large classes exist in schools, it is no good to "talk big". Moral education must rest mainly on habit, rule, custom, obedience, religious instruction, influence, etc. Experience, activity, struggle are the best teachers.²

When you have obtained your finely educated teachers, acquainted with the latest researches, will they choose the lower schools? Surely Ziller ought to have founded a philanthropic "brotherhood". Pedagogical enthusiasm is rare; so long as teachers do their duty that is enough. A day has only twenty-four hours. How many thousand volumes must a man read before becoming a Zillerian teacher?

"Educative Instruction." Strange terminology, that of the Herbartians! Preposterous claims to have discovered a "science" of pedagogy! Pedagogy is merely an *art* with a narrow aim; it picks up its knowledge from other sources. To give the name of science to a pedagogy founded on the doctrine of a presentational-mechanism—a doctrine which ignores the rich life of the soul, its secret impulses, the thousand riddles of the world—is monstrous!

Do not *all* educators try to educate through Instruction? The Zillerians answer, "Only in a chance way. You tried to cultivate the Understanding, the Taste, the Imagination, etc., but you forgot that Will is the one supreme goal; you should aim at creating Virtue and Christian Love, and the Kingdom of God on earth." But is education impossible, then, with Jews, Moslems, etc.? It was Ziller who added the religious notion

¹ In other words, Hubatsch pleads for a narrow, brutal professionalism without ideals.

² Yes, and how many pupils *succumb*? The need of *Instruction* is the great Herbartian message, a far more valuable one than that of Hubatsch,

to Herbart's system and claimed that Christianity alone includes all that is humanly good. He rejected French and also various classical authors (Horace) as not truly educative; but surely this is pure fanaticism; all men of culture must know French, Horace, etc.

"Action depends on the circle of thought," say the Herbartians. This is really Socrates *redivivus*. The doctrine is wrong. Man has desires, inclinations, etc. It is no good to deny inborn activities, or to call them purely "formal". Darwinism and the inductive method show that "faculties" must be assumed, such as no presentations can invert. When Dickens described pure-minded children amid squalor and vice, was he wrong? Ziller and Herbart are really in conflict over this question; Ziller practically admits "faculties".

The relation between "many-sidedness" and Virtue is not clear. Surely a one-sided person may be virtuous, and *vice versa*. "Yes," says Herbart, "but Interest must be awakened if Instruction has to bear on Virtue. Moreover, morality is really impossible without intelligence, for the circle of thought limits everything." "But surely many-sided Interest is often connected with self-love, pride, etc." "No," says Herbart, "the Interest is not, in such cases, genuine." "Really," responds the critic, "what about Voltaire, Bacon, Cicero, Seneca?"

Christianity lays stress on Faith and Love, not on Knowledge and many-sided Interest. Where is the real connection between the latter and Virtue?

Interest, say the Herbartians, "is a protection against passions," which often spring from narrowness of mind; it is a means of "help in the affairs of life," and it is a means of "safety amid the storms of fate," as opening up new paths. But (says the critic) a *one-sided* Interest is often more satisfactory. There are many gradations between stupidity and many-sided Interest.

Herbart denies that true Interest is of the nature of Desire. It is, he says, a peaceful thing, and not an impatient "pressing forward". But (says the critic) such Interest is neither fish nor flesh. And, in point of fact, some of Herbart's six classes of In-

terest are "peaceful," some are not; his whole classification is illogical. "Speculative" interest is not "peaceful," as "aesthetic" is. Some of the interests are interests in definite objects; others in *relations*. Again, religious interest easily passes over into a Feeling (of Fear, Hope, etc.).

Then the "concentration" and "culture-stages" doctrines are of dubious value, and scarcely found in Herbart's own works. They rest on bad psychology or partial analogies. There is no history of mankind *in general*, only of nations. Fables are products of *advanced* not primitive culture; primitive man regarded animals as enemies, whereas the fables lay stress on the unity of nature, and really spring from a time when animals had already been tamed. Sleeping princesses, etc., were no part of primitive man's world. He thought mainly of the dreadful, vast forces of nature. It is impossible to extract morals out of Märchen. Moreover, schools have to teach reality, and the imagination must not be over-stimulated.

Again, though "Robinson Crusoe" is a splendid story for children, suggesting self-power, stimulating imagination (how to act in hour of need), sympathy, etc., yet the story does not represent any one stage of development. Men did not make clothes, etc., nor live *alone* after Robinson's fashion. He already had the ideas of civilisation in his mind. How different the child of eight! At *no* stage ought we to make the story the *centre* of instruction, the story brings forward foreign and exceptional scenery. But the story is an excellent one for *reading* at a certain age.

Others of Ziller's stages are equally dubious. The Odyssey stage is said to correspond to that of navigation; doubtless selections from this poem are useful, but not as the *centre* of instruction. What a medley Ziller's material is, animal fables, modern Robinson, ancient patriarchs, Greek heroes, etc.! Many of the "stages" (the Livy stage, the Anabasis stage, etc.) may be useful *in school*, but have only very superficial parallels in the *race*. The child has parents whom it *imitates*; how differently did the *race* learn! Most of the Zillerian parallels and connections, *e.g.*, between Greek and Jewish history are equally artificial.

How absurd, also, to begin with geography of Asia (Ararat, etc.)! We should begin at home.

The great "Interest" doctrine! The Herbartians make Interest an *end*, not a mere *means*. It must rest on *involuntary* attention, itself favoured by *Regierung*, and resting on sensible intensity as well as on contrast, newness, expectation, etc. But, says the critic, what is the first germ of Interest? How can Interest be generated merely out of presentations, apart from any central ego? The Herbartians say, "Interest arises when presentations come forward *freely*; without this freedom there may still be *attention*, but of a forced kind". In point of fact the whole mathematical theory of presentations, their interactions, etc., is so obscure as to ruin the doctrine of Interest which rests on it. In its essence it is materialistic or atomistic. But presentations are *not* atoms; they are much more complex, and cannot be treated as homogeneous. A tone and the Roman Empire cannot be treated as alike; some presentations are highly complex; *concepts*, too, are peculiar; yet Herbart lumps all these together as *presentations*.

Again, Herbart lays great stress on *primitive* and *apperceptive* attention; but whence comes the *agency* in this? He is compelled to admit the necessity for *voluntary* attention; here we have the *agent*, the *Will*. Surely this factor is important. Attention is a function of the Will. It may be voluntary or involuntary. It is this Will that explains everything. But Herbart only brings it on the scene at the very end of the series—Attention, Interest, Will. There is with him no original Will. According to him, out of primitive attention there arises, by a storing up of presentations, apperceptive attention; out of this finally emerges Interest. But why not reverse the process, and say that the living will-power of the soul shows itself in impulses, interest, etc.? *The Will is the presupposition, not the result of Education*; we must work upon the Will by presenting to it suitable objects for arousing Interest. Interest presupposes Will, not *vice versa*.

The Herbartian emphasis upon *immediate* interest and the partial depreciation of *mediate* interest overlooks the fact that

we cannot gather grapes from thorns ; we must take men as we find them. Happy if we can awaken even mediate interest. To say, "Don't interest to teach, but teach to awaken Interest," is sophistry. The teacher can only awaken Interest by being interesting. How can you awaken an interest in Latin declensions except by first conveying the impression that it is something fine, mighty, worthy, etc., to know Latin? But this is *mediate* Interest.

Again, Herbart admits that Interest depends on the one side on *natural capacity* which cannot be created. But if so, many-sided Interest is *unnatural*. He and Ziller compare education to an imaginary process in which an angular body gradually approximates to the spherical form by the excitation of many-sided Interest. But the illustration will not serve. Either the angular body is alterable or not. If unalterable, many-sided Interest has no influence ; if alterable, the individuality vanishes. "It is alterable," say the Zillerians, "but mainly so in youth, and the difficulty of alteration increases with age ; hence the importance of Education." They tell us that all must be amateurs in everything, virtuosi in *one* department. But all cannot be amateurs in everything ; individuality prevents it. A theory which professes to unite individuality with many-sided Interest is so absurd as to be impervious to attack.

No doubt Herbart contends that many-sided Interest is a foe to *fickleness* as well as to one-sidedness, and he lays stress on Absorption (*Vertiefung*) as well as Reflection (*Besinnung*). But Absorption really presupposes Interest, and this depends on innate powers. One man likes Mathematics, another Languages, etc.

The Goal of Education.—This is, according to Ziller, the forming of ethico-religious personalities according to the ideal of the Kingdom of God. But a transcendent goal like this will not do. When parents send their children to school what do they expect? Surely that the children be made into useful and capable persons. Education only deals with the preliminary part of life, the part before independence is reached. The Herbartian goal may be very good, but only for adults. It is

no good to rave against existent schools. All their attempts correspond to definite needs that have grown up. We must be practical people. The age will not stand mere "culture ideals". Education has several distinct tasks.

"No," say the Herbartians, "Instruction must not be separated from Education, Knowledge from Morality. Instruction must serve Education; it must create Virtue." But this is a great mistake. *One* goal is not enough. There must be as many goals as there are directions of human activity. *Moral and intellectual Education are two different things*,¹ and the latter is far more effective than the former, for no Education can wash a Moor white. Moral action rests on impulses deeply buried; the teacher is not responsible for them; if he were we should punish not the criminal but his teacher.²

"No," says Herbart, "action springs out of the circle of thought." But character cannot be altered so easily.

"*Formal Culture.*"—Apart from the rousing of æsthetic and other Interest, and the formation of a "circle of thought," Herbart despised languages, mathematics, etc. But formerly people believed that the study of the classics was a fine mental gymnastic, a fine training in logic, in fact fine "formal culture". So also with mathematics. But the Herbartians contend that these subjects must not be treated in independence. Thus these men encourage scattered, superficial thinking, and the tearing apart of what belongs together. The true principles of language and mathematics are not learnt. Note the superficial connections established by Zillerians!

History.—The Herbartians rightly lay great stress on this subject, but mainly because of its *moral* aspects. But this view of the subject will conduce to the encouragement among children of premature judgments upon characters. A sound judgment upon historical characters demands severe abstraction. Far better use common life as moral material.

¹ Elsewhere Hubatsch says that there are three aims to be kept in view : (1) moral ; (2) intellectual ; (3) professional.

² In other words, the great Herbartian message is of no value whatever.

The new pedagogy uses force with its material. It is like a French garden in which nothing is allowed to grow up naturally. Language is subordinated to History; Mathematics to Nature - Knowledge. But formerly we thought that the hardest subjects were the best; the Herbartians put the easiest in the seat of honour.

Herbart seems constantly to be thinking of *home* education; here there is some sense in talking of analytical Instruction, etc., for the soul of the one pupil is an open book to the tutor. Herbart at times distinctly depreciates the value of the school. How remote his ideas from modern conditions!

Then the "formal steps". Comenius urged the importance of the first, as also of others. The Zillerians often treat the material with violence, and there is danger that the pure image of the object studied may be erased owing to premature comparisons with other objects. Let the teacher ensure clear *Anschaung*, and not trust too much to words and "steps".

Analysis is the main thing; synthesis is understood of itself; the third step (Association) is only valuable if we are aiming at some inductive result; so with the other steps, they are not *always* necessary. Herbart never intended that the "steps" should be always employed. But Ziller has insisted on this, and has even invented "teaching units".¹ There must be more consideration of the individual peculiarities of subject and pupil. Again, the fifth step (Application) should often be the third; it is absurd to use *comparisons* until the material itself is familiar.

¹ Dr. Findlay prefers the word "section" for the "teaching unit" of Ziller.

SECTION IX.

DREWS.

(1890.)

Reference.

Drews. *Die Katechese und das Lehrverfahren der Herbartianer*. Velhagen und Klasing (Bielefeld and Leipzig).

THIS brief critique is directed against the Zillerian policy of deprecating the catechetical or questioning method. The author, who, however, is not blind to the merits of his opponents, attempts to show (what ought surely to be in no need of proof) that the method may have a legitimate place in school work.

It is at first sight strange that the Herbartians should make this attack. For the two parties are at one in their objection to mere "learning by heart," in their approval of a thorough working-in of material, and in their ideal way of regarding the work of education.

Doubtless the catechetical method was established in pre-psychological days, and needs to be looked at in a new light. Still, there is no need to follow the Zillerians in their policy of wholesale condemnation.

We agree with the Herbartians that our Instruction must act on the Will, and we need not here quarrel with them as to how far the influence of the Instruction can extend. Neither need we quarrel with them as to their doctrine of many-sided Interest, which, after all, is not very different from the doctrine of the "harmonious development of all faculties". "All faculties"; this is a just protest against mere memorising. The two views may differ fundamentally in their philosophical foundations, but there is no conflict in practice. All intelligent parties wish to make teaching "heuristic," that is, to arouse the mental activity and independence of the pupil. The catechetical method really arose out of a desire to get rid of mere memorising. The example of Socrates was followed, and attempts

made to educe the unknown from the known, a procedure only possible when the "known" already contains the germ of the "unknown," and impossible of application to subjects which rest on experience. This, in reality the catechetical method, conforms to Ziller's own requirements.

The Herbartian terminology is new, but the facts it stands for have long been known. Knowledge is for life, not for school. We must begin with *Anschauung* (Intuition or Observation), and go on to Conception; we must proceed from particulars to generals. Alike in the catechetical and in the Herbartian procedure this is recognised, and likewise a final stage, that of Application. The catechetical method itself is not to blame if, in religious teaching, this valid principle is not recognised; the fault lies with tradition and authority.

Ziller divided *Anschauung* into two stages, and Abstraction into two also. But there is no new discovery in this. Still, the Herbartians can teach us something here, especially with regard to history and religion, subjects in which there are often given too few sense-impressions. Ziller's formal steps must be used with great discretion.

Ziller proposed that history should first be read from books, in order that a grasp of the whole story might be acquired; that then the history should be gone through again, this time from the point of view of geography and the history of culture; and that then finally the psychological, ethical, and religious side of the narrative should be considered in the course of a third perusal. But Dörpfeld is surely right in claiming that the oral teaching of new matter is better than acquisition from books.

The catechetical method has doubtless been too abstract, and has not paid sufficient attention to *Anschauung*, and to number of instances. The formal steps have the advantage of not overlooking anything. But they occasionally verge on the unnecessary; thus, the third and fourth stages lie so close together that they scarcely need to be distinguished; comparison of several objects and the grasping of the common features are so closely connected that to make of them two distinct stages would conduce to weariness. It is right enough

to compare the conflict between Gregory VII. and Henry IV. of Germany with that between Samuel and Saul ("Association" stage); but a further stage ("System") is scarcely called for. On the other hand, the fifth stage ("Application") is quite suitable, though when cases of "imaginary action" are being considered, it is important that these cases be not too remote, otherwise the procedure degenerates into mere babble. In sum, the catechetical method may well make a discreet use of the formal steps.

The Zillerians do not attack questioning *per se*, for they approve of a method of discussion or disputation (question and answer). What they object to in the catechetical method is that, being a method logically developed and working towards a goal chosen by the teacher, the procedure is artificial, and the answers of the children spurious. It is this logical sequence which the Zillerians attack, as a sequence only understood by the teacher, not by the pupil himself. All acts of will are directed to a goal, but there is here no goal before the pupil. The Zillerians, therefore, rightly contend that every lesson must have its goal clearly known from the first, and advocates of the catechetical method may learn something from them.

Another objection is that the catechetical method does not take account of the mental condition of the individual child. It is the teacher's course of thought that is followed. Ziller's plan, on the other hand, is for the teacher only "formally" to lead the talk, entering in when there is confusion and hesitation.

But this objection is somewhat exaggerated. A good teacher will, during his catechetical procedure, allow children to discuss various points: "What do you think of that?" he will ask. But it is doubtful whether there is any need of so minute a consideration of each child's individual nature as the Zillerians suppose. Experience decides here; and so long as children are zealous and interested the method cannot have been unsuccessful. Ziller under-estimates the rapidity and agility of the child's mental processes, and his method of discussion or disputation would really be one of laborious weariness.

In short, the Zillerians should not break with the past, but rather build upon it, and improve it.

SECTION X.

CHRISTINGER.

(1895.)

Reference.

Christinger. *Friedrich Herbart's Erziehungslehre und ihre Fortbilder bis auf die Gegenwart, nach den Quellschriften dargestellt und beurteilt.* Schulthess, Zürich, 1895.

THE above, by a Swiss educationist who claims to be a "neutral" in the Herbart-Ziller controversy, is one of the sanest and most judicious works with which the writer is acquainted.

It deals biographically with Herbart and Ziller; discusses the contributions of each to pedagogical science; passes judgment without any signs of prejudice; gives information relative to the other leading exponents of Herbartianism; touches briefly upon its chief opponents; and finally gives a few specimen lessons on Herbartian lines.

Critique of Herbart's Pedagogy.—It does not pay sufficient attention to physical education. We must regard man's nature as a whole.

Female education has to some extent special ends—narrower than those of man—in view. Herbart scarcely recognises this.

Education for the practical duties of life is neglected. Unless children are successful in the struggle for existence their mental and moral life cannot thrive. Herbart inadequately recognises the poverty and effort which are the lot of the poor.

Instead of aiming at "many-sided *balanced* Interest" we must recognise that, for the sake of efficiency, a *single* interest must, as a rule, be allowed to predominate, though it may not exclude others.

No doubt æsthetic judgments influence character and act as motives. But some natures are rougher than others, and certainly there are two other things which influence character

profoundly—self-interest and religion. Herbart recognises the force of religion, but not of Christianity in particular. He sees that a sense of humility is necessary, but scarcely thinks of making “children of God” inspired by a love of God. Nay he even hands over the richest province of instruction to theologians.

One cannot admit that Herbart was ignorant of childhood ; he learnt more in the four years of his Steiger tutorship than many men would learn in a far longer time. But he was too far removed from the *working classes* and their cares ; his circle was the circle of the cultured.

But his excellences outweigh his defects. No doubt Education has other aims than Virtue in the narrow sense ; still if we want one word to describe its aim “Virtue” is the best ; it will then signify all human excellences of understanding and disposition. We must not only give knowledge, we must *educate* ; for mere knowledge leads to evil unless morality be uppermost. Herbart has convincingly shown how presentations come to the help of character, and how they are far more important than punishments, etc. But he never worked out thoroughly the question of habit.

His plan of “formal steps” is also of imperishable value, though mechanical teachers may abuse it.

Critique of Ziller.—Ziller had more practical experience than Herbart. He admitted the existence of innate dispositions—which Herbart tended to deny ; he urged the unity of moral and religious education, and regarded Jesus Christ as the ideal which we should place before us. Ziller’s proposals were sometimes right, sometimes wrong, but generally both.

He was wrong when, for example, he deprecated preparing children for the tasks of practical life.¹ We must not neglect this, however great the stress we lay on character-forming.

His schemes of small school-communities, and of schools for distinct social groups, were retrograde.

In the following particulars he was partly right, partly wrong :—

¹ Except in the upper classes of schools.

In substituting five "formal steps" for Herbart's four he was right; but there is some danger of making the first step too lengthy or artificial. Still it is right to begin, as a rule, with analysis: "from known to unknown". But we *cannot* always state the goal of the lesson; it would be a mere *word* to our pupils. Often it is best to give the concrete *object* before the name.

As to "Concentration," Ziller was right in putting character-forming in the foreground. Let us give the best hours of the day to it, and let us throw light upon it from all departments of study. But we must not so use character-forming instruction as to deprive other departments of their own claims. If we teach arithmetic, geography, etc., in connection, *e.g.*, with biblical history, the former subjects will be unjustly treated, and great gaps will be left in them. Moreover, the children will get tired if the same central material is served up daily.

The fundamental idea of "culture stages" is right, but Ziller's working-out is fantastical. It is not true that the epic fable first occupied the mind of man; the religious myth was still earlier. Moreover, mankind as a race was never in Robinson Crusoe's condition, with his advanced knowledge of civilisation. Further, neither the fables nor the story of Crusoe have such moral value as to be made a basis of "character-forming Instruction". On the other hand, the life of Christ requires two years at least.

In point of fact, the first "culture stage" (properly so called) was probably the one when men first began to care for the beautiful. Before this time they thought only of the *necessary*, and could scarcely be regarded as possessing *culture* at all. Later came care for the *useful*—the second "culture stage;" later again, the stage of seeking truth; still later, care for the Kingdom of God, the realisation of the moral ideal. But through the later stages the earlier ones still persist.

Some pupils are more talented than others; girls are quicker than boys; thus the stages are run through more quickly in some cases than in others.

Ziller is right in claiming that in schools only scientific facts—not hasty theories—should be taught. He is also right in urging

that pupils in the upper classes of a school should be trained for the definite professional duties of life. [Still, schools must "educate"; that is Ziller's main contention.]

Above all he is right in his goal. Education must be real; must rouse activities; must form character and power. Mental culture will not hurt morality, but will rather help it. The work of education is to implant *many* germs, not to let the child grow out of *one*, as Fröbel supposed.

SECTION XI.

BERGEMANN.

(1897.)

References.

- (1) *Die Lehre von den formalen und den Kultur-historischen Stufen und von der Konzentration im Lichte der unbefangenen Wissenschaft* (Haacke, Leipzig, 1897).
- (2) *Der entwickelnd-darstellende Unterricht, Neue Bahnen*, 1897, p. 156.
- (3) *Die Fabel vom Erziehenden Unterricht, Die Lehrerin*, 1897, p. 306.

THE attainment of a certain degree of freshness in dealing critically with Herbartianism may be placed to the credit of Dr. Bergemann, of Jena.

In the third of the above he dismisses "educative Instruction" as a mere "fable". Herbart's psychology is exploded, and no longer are we able to identify Education with Instruction. There is really no proportion between many-sided Interest and Intelligence on the one side, and Virtue or Morality on the other. Morality is only *one* aim of Education. Where is the connection between morals and mathematics?

What does science say? Is human nature so simple that it can be brought under one formula? Surely man is a product of at least three factors—heredity, environment, and individual variation; and his mind is complex also, functioning in three ways—Presentation, Feeling, Will. Education is a part of one's

environment, but there are the other two factors (heredity and variation) over which no control can be exercised.

The first thing for the teacher to do is to know the innate constitution of his pupils. With regard to the three mental functions there may be great differences in different people. Presentation, Feeling, and Will do not stand in any relation to each other. Hence it is absurd to talk of the last two as being modifications of presentations.

"Educative Instruction," the culture of the thought-circle so as to form character, is a fable. The teacher must look after Feeling and Will, as well as the thought-circle. In other words, he must *train* as well as *teach*. Teaching may give prudence, but cannot make men better. Morality cannot be taught. The main thing to look after in character-forming is Habit, and connected with this, reward, punishment, intercourse, and example.¹

The Herbartians mix up the several distinct tasks of Education. Moral Education is different from intellectual. Action really springs out of the depths of Feeling, Impulse, and Will. These are independent of presentations. Herbartianism is a bad preparation for the hour of trial. What is the good of theoretical morality?

The second of the above productions deals with "developing presentative Instruction" which the Herbartians prefer to Instruction in the form of narrative. Pupils must be encouraged by gentle hints to *build up* the material. Thus they are productively active, instead of being mere recipients of information.

But (asks Bergemann) is the method so very valuable after all? Surely, when a pupil listens to a teacher he must *attend*, and this is a form of mental activity. Moreover, he has to exercise his imagination actively in order to follow the teacher's account. Herbartians say that their method causes more pleasure than

¹This argument means that Herbartianism is nonsense, and that the circle of thought has no influence on character. But surely it is *not* nonsense. Though Habit, etc., are important, they will only conduce to conservative Morality. Moral insight must be aroused, and this necessitates "teaching".

the other; but surely this will depend on the teacher's tact. Both methods may be useful.

For what subjects do the Herbartians use it? Nature-knowledge, geography, history, poetry.

But surely in the case of nature-knowledge it is far better to use concrete *olives*, or, at least, *pictures* of olives, than to try to build up the notion of an olive through imagination!¹ So in the case of geography and history we must use concrete experience, pictures, etc., as much as possible, otherwise we shall merely encourage lawlessness.

But the method is useful in dealing with poetry, for here imagination may be allowed to have much free play, and facts are at a discount.

The main question is, whether it is better to give to the pupil the image or to let him build it up for himself. The Herbartians say, "The latter, because in this way activity is roused". But surely it is also roused when the child has to *attend*. The proposed method compels the child to attend to matter and form at the same time—too great a task. In fact, the proposed method, though not without its uses, can easily be overdone.

The first of the above works is the most important.

Bergemann holds that the Herbartians neglect *formal* education, and lay most stress upon heaping up knowledge. Surely we must develop the intellectual capacity *as such*, and here *language*, as connected with general notions, is of great importance. Similarly, it is important to cultivate the *habit* of attention.²

The "formal steps" are useful, but must not be used slavishly. It is right to give the goal of the lesson at the beginning. But the Herbartians ignore the value of *repetition*.

¹ Right. Pestalozzi and some modern Herbartians would here be at "daggers drawn".

² Thus, while Herbart thinks highly of *involuntary* attention, Bergemann lays more stress on voluntary, as having more significance for character-forming purposes.

The doctrine of "culture stages" is defective in many ways, though no doubt it represents a grain of truth.

Man was once a cave-dweller. Does the child go through *this* stage of development? If so, at exactly what age? According to Ziller's scheme, the child passes in twelve months from the nomadic stage to the next, and when he has arrived at the age of fifteen he stands at the stage of present-day civilisation! In fourteen years he has recapitulated the history of the race!

At the age of six he is at the fable stage. But this is no real stage of human progress at all, and if it were one, it would be far below the patriarchal.

During the first six years (*i.e.*, before he goes to school) he apparently makes no progress at all, while in the eight years of school life he passes through all the stages from remote antiquity to the present day!

How absurd to allow a child at the fable stage to read, write, and calculate, if this stage were a real one through which primitive man once passed! The fables are devoid of moral value, and would also soon become wearisome.

For the second school year the Zillerians prefer Robinson Crusoe (excluding the Bible). This is to cast out Satan by means of Beelzebub.

Is the parallelism doctrine really true? Great men may invent wonderful doctrines, but, after all, science has to decide upon their truth. And science decides that the parallelism between race and individual is run through mainly in the embryonic stage of the individual. As soon as the child is born he is ready to seize hold of the modern world which lies around him; he is not at some pre-historic cannibal stage. Hence, instead of the teacher trying to transplant the child back into a long-vanished past, he should begin with the concrete world, and only subsequently work back to past ages when the child's curiosity about them is aroused. The Herbartians claim that the past is simpler and more fundamental than the present. Not so. The child lives in the present, acquires the speech of the present, learns about the persons, buildings, etc., of the present. Thus the present should be the starting point, and

imagination must build on this. There must be no exaggerated stress on history; science has changed all views.

Then as to "concentration". This rests on false metaphysics, and does not really conduce to unity of character. The really natural method is that of "concentric circles," a plan which the Herbartians object to as conducing to weariness. But do children really weary of their surroundings? No, they gradually learn more and more about them. Home, country, etc., come to be loved. Character rests on Will, Feeling, etc., not on Thought. The Herbartians seem to think that *giving* an ideal is the only thing necessary; surely *training* is more important.

Again, the Herbartians refuse to approve of *moral* instruction apart from *religious*. This is a mistake. It involves that morality is not the same for all, but varies according to sect. Moreover, men have come to regard the God of Sinai as a myth, and thus morals are in danger of being pulled down along with religion.

SECTION XII.

LINDE.

(1899.)

Reference.

Linde. *Der darstellende Unterricht nach den Grundsätzen der Herbart-Zillerschen Schule und vom Standpunkte des Nicht-Herbartianers.* Brandstetter, Leipzig, 1899.

THIS is an able and impartial discussion of the so-called method of "developing-presentative Instruction" which many of the Herbartians prefer to the method of description and narration. Instead of the teacher telling and describing, he leads on the pupils by suggestion, illustration, and question to construct for themselves the whole scene or object under discussion. This plan is supposed to encourage mental activity, fluency of speech, and other *desiderabilia*.

Linde gives an account of the views of Herbart, Ziller, and others upon this question, and then expresses his own opinion.

With Herbart there were, primarily, two kinds of instruction. One kind was occupied solely with widening the pupil's knowledge and experience; the other with the working over of existent stores of knowledge so as to arrive at general relations. The first was "merely presentative," the second "analytic". There was a third kind, in which not only was new knowledge conferred, but this was also worked over systematically. It gave certain elements and then elucidated the relations between them. Such instruction was "synthetic".

"Merely presentative" instruction was of the nature of "telling" or "describing". It might take the form of an informal talk, for the living voice is better than a book. Clearly the pupil must, in such a case, have already had much experience of reality, or he cannot understand the teacher's references; moreover, the pupil's vocabulary must correspond to his experiences. If his vocabulary be narrow, how can he properly appreciate the teacher's instruction?

Ziller uses the terms "analysis" and "synthesis" in a somewhat different way from his master. He does not admit that there is any independent "analytical" method. Analysis is but a preparation for synthesis; it is the first of the "formal steps". The pupil is led to search among his already-acquired ideas (analysis), as these are necessary elements in the apperception of new ones (synthesis). In Ziller's "analysis" there is no aiming at universal principles or relations. It merely reveals to the educator the already acquired knowledge of the scholar. Similarly, Ziller's "synthesis" involves no aiming at universal principles, but only the giving of concrete material.¹

Both Herbart and Ziller lay stress on *Association* and *System* for the elaboration of new ideas. But Ziller lays far more stress than Herbart on the relation borne by the already possessed knowledge to the new material. This distinction is important.

Ziller, aiming at making the far-off and remote vividly known, sees the importance of using the knowledge already possessed.

¹ These distinctions deserve to be kept in mind by the student of Herbart and Ziller, otherwise much confusion is likely to arise.

Thus the ideas of Sago and the Reed Palm can be obtained by help of hothouse varieties as a basis. Herbart would also lead to the unknown by means of the known, but he laid greater stress than Ziller on the value of a fluent, inspiring narrative or description by the teacher. The blending of old with new takes place quietly and spontaneously; but to Ziller the process is conscious, logical, methodical. The process of appropriating the new takes place under the eyes of the teacher, who has gone down into the soul of the pupil, brought latent ideas to light, and thus illuminated what is new and strange. This is Ziller's "presentative Instruction;" it makes a special art of the union of analysis with synthesis.

While Herbart thought highly of narrative and description—the method of monologue—Ziller thought more of dialogue or conversation. New facts are not to be told to the child, but are to be led up to from those he already knows. Instead of saying, "Joseph and Mary went south," the teacher says, "Joseph and Mary went in the same direction as if we went to Bavaria"; thereupon the children will say, "To the south". Instead of describing in his own words the inundations of the Nile, he leads up to them, and then, examining the map, asks, "Will all Egypt be inundated?" Discovering that high land bounds the Nile valley, the children will decide that this land will remain uncovered. "Where are the people likely to build their houses?" On this high land. And thus the class develops the subject, and finally narrates the facts arrived at.

The "developing" method is said to arouse the self-activity of the pupil to a high degree. Children *construct* history. Their *wills* and *characters* are supposed to be influenced by the method far more than by the narrative and descriptive method of Herbart. The teacher should never do what the scholar himself can perform. The pupil must deliberate, and state his own questions. Ziller claimed that this method of "disputation" rouses keen interest and joy, and also conduces greatly to fluency of speech on the part of the pupils. The method is also said to bring difficulties easily to light and to promote co-operation.

Ziller and his friends (*e.g.*, Rein) attack the descriptive and

narrative method as being defective in the respects just indicated. This last method is supposed to check the activity of the pupils, and the teacher can never be certain that the pupils fully grasp or apperceive what he tells them. The child may join false ideas to what the teacher says.

But in point of fact, though the "developing" method sometimes has its advantages, the "narrative" method has *its* advantages also, and these often balance the others.

The aim of both methods is to represent vividly to the pupil's mind something not actually present, *e.g.*, a palm, a storm at sea, an historical event.

Now often the narrative or descriptive method is good for this purpose. Men like Foltz and Dörpfeld lay stress on the inspiring power of warm and eloquent delivery, and the latter writer has urged that there are moments so solemn that any break in the teacher's story would disturb the whole process of apperception. The pupil must simply listen in silent sympathy. A quiet state like this is often highly productive; our best thoughts then come, and the ego is systematised and organised. Speech at such a moment would actually check the creative current. The method of disputation might conduce to a kind of *outward* activity, but the depths of the nature might be unaffected. There are always times when the narrative method is the better one; and there are reserved natures which cannot express themselves outwardly. A child listening to a narrative is active in a sense, while the "much speaking" encouraged by the "developing" method is no clear proof of deep thought.

The "developing" method has dangers of its own. It shows a tendency to bring about false conjectures or guessing, especially in the case of young children, who, not yet possessing full power to combine thought, often miss the crucial point of the lesson.

The method often causes *many* ideas to be summoned up where only one is necessary. In order to lead on to some result (*e.g.*, the image of a foreign product) a whole series of objects are called to mind. The teacher's illustrations may not really appeal to the child as nearly as he supposes. It may have been

far better for the teacher to narrate and describe and let the child interpret the narrative or description spontaneously, using his own mental resources. In fact, the teacher cannot control the apperception of the pupil so much as he may think.

If the teacher describes or narrates with vividness, the child will readily apperceive the new, investing it with familiarity according to his own knowledge. This may be a better plan than a piecemeal method of disputation and dialogue.

Another difficulty of the "developing" method is that the thoughts uttered by one child may not resemble those of the other children.

Again, the method makes very great demands on the skill of the teacher.

It is often best for the teacher just to let the new matter have its own silent course.

Does the "developing" method really conduce to fluent speech? Schmidt, Dörpfeld, and others have denied this. A vivid narrative sets forth right forms of speech as samples; these sink into the child's mind, and are really more effective than the repartee encouraged by the "developing" method.

Hence one arrives at the conclusion that though the "developing" method is often useful, its excellencies are shared by the other method, and this latter has certain advantages of its own. Hence an alternation of the two may be advisable.

A Few Further Points.—There is some difference of opinion among Zillerians as to whether the last three "formal steps" should be regarded as belonging to presentative instruction, or whether this instruction does not end with concrete "synthesis" (the second step). This last was Ziller's view; the processes of abstraction are no part of presentative instruction.

In addition to the dialogue method, Ziller recommended the extensive use of *reading*. Bible history had to be taught by these means.

In very many cases, instead of using the "developing" or the narrative methods, the best plan is to present the object itself, or a picture of it, to the pupils.

SECTION XIII.

NATORP.

(1899.)

Chief References.

(1) Natorp, *Herbart, Pestalozzi und die heutigen Aufgaben der Erziehungslehre*, 1899. Fromman, Stuttgart.

(2) Flügel, Just and Rein, "Herbart, Pestalozzi und Herr Professor Paul Natorp". *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Pädagogik*. 4th vol. 1899.

(3) Willmann, "Der Neukantianismus gegen Herbarts Pädagogik". *Zeitschrift für Phil. und Päd.* 2nd vol. 1899.

(4) Willmann, "Über Socialpädagogik". *Jahrbuch des Vereins für wissenschaftliche Pädagogik*. 1899.

(5) Natorp, "Kant oder Herbart? Eine Gegenkritik." *Die Deutsche Schule*. July and August, 1899.

ONE of the most recent, and in many respects the most interesting, of the many attacks upon Herbartianism has come from the philosophical chair of Marburg. Professor Paul Natorp is no neophytic opponent of presentational philosophy. An avowed follower of the "transcendental" movement inaugurated by Kant; an author of works upon the theory of knowledge;¹ editor of the neo-Kantian *Philosophische Monatshefte*, and a frequent contributor to its pages,² Professor Natorp has long been in occupation of a philosophical standpoint removed *toto coelo* from that of Herbartianism. A criticism from such a source is bound to be far-reaching, bound to assail psychological principles even though leaving details and consequences unchallenged. Such indeed is the nature of the present attack. It assails the supposed foundations of Herbartianism, and only touches incidentally upon the deductions and applications of the system.

¹ *Descartes Erkenntnisstheorie*, 1882; *Forschungen zur Geschichte des Erkenntnisproblems im Alterthum*, 1884.

² "Einleitung in die Psychologie nach Kritischer Methode," 1888; "Analekten zur Geschichte der Philosophie," 1882.

The controversy initiated (or rather resuscitated) by Professor Natorp is but one phase of the controversy which perennially divides philosophers into sharply opposed classes—the controversy between Spiritualism and Materialism, Idealism and Empiricism, Spontaneity and Mechanism. Though Herbart was no materialist, his principles have a greater affinity with a thoroughly mechanical (if not materialistic) view of the universe than with the opposite views. Presentationalist he was, in an emphatic sense, and Presentationalism is an ally (though a treacherous one) of Materialism. On the question of the Freedom of the Will, Herbart's attitude was likewise quite unambiguous; he was avowedly a determinist.¹ No wonder therefore that Natorp, a Kantian or neo-Kantian, devoted to the terminology if not to the cause of Libertarianism, could see little to approve of in the principles of Herbart.

Upon the central problem thus indicated, there appears no likelihood of a philosophical consensus. Every man, we are told, is born either a Platonist or an Aristotelian, either a Libertarian or a Determinist, we may even say, either a Natorpian or an Herbartian, according as his interests and impulses are directed to the active and moral or to the speculative and natural worlds. Not, of course, that Herbart was indifferent to moral problems. His educational system is pervaded through and through by a sense of their supreme importance, a sense so extreme that Natorp has to protest against the supposed neglect of the logical and æsthetic factors. But whereas Natorp's emphasis is constantly laid upon the inner principle of self, Herbart works from without inwards, and thus reveals his metaphysical affinity with Locke and Empiricism. Whichever side the reader may take in this interminable controversy of philosophy, he will not fail to admire the rigorous consistency with which Herbart, starting from the presentational standpoint, works² upwards to an elaborate system and downwards to a multitude of practical applications.

¹ His emphasis on the idea of "Inner Freedom" does not conflict with this statement.

² Of course Herbart recognises a "Soul". But virtually the presentation, not the soul, is his unit.

No small fluttering occurred in the Herbartian dove-cote when Professor Natorp's attack saw the light. Previous attacks there had been, *e.g.*, those of Vogel, Dittes, Ostermann, to say nothing of the more academic criticisms¹ to which all systems of philosophy are exposed. But Natorp's attack touched Herbartians at tender places. Their master was a "dogmatist"; he was unable to "develop" a thought; he could neither understand nor appreciate Pestalozzi, though he tried to patronise his memory; his philosophical followers were few and (what was worse) were antiquated "veterans"; in short, Herbart was overrated and his followers were old-fashioned.

It was no wonder, therefore, that the Herbartians responded with vigour to the attack opened upon them. No better introduction can be found to present-day educational problems of the philosophic type than a perusal of the two sides of this controversy.

The most systematic reply to Natorp is contained in the fourth volume of the *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Pädagogik*, 1899. As if to disprove the charge of numerical inferiority (a charge certainly based on very slight grounds) the reply came from several hands.

Pastor Flügel, certainly a "veteran" in the defence of Herbartianism (he had defended it against the previous strictures of Dittes and Ostermann), replied to the more specially psychological side of Natorp's attack. Dr. Just, well known as an active writer on the Herbartian side and as director of an important school, defended Herbart's Ethic. The discussion of the pedagogical aspects of the question fell to the task of Professor Rein. But in a system such as Herbartianism, in which the Psychology, Ethics and Pedagogy are connected with some degree of closeness, the three defenders necessarily intruded on each other's domain, especially in their discussion of the Will.

In the discussions which follow, the portions indicated by the letter (A) are expository of Natorp's criticism, those by (B) give

¹ *E.g.*, those of Lotze and Trendelenburg.

the Herbartian reply, while those indicated by (C) are remarks of the present writer.

(1) *The (supposed) parlous state of Herbartianism.*

(A) Professor Natorp declares himself not blind to the value of the Herbartian system. He attributes to it much stimulating power, many detailed excellences (more especially in the realm of practice), and considerable utility for the teacher who is beginning his work. It is the system as a whole which he condemns, and it is its theoretical and philosophical aspects which alone he feels competent to discuss. [Natorp, p. 1.]¹

He is astonished at the enormous and apparently increasing influence of Herbart, an influence perhaps equal to that of all other educational writers put together.² Each age has its problems, and a dogmatist like Herbart is not the best guide in face of the onward movement of mankind. [2.]

The strange thing is that Herbart's influence on education remains paramount although the philosophical foundations of his system have been almost abandoned. Scarcely a single active professional philosopher is an Herbartian, though a few veterans still exist. Even enthusiasts, while confident of the strength of the structure raised, admit that its foundations are in need of change. In view of the fact that almost all German philosophers have touched upon education, why this peculiar confidence in Herbart? [4.]

Firstly because of the earnest interest he felt in education, and the prominent place it occupies in his system. *Kant* treated pedagogy as a secondary matter; with him, moreover, the necessary psychology is almost non-existent, and his ethic shows a lack of immediate practical applicability. *Fichte's* principles

¹ The pages of the works consulted are given for the convenience of those who wish to refer to the originals.

² He considers that instead of going to Herbart we should go (1) for the end or goal of education, to *Kant*; (2) for ways and methods, to *Pestalozzi* at his best; (3) for questions of organisation, to *Pestalozzi*, *Fichte* and *Schleiermacher*.

are far removed from the workaday world of education. *Schleiermacher*, however, approaches Herbart more closely, and it is astounding that his influence is so small. He is as much a psychologist and a moralist as Herbart, and there is much of immediate practical value in his work; yet he has founded no school, and there are few tolerable works which deal with his pedagogical labours, while Herbartian literature counts its hundreds of volumes. Doubtless *Schleiermacher's* manner is at the root of the difference. [5.]

A second reason for Herbart's influence is the impressiveness of his manner. He employs the short, measured speech of authority. There is no wearisome weighing of *for* and *against*, no doubt or hesitation, such as we find in *Schleiermacher*. Herbart's ripe results shine forth like fruit on a tree, and only need to be shaken in order to fall into the basket. The talent of authority which, as a practical teacher, he possessed in an unusual degree, has passed into his theoretical delivery. Hence men feel that he lived in the very element of pedagogic practice, and as he was, in addition, Philosopher, Moralist and Psychologist, he has aroused unusual confidence. [6.]

Then, again, his educational doctrines have proved really fruitful in practice, and this, with many, is a clear sign of their truth. [7.]

To appeal to the practical value of Herbart's doctrine is, however, tacitly to surrender the claim that they are philosophically established. Away with his theories! But Herbart himself would scarcely agree to having the useful maxims of his pedagogy picked out while his system as a whole is renounced. And there *Natorp* agrees with Herbart: a theoretical foundation is neither superfluous nor of secondary importance. [7.]

Are, then, the foundations of Herbart's system really secure? If they are not, no excellence of another kind can compensate for the deficiency; neither his genuine enthusiasm for education, his love for human beings, nor his distinct sense for the useful and applicable. Self-confidence is doubtless necessary for the practical man; but for the theorist, self-criticism. It is here that Herbart is deficient. We distrust his dogmatic, "It is so". [8.]

Criticisms of Herbartianism have not been wanting. Attacks upon special points, especially upon Ziller's development of the system, have been numerous, and Herbartians themselves have surrendered or greatly modified some of the chief parts of their master's pedagogy. *Dittes* and *Ostermann* (the latter from approximately the standpoint of Lotze) have been among the chief opponents; *Ostermann's* direct attack upon Herbart's psychology comes close to the present criticism. In fact, modern psychology is leaving Herbartianism quite behind. But the decision of the question, "*For or against Herbart?*" is really not so much a psychological question as one concerning Logic, Ethics and *Æsthetics*, for it is these studies which have to decide what the *aim* of education is to be. Even from the point of view of the *means*, Psychology is not so important as adherents and opponents of Herbart alike suppose. The other three studies are the real foundations of Pedagogy, Knowledge, Morality and *Æsthetic* culture being the ends with which they are concerned; while Psychology may be regarded either as identical with these (or contained in them), or as a special study which informs as to the application of the general principles of education (ascertained from the other three studies) to each special case in its peculiarity. Thus, while the human content of consciousness—with its three aspects, scientific, moral, *æsthetic*—builds itself up out of its elements in accordance with unchanging laws—this growth may be hindered in special cases, and here comes in the value of Psychology and Physiology. Thus, after all, the value of Psychology for education is but slight, and in any case is quite secondary; hence even if Herbart's psychological presentation-mechanism were a valid notion (which it is not), it would be no basis for education. That basis cannot be found in Psychology at all. [11.]

(B) The defenders of Herbartianism have done their best to answer the above criticisms.

Instead of Herbartianism as a philosophical and psychological system being little more than "historical," and its advocacy being confined to "veterans," psychologies of the Herbartian

school "rule the present market". Natorp's emphasis on physiology has no point for Herbartians, for they welcome all physiological and psycho-physical investigations. (Flügel, pp. 257-9.) The complaint that Herbart's psychology ignores the difficulties of individual cases is refuted by the existence of Herbart's letters on the application of Psychology to Pedagogy, in which he discusses the difficulties arising from physiological hindrances; and also by the zeal of Herbartians like Strümpell, Ufer, Trüper, and Koch in these very directions. Natorp claims that Herbartian psychology is useless in such cases; in reality he himself exaggerates the psychological value of physiology. Contrast his view with that of the psycho-physicist Münsterberg, who explicitly denied that his favourite study can throw real light on mental problems. [259-60.]

Herbart was not a "dogmatist". He emphasised the necessity for scepticism at the beginning of philosophical thinking as the only salvation from "stupid and arrogant dogmatism," and warned teachers against impressing their own modes of thinking on their scholars. Instead of Herbart being incapable of doubt, he once exclaimed: "Are we never to be able to grasp the whole completely?" [Rein, pp. 298-300.]

(C) The charge of "dogmatism" is of little real gravity; the exposition of any systematic scheme must appear dogmatic unless the expounder choose to qualify and apologise in every paragraph. But if Herbart's system were a rigidly fixed one how can we explain the varied development it has experienced from his followers? Moreover, no men have done more for the study of abnormal mental phenomena manifested in children than the Herbartians.

Still, the defenders of Herbart serve their cause ill when they try to defend his Psychology *en bloc*. Natorp is right in regarding it as scientifically antiquated. The whole tendency of modern psychological thought is away from a system which, though not exactly ignoring biological facts, has no logical place for them, and which was elaborated in pre-Darwinian times. Herbartian psychologists have been compelled to concede that

ideas are not absolute *causes*, but rather *occasions* of volition. Still, the value of the work of Strümpell, Volkmann, Waitz, Cornelius, Nahlowsky, and other Herbartians is admitted. Moreover, a presentational Psychology may be, after all, the best for a pedagogue, seeing that presentations are the material with which he works.

(2) *The "disconnectedness" of Herbart's teaching.*

(A) Herbart was devoid of the power of developing his principles logically and consecutively. Clear in details—indeed a model of clearness,—he seems to have had no feeling that these must hang together in indissoluble connection. Will it never be the lot of a true thinker to influence the teachers of the rising generation? [Natorp, p. 8.]

(B) What a contrast between the above opinion of Natorp and that expressed in the *Herbart Recollections*, which describe Herbart's maxims as "bound together as closely as the members of a mathematical demonstration!" [Rein, p. 300.]

(C) The above objection of Natorp is probably the most unfounded of any in his book. There is no system of philosophy in existence of a more unitary character than Herbart's. The unit is the presentation, and everything hangs upon this. There is no "Will-faculty," etc., to introduce disturbing factors; Herbart, indeed, was a vigorous opponent of every "faculty" doctrine. His system may be right or wrong, but that it is thoroughgoing and systematic in the highest degree few will deny.

(3) *Attitude and relation of Herbart to Pestalozzi.*

(A) Pestalozzi is the only educationist at present held in a reverence at all commensurable with that given to Herbart. But he is not reckoned as a philosopher. People tell us that Herbart has methodically embodied in his own system the best of Pestalozzi—the principles which the great Swiss teacher had arrived at in a half-dreaming manner. Really this is not so.

There is a great contrast between the two, and Herbart never did justice—could not do justice—to his predecessor; though he praises and patronises him often enough, he alters his thoughts and subordinates them to his own. [Natorp, p. 5.]

Whereas Herbart, as seen above, subordinated everything to the moral aim, Pestalozzi insisted on the necessary unity of the culture of "Head, Heart and Hand," of Intellect, Will and Artistic ability. [12.]

He insisted, too, upon the necessity of an investigation of the elements of mental life and then upon a steady advance to the complex content of consciousness. [12.]

In these two points Pestalozzi is in full agreement with Kant, as also in others, such as his emphasis on the fundamental concept of Anschauung and his ethical views. He had scarcely read Kant, but perhaps he had learnt some of his fundamental thoughts from conversation with Fichte. From the point of view of sociology and social pedagogy he even went beyond Kant. Pestalozzi was no dreamer; he had investigated the fundamental springs and form of human nature, and it was for this reason that, though he fell into errors of detail, he anticipated so accurately the further developments of mankind. [13.]

Herbart, on the contrary, stands in pronounced contrast to Pestalozzi. He was excellent as a practitioner of education; Pestalozzi was not. He was well versed in all kinds of science, and was a clear thinker in matters of detail. But he was incapable of forming systematic and all-embracing views, even incapable of understanding them when offered by others (Kant, Fichte, Pestalozzi). [13-4.]

The two men did not mean the same thing when they spoke of psychology, and it is not true that Herbart supplied the desiderated psychological foundation for his predecessor's views. Pestalozzi meant the fundamental laws by which the content of human culture grows from its elements, these elements being deduced from Ethics, Logic and Æsthetics. Contrast this with Herbart's presentational-mechanism! [14-5.]

(B) Herbart constantly confesses his indebtedness to Pestalozzi, as can be seen by any unprejudiced reader of those writings of Herbart which deal with his predecessor's work. In addition to obligations of a minor character¹ no one had a finer understanding than Herbart of the Pestalozzian doctrine of Apperception-Instruction. He even remained true to his master when, long ago, men's enthusiasm for the latter had waned. Natorp with his illegitimate formula "Herbart or Pestalozzi" implies an opposition between them, but in point of fact Herbart worked on the lines of his predecessor, and the true formula is "Herbart and Pestalozzi". Natorp's formula has been invented by the enemies of Herbartianism, who use Pestalozzi's name for controversial purposes. [Rein, pp. 296-7.]

Natorp is thoroughly prejudiced against Herbart, while towards Pestalozzi his attitude is equally prejudiced but in the opposite direction. He completely passes over Pestalozzi's many obscurities and inconsistencies. But apart from this, he always sees Pestalozzi through the spectacles of his own theory of knowledge, just as Niederer had thrown the doctrine of the great Swiss into confusion by a dragging in of the philosophy of Fichte. It is a service of Wiget to have revealed the additions of Niederer. Natorp appears ignorant of Wiget's work. Apparently Natorp's prejudice against Herbart is due to the impossibility of fitting the clear unambiguous thoughts of the latter into the structure of a ready-made theory of knowledge, while Pestalozzi's ambiguities are much more adaptable for such a purpose. [300-1.]

The Pestalozzian doctrine of *Anschauung* has really but little affinity with that of Kant. Pestalozzi understood by *Anschauung* the impression of an outer object upon our senses, not, as Natorp thinks, the generation of the mathematical form of *anschaulich* things out of the pure elements of our *Anschauung* itself (an addition of Niederer). Pestalozzi would have rejected Natorp's interpretation as readily as he did Niederer's. [301-2.]

Along with this must go Natorp's undervaluing of Psychology

¹ Such as the use of transparent plates of horn.

and his exaltation of criticism of knowledge into the first place, by which choice he condemns himself to unfruitfulness. Moreover, Pestalozzi would never have founded his system upon the notion of a pure spontaneity. [302.]

(A) Natorp in his reply (*Die Deutsche Schule*, August, 1899) justifies his greater severity towards Herbart on the ground that the latter's professions are greater than those of Pestalozzi, and are therefore to be judged accordingly. He also stoutly maintains the existence of Kantianism in Pestalozzi previous to the influence of Niederer. There is no real contradiction in appealing to experience and at the same time to deduction (*vide* Kant, Pestalozzi, etc.).

(C) The present writer's reading leads him here to side again with the Herbartians. There is nothing "condescending" about Herbart's treatment of his great predecessor. The principle of *Anschauung* was "the grand idea of its discoverer, the noble Pestalozzi". Herbart seized hold of it gratefully, and, in the opinion of the vast majority of educationists, developed it successfully into the Apperception doctrine by showing the essential contribution of the mental factor.

(4) *The aim or goal of Education.*

(A) In considering the aim or goal of education we find that Herbart lays great stress upon Ethics. Morality is the goal of education. But this is a one-sided view. Logic and Æsthetics have a right to insist upon their aims, Knowledge and Æsthetic culture. [Natorp, p. 11.]

In point of fact education must rest on Philosophy as a whole, not upon two fragments of it, Psychology and Ethics. Will, Intellect, Æsthetic imagination—all three must be considered, along with, of course, their respective psychologies. [11-2.]

(B) Natorp would be right if the three goals (Ethical, Intellectual and Æsthetic) were of equal worth. But they are not so. There is only one absolute goal, as Kant himself points

out; a good and moral Will is always good, while Æsthetic or Intellectual power may be devoted to evil purposes. Hence Ethics alone gives the goal of Education. Logic and Æsthetics have a subordinate use only.

Even Natorp himself in another place [p. 72] admits (here contradicting himself) that the Ethical end is the highest educational goal, not merely as the most elevated but also as including and controlling the others. The difference between the two men is that while with Natorp the place of the highest educational aim (Morality) remains a mere phrase, for Logical and Æsthetic culture go their own ways—with Herbart the latter appear as preliminary steps or means to the moral goal. Here, too, Pestalozzi is in full agreement with Herbart. He declares that only by a subordination of all the other claims of our nature to the higher claims of Morality is a harmony of our powers possible. [Just, pp. 277-8.]

(C) The question above mooted is no easy one to answer, and its solution has as much philosophical interest as pedagogical.

Moralists (*e.g.*, Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics*, 6th edition, pp. 399-402) have frequently found a difficulty in considering the possible conflict of the Moral with the Logical goal. Suppose that on a complete view of the universe we became convinced that it was essentially cruel or purposeless, would it be our duty to proclaim the truth? Would not the claims of the moral life be endangered by such a proclamation? If so, have we to risk the subversion of morality? Or have we to regard Morality as the highest end and endeavour to subordinate everything, even Truth, to that? Such ultimate questions cannot be solved to the satisfaction of every one; some controversialists will insist that Truthfulness is an absolute duty, others will subordinate it to Morality, while others again will be so bold as to deny the possibility of a conflict. Similar questions arise with respect to the relations of Art and Morality.

The question is, therefore, not merely one between Herbart and Natorp, but one of perennial interest.

With regard to the pedagogical aspect of the question, it may

be pointed out that English teachers, who for the most part have not yet been appreciably touched by the Herbartian spirit, do not feel the importance of the issue thus raised. Their ideals are those of imparting knowledge and dexterity—mainly the Logical and Æsthetic ideals. So far as the Moral ideal affects them at all, its operations are confined to a few definite “religious” lessons; it does not permeate their whole work. The two aims remain separated by conventional barriers; hence, when a teacher is asked to instil “temperance” or “humanitarianism” he frequently regards these subjects as “outside his province”. But such a confession is virtually an exaltation of the Logical and Æsthetic ideals at the expense of the Moral. The case just cited probably represents the usual attitude of the English teacher. The two ideals are conventionally held apart in the “Time Table,” but when there is any possibility of mutual interference the “Moral” has to give way.

The agitations for “religious” education are in large measure an outcome of this hard and fast separation which is made between “sacred” and “secular” subjects, a separation which is itself due to a non-recognition of the moral value of “secular”¹ subjects and an ignorance of the psychology of human motive.

The great service of Herbartianism has been to break down the barrier above indicated. “Secular” instruction loses its stigma if it can be shown to enter into the field of motive and action. This it does when Apperceptive Interest has been aroused. Geography, Mathematics, Science become moral forces, for as sources of “Interest” they draw or impel the pupil in the direction of an elevated life. Even on a lower view they may be regarded as moral forces so far as they may have the effect of keeping the pupil throughout his life from the debasing pursuits which the ignorant man almost inevitably follows.

¹“Abgesehen vom Religions-unterricht, von dem man vermöge seines Inhalts einen einfluss auf Gemüt und Willen des Zöglings erwartet, verfolgen die Unterrichts-gegenstände einen selbständigen Zweck, nämlich die Aneignung eines bestimmten Wissens und Könnens, damit der Zögling dereinst im Leben sich gut forthelfen könne. . . . Eine solche Auffassung ist . . . unhaltbar.” Rein, *Pädagogik im Grundriss*, pp. 78-9.

"The stupid man cannot be virtuous," for he has no springs of action except such as lead to vice. The man with a vital interest in Art, or Science, or History has an enormously greater chance of being "virtuous" (using this word even in the usual narrow sense) than the man devoid of such interest. Positively these interests are springs of worthy volition; negatively they keep from vice.

In short, "Interest" is the bridge from the Intellectual to the Moral realm—a bridge which popular theology, with its hard and fast separation of the "sacred" from the "secular," is daily rejecting. It is the imperishable work of Herbart to have discovered (the word is not too strong) this bridge, and to have arrayed Æsthetic and Scientific culture under the banner of Virtue. If many-sided Interest be so important, so vital, as Herbartians allege, then the demonstration of the unitary nature of Herbart's goal is his crowning achievement. The teacher of Mathematics is the teacher of Virtue, and there is no longer any need to regard Education as having three or more conflicting ends in view.

(5) *Herbart's mistaken separation of "Training" from "Discipline".*

(A) Reserving for future consideration the very important question of the relation of Instruction (culture of the Understanding) to Education as a whole (culture of the Will), we have now to consider the validity of Herbart's distinction between the other two agencies, Training (Zucht) and Discipline (Regierung). [Natorp, pp. 48-9.]

Herbart lays stress upon the fact that Instruction (the culture of the Understanding or the formation of the "circle of thought") is the chief agency for the culture of the Will also. "There ought to be no Instruction which does not educate." By Training he means whatever, apart from Instruction proper, cultivates the Will. But what then remains for Discipline? Something comparatively unimportant; indeed something, according to Herbart himself, hardly belonging to

Education but yet not entirely separable from it. The purpose of Discipline lies in the present, not in the future; it aims merely at outward order, which is a prerequisite of education, but not in itself educative. No doubt Discipline immediately influences the pupil's state of mind, but it serves no ulterior purpose. Punishment (under Discipline) ignores the intention of the agent, and considers only the act itself; while genuinely educative punishment considers intention also. [49-50.]

Natorp holds that his separation of Training from Discipline is utterly untenable, and points out that even Herbartians have remodelled it. [50.]

Discipline is supposed to regulate merely the outer behaviour of the pupil. But surely outer behaviour is subject to the laws of morality! The question is, whether, in connection with education, the merely "right" relation apart from the moral can be of any value. Surely not. External order is necessary, but only for the sake of the internal moral order. The educator cannot separate himself into a moral and into a merely "right" being. A punishment which aims at subjection pure and simple and does not address itself to the will of the pupil is impermissible. Even outer order must only be preserved through moral means, and the pupil, though himself ignorant of the right way, must willingly confide in the guidance of the tutor. [51.]

Herbart seems to think that at such a stage the child is devoid of will; but surely it has a will in process of becoming; and this very fact makes the psychological influences upon it of great importance. The smallest influence has not only a momentary but a permanent result. [52.]

Certainly we may admit that there are permanent and momentary, moral and merely right, positive and negative influences; influences through the will of the pupil and through merely momentary excitations. But the latter must be absolutely subordinated to the former. Hence the separation of Training from Discipline is untenable, and we are left only with Training and Instruction. [53.]

(B) Natorp declares that Herbart's doctrine of "Discipline" is in no single point tenable. But this is to shoot beyond the mark. Herbartians have already modified Herbart's doctrine, and instead of the three divisions, Training, Discipline and Instruction, now adopt two, Guidance (*Führung*) and Instruction. But Herbart's differentiation of Training from Discipline has still some theoretical and practical significance. Natorp himself admits the distinction between negative and positive modes of action in connection with the training of children; merely "right" as contrasted with genuinely "moral"; momentary as contrasted with lasting; modes which make use of momentary stimuli as contrasted with those which act through the Will. Here, then, is the distinction between "Discipline" and "Training"; both, however, ought to be subsumed under the concept of "Guidance". [Rein, p. 303.]

(C) Despite the partial recantation of Herbartians from the triple classification of their master, this classification can frequently be illustrated in the concrete from English methods of teaching. The functions of "Discipline" pure and simple seem in no danger of being absorbed in those of the other two, so far, at any rate, as Elementary Schools are concerned.

In view of the large classes which are usual rather than exceptional in these schools, the necessity of firm Discipline is all-important. "Are you a good disciplinarian?" is the first question asked of a candidate for a pedagogic post, and the meaning of the question is, "Are you able to maintain a system of military precision?"

The question of punishments is the most important in this connection. The punishments of Discipline are based mainly on the Retributive and Exemplary theories; while those of Training (in the Herbartian sense) rest on the Reformatory theory. In this country of large classes, the Exemplary theory is the prevalent one in school life; and the chief scholastic offences are not "moral offences" at all, but offences against a rigid code of military rules which have no existence or utility.

outside of school life, and which would have none in school but for the exigencies of the large-class system.

It would be no exaggeration to say that in the English elementary school—

“Discipline” is regarded as all-important.

“Training” (in the Herbartian sense) is, except so far as it comes under “religious influence,” almost non-existent.

“Instruction” is plentiful, but its genuinely educative (*i.e.*, will-forming) character is unrecognised owing to the artificial separation, based largely on theological prejudices, between “sacred” and “secular” subjects, and an almost complete ignoring of the Herbartian doctrine that action springs out of the circle of thought, and that, through the mediation of “Interest,” “secular” instruction can become a moral force and pass into action.

It may therefore be said that Herbart’s much criticised three-fold classification has still some significance, though in practice there is sometimes no precise separation between the three agencies, and with the majority of teachers no clear recognition of their essential differences.

(6) *The Herbartian doctrine of “Educative Instruction”—The distinction between Instruction (Unterricht) and Training (Zucht).*

(A) At first one would be inclined to understand these latter in the following sense:—

Instruction—the culture of the Understanding.

Training—the culture of the Will.

But this cannot be Herbart’s meaning, for he refuses to admit the distinction between the three soul faculties, Understanding, Feeling and Will. Moreover, he insists that there should be no Instruction which does not educate (*i.e.*, form the Will), and the final aim of Education must be, in accordance with this, an ethical aim. With Herbart the Will has no territory of its own in the mental life, and is a pure result of the movement of the presentation-masses; thus the whole culture of the

Will—or nearly the whole—depends on the culture of the Understanding, the formation of the circle of thought—in other words, on Instruction.

What then remains for Training? Only the supplementary and secondary influences which come through the stimulus of pleasure and pain so far as these influences are directed to Will-Culture, and are not merely on account of Discipline. [Natorp, pp. 54-5.]

The close connection or virtual identity between the culture of the Will and that of the Understanding is the essence of Herbart's famous theory—that of Educative Instruction. No doubt, with Pestalozzi, in spite of his emphasis on the Instruction of "Head, Heart and Hand," the final goal of Education is the Morality of the Will, an aim in which, according to him, the other possible aims unite. Still the culture of the Intellect or of the *Æsthetic* faculty has with him a relative independence. But this view is departed from by Herbart and still more by the Herbartians. They seem to ignore the claims of the intellectual and *æsthetic* and to exaggerate those of the moral nature of man. But surely a thing may be intellectually true or false, *æsthetically* correct or incorrect, quite apart from moral considerations. [55-6.]

It is said that Knowledge and Ability (*Können*) are dead possessions provided they do not influence the culture of the moral Will. But we are not speaking of a "dead" Knowledge or Ability, but of living and creative processes. Doubtless, the kind of consciousness connected with them is also related closely to Will consciousness; Morality indeed is the prominent point towards which these others point; still there is a kind of independence in the three. It was Kant who established this threefold classification; Schiller and Pestalozzi agreed with it; while Herbart, and still more his adherents, are in danger of destroying it. [56.]

We must not wonder if reactionaries welcome Herbart's doctrine as a reason for refusing satisfaction to the intellectual and *æsthetic* needs of the people. [56-7.]

The real reproach, however, only attaches to Herbart himself

in a small degree. In fact it is difficult to reconcile clearly his exaggerated stress upon the Will when the *aim* of education is being considered with his extraordinary minimising of the significance of the Will in general. The culture of the Will depends not, of course, on the Will itself, but, in accordance with his Ethics, upon Taste. Hence one would expect him to put Æsthetic culture at the summit; yet he really almost ignores it. The Will, according to him, depends on the movement of presentations, hence the formation of the "circle of thought" is "everything to the educator". Only a small task is left to the feeling-influences of Training, the task of "making a path for instruction". [57-8.]

Thus we find that when Herbart considers the *aim* of education he lays an exaggerated emphasis on the culture of the moral Will, and ignores the claims of intellectual and æsthetic culture; but when he considers the *means*, he lays an equally exaggerated emphasis on Instruction (Understanding-culture). [58.]

(B) Natorp's criticism is based on a caricature of Herbart's doctrine. He has omitted Herbart's central thought, that of Interest. It is this concept which connects the Instruction goal (culture of the Understanding) with the goal of Education in general (culture of the Will). It is true, Natorp refers to "Interest" (p. 64), but strangely regards it as a side goal of Education, and he does not enter upon the psychological relations of the factor of Interest to Presentation and Willing. Interest is the fundamental concept of the theory of Educative Instruction, and it possesses a permanent worth even if the practical details of Herbartianism were abandoned. Moreover, "Interest" supplies the very element of inner activity which Natorp finds missing in Herbart's system, and, moreover, brings Herbart into close connection with Pestalozzi. He declares that his chief effort was identical with that of his predecessor, namely, to find out the best order of succession, the best fitting-together of the teaching material, so that the attention of the children may be seized and enchained. It was with this aim in

view that Pestalozzi tried to understand the normal process of man's development, individual and racial, and this work has been taken up by Herbartians (witness their doctrine of "culture steps"). [Rein, pp. 304-5.]

(C) The judgment upon the above issue must probably be of a mixed character.

Natorp has undoubtedly committed a most serious oversight—perhaps the worst of all in his work—in not recognising the central position of Herbart's "Interest" doctrine.¹ It is this doctrine which bridges over the gap between intellectual and moral Education. It is Interest which converts an intellectual apprehension of History or of Natural Science into a moral force, a force which not only negatively keeps the pupil "out of mischief," but positively moulds his future conduct and pursuits. Interest (provided we do not mean by it a merely momentary feeling of pleasure) is the greatest moral force in existence, we might almost say, the *only* moral force if we except the rewards and punishments of "Training" and "Discipline". It is safe to say that a pupil who has a keen interest in Literature or in some social or cosmic question (we must not ignore the "many-sidedness" of Herbart's concept of Interest) is certain,

¹ Natorp replies (*Die Deutsche Schule*, August, 1899, pp. 507-8) that he only is following Herbart's own exposition (*Allgemeine Pädagogik*, Book I., chapter ii.), according to which, though Morality is the chief goal of education, "many-sided Interest" is another goal not necessarily entirely identical with the other. Moreover, Herbartian "Interest" is not, as Rein thinks, a "forward-willing" directed to the future (and therefore constituting the missing element desiderated by Natorp), but is, according to Herbart, strictly dependent on the perceptions of the moment. It works from without, not from within, and hence is quite a different thing from what Natorp demands.

Natorp has done good service in pointing out the elements of hesitation in Herbart (though it is difficult to see how these elements can be reconciled with a charge of "dogmatism"). But undoubtedly "Interest" and the close connection between "Interest" and character form the essence of Herbartian doctrine, and this essence stands firm even though Herbart may momentarily or provisionally have raised doubts.

other things being equal, to grow up more moral than individuals devoid of such interests.

Again, Natorp's reproach that Herbart, in considering the ways and means of Education, lays undue stress upon Intellectual culture (just as, conversely, in considering the aim of Education, he lays undue stress upon Morality) is rebutted by the point just mentioned, *viz.*, the very wide meaning attached by Herbart to the notion of "Interest". If "Interest" meant with Herbart "Empirical" and "Speculative Interest" only, Natorp's strictures might be well justified. But one of the most characteristic features of Herbart's doctrine is that Interest must be many-sided. Empirical and Speculative Interest are only two varieties out of the six he enumerates, the others being *Æsthetic*, *Sympathetic*, *Social* and *Religious*.

It may be admitted, however, on Natorp's side, that though Apperceptive Interest is always a moral agency, some varieties are morally educative in a greater degree than others. The connection between Mathematics and Morality is less close than that between Literature and Morality. Doubtless, as pointed out before, each of these studies has a moral influence of two kinds: (1) An interest in them keeps their possessor "out of the mischief" which results from emptiness of mind and absence of engrossing pursuits. (2) An interest in them leads on to a life of genuinely elevated character. But beyond this, virtue, in the narrower sense, is not appreciably¹ influenced by mathematical study owing to the abstract nature of the subject and the absence in it of the humanistic factor.

There are, in point of fact, two concepts of Virtue. The Greek concept is a wide one, and is inclusive of Wisdom and Culture. The Puritanical concept omits these latter elements. There can be no doubt but that Herbart accepted the wider ideal, and hence he could, with perfect appropriateness, connect Instruction with Virtue and Morality, and regard the latter as

¹ Perseverance, exactness and similar qualities are, no doubt, cultivated, but they are not "virtuous" in the narrower sense, though there is plenty of room for them within the larger ideal.

springing directly out of the "circle of thought" which it is the work of Instruction to form. Even on an acceptance of the narrower ideal, the connection between Morality and Instruction is important, and Herbart has won an immortality of fame by working it out. Still, in this latter case the connection is less striking and direct, though surely real enough to merit the solemn attention of teachers and reformers. A vast amount of evil is directly traceable to emptiness of mind, and philanthropists may with good reason devote their efforts to creating healthy interests and impulses, rather than to removing the necessary after-results of this emptiness.

(7) *The Herbartian Theory of the Will, considered ethically.*
Kant and Herbart.

(A) Herbart constantly waged war against certain Kantian doctrines, though, in Natorp's opinion, these doctrines are the only secure basis for Ethics and Pedagogy.

Kant's central thought was the Autonomy of the moral Will.¹ The moral Will must not be determined by anything external to itself; any command, impulse, or desire. It must be determined by itself alone, and be not only an executive but a law-giving Will. Its only principle is that of harmony or consistency with itself, and this principle is clearly a *formal* one. [Similarly with Understanding; that which is objectively true is consistent; in both cases, conflict or contradiction is the test of untruth.] The strongest appeal that can ever be made to the human Will results from this fact of self-judgment. Surely Education should recognise this fact and demand the highest thing possible from man. Was it not a retrogression when Herbart surrendered this point of view? [19-22.]

His reasons for doing so were psychological. How can such a faculty of absolute self-determination be thought of? Will must depend on presentations; there is no Will *per se*; hence

¹ Kant's famous "categorical imperative" was, "Act only on such a maxim as you can at the same time will to be a universal law". In other words, "Never make exceptions for yourself".

the Will cannot sit in judgment on the Will. But surely (replies Natorp) though no single act of Will can give the law to another act, yet there is the formal law of the Will; the harmony of the Will with itself. Herbart ignores this. Harmony of willing is the ultimate test of morality, just as harmony of belief is the ultimate test of truth. [22-5.]

(B) The above question is the fundamental one in the present discussion. Natorp is a libertarian; the Will is, with him, a causeless spontaneity. It is the one vital element in man and the universe; it is the norm of the moral life. [Flügel, p. 261.]

Kant's great service was to reject the pleasure-theory of morals, and to lay emphasis on the *form* of willing. Did Herbart really depart from Kant's position? No. He still opposed the pleasure theory, and held that moral worth can only be found in the form of willing. [Just, pp. 279-80.] Herbart and Natorp both feel that it is necessary to find somewhere a judgment upon the Will, in order to know whence comes its worth and dignity. Natorp finds that the Will is good so far as it is autonomous—devoid of all motive except itself. Thus, the good Will is the one which suppresses every momentary desire or makes it conform to itself. But surely this is possible with great sinners as well as great saints! An avaricious or ambitious man may will with perfect consistency. [Flügel, p. 263.]

No doubt "harmony of the Will with itself" is æsthetically pleasing. Napoleon's will was in harmony with itself, but, being egoistic, was immoral. If the good Samaritan had made a general rule of hating the Jews, would he have been immoral in relieving the distressed man? Mere *harmony* of Will does not prove *morality* of Will; there must be a general type of worthy willing. [Just, p. 282.]

Herbart, quite as strongly as Kant, insisted that the moral Will must be free from external motives, sensuous impulses, etc. But he rightly rejected absolute self-determination, which means merely caprice, and is devoid of moral quality. There must be some standard outside the Will itself. Here we come to the "moral ideas" which Herbart enunciated. [Just, p. 280.]

Kant's Ethics were the product of an age which strove after independence. Morality appeared as mere self-rule or Egoism. Nietzsche drew the logical consequence from Kant's system. [Willmann, *Zeitschrift*.]

(C) The above discussion may appear academic, but it is really of deep philosophic interest. Whence are we to derive our standard of moral action? Kant, Herbart, and Natorp agree that a mere formless thing like "pleasure" which may arise from any one of a multitude of causes, cannot provide such a standard.

Are we then, with Kant and Natorp, to fall back on a formal principle of mere consistency or universality? The difficulty here is that an immoral man may be very "consistent" indeed.¹

Herbart was, therefore, driven on to seek some other ground for morality, and he found it in the "five moral ideas," intuitively or æsthetically apprehended. He, like Sidgwick, was "forced to recognise the need of a fundamental ethical intuition".² The two writers are agreed that only by postulating one or more spontaneous intuitions, each incapable of logical proof, can a moral standard be acquired. The "æsthetic judgments" of Herbart are essentially similar in nature to the "intuitive" judgments of Sidgwick.

(8) *The Herbartian Theory of the Will considered Psychologically. The Doctrine of "Faculties".*

(A) Men frequently regard the faculties of Presentation, Feeling, and Will as more or less external to each other. Herbart was at great pains to abolish this separation and to base mental life on one foundation only—the complex interaction of innumerable presentations. Herbart was correct so far as he contended that the three fundamental faculties are not

¹ "The Rational Egoist . . . might accept the Kantian principle and remain an Egoist." (Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics*, preface.)

² *Ibid.*

self-sufficient or mutually hostile. Man is never merely a presentative, merely a feeling, or merely a volitional being; all three aspects coexist, though one may be predominant. Herbart did great service in calling attention to the errors of the vulgar "faculty" doctrine. [40.]

True, his own view is wrong. He makes his presentations into powers or activities, and bases Feeling and Will upon them. This is to ignore the fact that the latter are as fundamental as presentations; Herbart, however, obscures the illegitimacy of his doctrine by constantly regarding presentations as already forces or powers. [41.]

If once we recognise Will as a peculiar content of consciousness, we must infer that it goes beyond the mere presentation of an object in consciousness; it presses forward beyond the sphere of the given. All this is unintelligible on Herbart's view, which regards Will as rooted in presentations, and not as being a law to itself, and thus "free". [42-3.]

(B) When Natorp tries to establish the doctrine of there being something peculiar to the Will, he does so by pointing out the supposed endlessness of the Will. I pull my boots on in order to go to the post, in order to, . . . in order to . . . But this only lands us in the pleasure-theory. [Flügel, pp. 265-6.]

(C) It seems impossible to accept Herbart's view of the mind as being fundamentally presentational. Why should not Feeling and Will be as ultimate as Presentations? Again, we are conscious of the phenomenon mentioned by Natorp—an organisation of our whole life in accordance with some voluntary plan, a plan which, though modified by new circumstances, is not abrogated, but rather receives these circumstances into itself. Will does not appear as a mere product of presentations, but often as dominating these, and pressing on beyond them. It is extremely difficult, on Herbart's theory, to explain the unity of consciousness which is manifested in facts like these.

But the reader of Natorp's strictures might possibly imagine

that Herbart had been the victim of inadvertence. This was not so. His psychology may be wrong, but it was deliberately adopted. Herbart saw the fallacy of the vulgar "faculty" doctrine, and also serious pedagogical errors which follow from a recognition of distinct "faculties". Accordingly he sought for a unitary principle, and found it (he thought) in presentations. Thus his error, if error it is, must not be regarded as one arising out of blindness or ignorance.

After all, the presentational doctrine has much value for the teacher. Just as a house builder presupposes that the force of gravity will *not* be absent and that earthquakes and eruptions *will* be absent during the building of a house, so the teacher assumes normal conditions in his pupils, and thinks mainly of the one factor which is definitely within his own power to confer—presentations, which constitute his bricks and mortar. If the child is normal, the normal impulses, etc., will be called forth by the presentations. Thus Herbart's Psychology lays stress precisely upon those mental processes which are under the control of the teacher.

These, then, are the main points raised by the controversy between Natorp and the Herbartians. However philosophically important, they have only an indirect bearing on pedagogical questions. Indeed, Natorp makes no pretensions of being an educationist, and Professor Rein condemns him on this ground.

SECTION XIV.

KUNZ.

(1900.)

Reference.

Kunz. *Zur Würdigung der Herbart-Zillerschen Pädagogik*. Eberle and Rickenbach, Einsiedeln, Switzerland, 1900.

HERBARTIANISM is essentially Protestant in its inception, and many of Ziller's proposals bear this fact upon their face. Thus,

for example, the recognition of the German Reformation as a distinct "culture stage" would be unwelcome or impossible to anyone but a Lutheran.

A few Roman Catholics have identified themselves with the movement, among them Vogt, the successor of Ziller in the headship of the *Union for Scientific Pedagogy*, and Willmann, a professor at Prague. Such men would, of course, have to withhold approval from certain details of Ziller's plan.

Some interest may attach itself to a consideration of the point of view adopted by intelligent Catholics towards the Herbartian system as a whole.

Director Kunz has many good words to say for the system. It is pervaded by a noble spirit, and it stimulates to a deeper grasp of the teacher's task, especially to a consideration of how to base Instruction on psychological foundations and to carry it out with a definite goal in view. It also rightly places religious instruction in a central place (except in the first two years, where the central matter is not religious).

But, no system resting on *natural* Ethics and psychology can endure. A divine revelation is necessary if we are to understand the human soul, and from it we learn about man's creation in God's image, his fall, and his divine goal. Revelation likewise gives us in Jesus Christ the true ideal to set before us. Such matters as these cannot be discovered by reason. Pedagogy must be based on Theology and Christianity.

Hence the defect of Herbartianism. To Herbart an act was good if it agreed with the five moral ideas; to Christianity it is good if it corresponds to God's will. The æsthetic judgment in the one case, God in the other, gives the verdict. To Herbart, man is his own lawgiver, and there are no supernatural laws.

Even Protestants have objected to Herbart's exclusive stress upon the æsthetic judgment; thus Christinger holds that while this judgment can give a motive, belief in God is a far stronger one. In reality, Christianity goes far deeper than Herbartianism. The real goal of education must be the restoration of the original communion with God.

Herbart rather late in life (1831) admitted that Higher help was necessary, but both he and his follower Ziller regarded religion rather as a complement to morality than as its foundation. The goal, he says, is strength of character; but surely this must rest on Religion. Ziller went rather further than Herbart and, far more explicitly than his master, regarded the goal of education as moral and religious.

Many useful points can be gathered from the Herbartian system, but it is essentially Protestant, and quite ignores the Catholic sacraments; while Catholic pedagogy regards these latter as communicating supernatural blessing.

The Herbartians rightly protest against schools which do not educate, *i.e.*, form character. They say rightly that knowledge without virtue has no value, and that the latter should be the one goal of education. But this was no new discovery. The old Fathers (Augustine, Gregory, and others) said this.

Herbart's psychology deprives the soul of all original powers. Character rests on presentations or ideas. But this doctrine conflicts with Christian and pre-Christian thought; it destroys the freedom of the will and moral responsibility, likewise the unity of the person. The mind is but a presentational mechanism. Herbart expressly approved of Locke's *tabula rasa*, though not in the sense that foreign impressions can be made upon it. The materialist says, "Man is a product of parents, etc."; Herbart says, "Man is a product of the influence of his outer world". The teacher, for Herbart, is no longer a loving gardener, guiding the unfolding of an inner life, but a technologist controlling a machine, or a chemist bringing together and mixing certain materials.

The Herbartians rightly lay stress on Interest, and show how by a psychological procedure this is aroused; here come in the "formal steps". But surely it must not be a *balanced* Interest; some Interests are more important than others, those of sympathy are more important than those of knowledge. Especially essential are the moral and religious, while Interest in knowledge is less important.

How does Virtue come out of Interest? Here the Herbartians

overvalue Instruction, for though presentations influence the Will they do not compel it. The Will is free, and may go counter to insight.

The scheme of "formal steps" has been but little opposed, and on the whole is useful. Kehr, however, has insisted that we must not have one model for everything; each subject and each class requires special treatment; moreover, the scheme manifests signs of hairsplitting. The formal steps are based on psychological principles, but are inapplicable in some cases, *e.g.*, the correction and repetition of exercises; description; the working over of any material already arranged in encyclopædic form (catechism, Sermon on the Mount, history tables, grammar, etc.).

"*Gesinnungsstoff*."—This phrase ("character-forming material") is not well chosen; it places religious teaching on the same level with profane history, whereas it is quite unique, a supernatural bread.

"*Culture Stages*."—This doctrine is a mere figment. Ziller's stages are (1) Darwinian, (2) Protestant, (3) German. But we do not agree with "scientific pedagogy," or with the Reformation, or, being Swiss republicans, with German imperialism as the one ideal of state life. A child from six to fourteen cannot run through many stages of human development, only those of childhood. Sallwürk has rightly contended that the child is rooted in the *present*; Fröhlich, likewise, that the present-day Christian view rather than the view of men ages ago should be the one given to the child.

Rein and others have modified Ziller's scheme mainly by choosing *national* culture stages (except in the case of biblical instruction). But the whole doctrine is dubious. We must start from the *present*, the *near*. What is early and primitive is really far removed from the child, and we should never make a spring into the past except (1) when this is necessary to explain the present, (2) when points of contact already exist in the child's mind. Moreover, many "stages" really occur simultaneously.

Ziller's detailed scheme is defective in the following aspects.

(1) The fairy tales are not primitive, but very late material.

(2) Children know that these stories are untrue ; what impression, then, will be made ?

(3) The stories delight and rouse the imagination, but have no religious value ; often they are immoral. The baptized child has a right to Christian teaching. It is true, Ziller and Rein propose that there should be "children's services" devoid of systematic instruction ; but surely instruction is necessary for any real influence to be exerted. And it is *not* true that biblical stories, properly selected, are too hard for children. True, even fairy tales sometimes have a moral kernel.

(4) Robinson Crusoe is a late and foreign story, and is beyond the interest of seven to eight year old children. Many Zillerians reject it. Willmann does, on the ground that it is neither classical nor national ; it deals with foreign regions and must in any case be seriously modified before being used. Still, it has its value as material for free reading with pupils of ten to twelve.

The very early history of the world has no place in the Zillerian plan of Bible study, which begins with the patriarchs ; but surely this history is essential. The Zillerians omit it because they cannot force it into their eight stages.

Only *one* year for Catechism ! Surely this would be inadequate even if all the preceding years had been a preparation for it.

The Niebelungen song may be useful for upper schools, but is scarcely so for the people's school, least of all for the lower grades (third and fourth years). The notion that love rewards with suffering is beyond young children. Moreover, though there is exemplified much fidelity, courage, etc., the song abounds also in betrayal, hate, revenge, etc.

There is no *repetition* in the Zillerian plan ; each year involves fresh work. Surely, Christ ought to be the centre of all, not the mere end of the course. Dörfeld himself admits that there is some need of repetition, such as occurs in the plan of "concentric circles".

The notion of concentration is good, but on Ziller's plan there is an actual tearing asunder of material, though at times Ziller

admitted (here contradicting himself) that each department of study must assert its independent claims.

Rein and others have modified some of Ziller's details. *Gesinnungs-unterricht* has to be a centre for the geography, nature study, and language study. But only in the first year is arithmetic connected up with *Gesinnungs-unterricht*; drawing only in the first three years; singing not at all except so far as the *words* are concerned. *Real* connections are largely ignored in Ziller's plan. Interest is deadened; monotony is produced; the lesson is split into tiny units.

Surely *spatial matters* (geography and natural knowledge) form a better basis than temporal matters (history and narratives). Every action presupposes a *place*. The Zillerian plan has been condemned by Bartels, Frick, Stoy, Fröhlich, Weissmer, Wehmann, Wesendonck, Ruegg, Sallwürk, and others.

The goal aimed at by Ziller can be reached in another way—by *ethical* concentration. Moral and religious matters must always be kept in the forefront. The religious standpoint gives us an ideal point of view and a deep grasp of all other subjects. A world-view must pervade everything; religious instruction must not be isolated.

Natural concentration is good; related departments may be unified. The *reading book* is valuable as connecting instruction in language with instruction in things.

Ziller's plan is quite impracticable; it demands eight years and a separate teacher for each. What about schools which have only one class? It is true Hollkamm has tried to apply Zillerianism even here, dividing the course into four sections and various subsections, and combining the catechism stage with biblical history.

APPENDIX.

PROFESSOR DARROCH ON HERBARTIANISM.

QUITE recently a British critic has appeared¹ in the person of Mr. (now Professor) Darroch, who, apparently since the present writer's visit to the University of Edinburgh in the autumn of 1901, has realised the capacities of the subject that had been already, at that time, avowedly selected for research by the visitor.

The most prominent feature of Mr. Darroch's criticism is its persistent irrelevancy. Acquainted with the objections raised by Lotze to Herbart's psychology (these are given here under "Ostermann"), Mr. Darroch reproduces them at some length under the impression that he is thus damaging Herbart's pedagogy. The psychology is, according to him, the foundation of the pedagogy. The latter is "derived," "deduced," or "developed" from the former, which is its "starting-point," the "point of departure," containing the "original assumptions" upon which the pedagogy is "based" or "ostensibly founded". Would any reader believe, after this, that, as a matter of fact, *Herbart's psychology was elaborated years after his chief educational works were written?*

Professor James is right. "Even where, as in the case of Herbart, the advancer of the art of teaching was also a psychologist, the pedagogics and the psychology ran side by side, and the former was not derived in any sense from the latter."² Moreover the present writer had already hinted that "Herbart's presentational mechanism was by no means the starting-point of his educational proposals".³ The whole question is dealt with somewhat fully in the present work.⁴

It should not, however, be inferred that Mr. Darroch has completely

¹ *Herbart; a Criticism* (Longmans, 1903); also *Journal of Education*, March, 1903.

² *Talks with Teachers*, p. 8.

³ *The Student's Herbart*, p. 8.

⁴ Pp. 28-32.

ignored *The Student's Herbart*. That little work, with its list of twenty or more objections to Herbartianism collected after considerable study of German educational literature, has clearly proved of immense service to him. Mr. Darroch never admits this service, his only references to the work being hostile. But his respect for the book is such that not only does he apparently reproduce one after another its arguments and ideas, but he does so even when these arguments and ideas are perhaps of dubious validity.

A few of the following instances may be irrelevant—of that the reader must judge; but the rest are surely obvious enough; and, as Mr. Darroch has chosen to criticise *The Student's Herbart*, a reply from the author of that book will not be out of place.

The one writer speaks of "an apperceiving machine which responds smoothly and immediately" (p. 53); the other follows suit with "an apperceiving machine which responds easily and smoothly" (p. 41). The one writer points out that "two opposite dangers face our schools," the first represented by "heuristic" advocates, the second by the "didactic materialism" to which Herbartianism in some of its forms may perhaps tend, and goes on to say that "educationists must avoid both extremes," seeing that "mental life is rhythmic" (pp. 25-26); the other writer follows suit with, "As, on the one hand, the Herbartians lay the emphasis upon the one aspect of our mental life, so in like manner the extreme advocates of the heuristic method lay the emphasis on the other, but the truth lies in neither extreme, but in realising clearly the twofold aspect of all intellectual process" (p. 44; stultified on p. 123). The one writer quotes the objection that a robber exemplifies the "second moral idea" (p. 50); the other follows suit with "the successful swindler and cracksman" (p. 75). The one writer complains that "even the much vaunted 'Nature Study' may be scrappy and ineffective" (p. 54); the second is tortured by the fact that "there is at the present day so much teaching of nature knowledge and of elementary science of a purely desultory kind" (p. 100). The one writer refers to Professor Patrick Geddes as an advocate of placing Nature Study "at the centre of the circle of knowledge" (p. 74); the second writer—apparently regarding his countryman as a representative Herbartian—speaks of "some enthusiasts" who would "make Nature Study the centre of the circle of knowledge" (p. 131; also p. 144), the plain truth being that no avowed Herbartian has ever made such a proposal. The one writer refers to Miss Ravenhill's advocacy of the claims of Hygiene (p. 74); the second seems to dignify her likewise with Herbartian honours (p. 144). The one writer, omitting the original meaning of "didactic materialism" (the term was invented by Dörpfeld to stand

for the blind policy of heaping up subject after subject in response to utilitarian, ecclesiastical and other demands), uses the term in a slightly and allowably modified sense (p. 25); the second writer faithfully follows suit with the same omission and the same definition;¹ "didactic materialism," says the one, "is a belief in quantity apart from quality" (p. 21); says the other, "it looks to the quantity of knowledge acquired rather than to its quality" (p. 108). The first writer ventured on a new and *possibly* erroneous interpretation of Herbart's Ethics, regarding it as an attempt to expand the concept of Virtue by the inclusion of elements "not always included" in that concept (p. 40); the second writer discovers that Herbart, "as it seems to me rightly, extends the conception (of morality) to include more than mere goodness" (p. 66). The first writer describes the "second moral idea" as "puzzling" (p. 40); by some strange fatality the second writer also finds it "somewhat difficult to understand" (p. 73). Still, when the first writer, beginning to see daylight, suggests that the idea stands for "greatness, or at least a notion very much like it," in fact for "strength and richness of mind" (pp. 40-1), the second also describes it as one of "greatness" or "strength of character" (p. 74), in this case inserting quotation marks (though without giving the source of his quotation. When the one writer, making a possibly erroneous conjecture, said, "Herbart felt that moral reformers were too negative in their views," their chief message being "avoid—avoid—avoid" (p. 42), he was attempting, on his own account, an interpretation of the historical genesis of "second moral idea" which,

¹ Not that Mr. Darroch never strays into originality. He invents the hybrid "didactive"; he gives an alternative metaphysical explanation of the term "materialism" (p. 21), an explanation which the inventor Dörpfeld would have smiled at; lastly he avows that "one section of the (Herbartian) school" has already "logically reached" the standpoint of "didactic materialism". It was rather questionable policy on the part of the present writer to claim that Herbartianism itself might tend towards "didactic materialism," the term itself having been invented by an Herbartian as one condemnatory of a system against which Herbartianism was a protest: however, questionable or not, the second writer follows suit, and even brings into existence a "section" of the school which has already reached, by a "logical process," the standpoint here referred to (p. 108). Will Mr. Darroch give some information as to the whereabouts of this "section," so completely unknown to the present writer? A subtle and quite problematic tendency is one thing; an arrival by "logical" process is another. There is not, and there never has been, a single Herbartian who has ever "logically reached" the standpoint of "didactic materialism"; Mr. Darroch is here challenged to mention one.

whether correct or not as an interpretation, was at any rate novel. In point of fact he knew as little as Mr. Darroch as to the actual motives and convictions which led Herbart to the enunciation of his system of Ethics. However, it is satisfactory to know that the second writer supports—though without referring the interpretation to its original source—the view put forward by his predecessor. “Herbart,” says Mr. Darroch, “insists on the positive aspect of virtue; it is not a mere not-doing, but a doing” (p. 70).

Again and again the arguments and counter-arguments of *The Student's Herbart* seem to be reproduced by Mr. Darroch without any acknowledgment of their origin. The one writer warns against confusing pleasantness with Interest (p. 51); the other feels called upon to utter a similar warning (p. 46). The one writer defends Herbart against the “robber” argument by pointing out that “the robber is not moral, for there is a ‘third moral idea’ namely Benevolence, and a ‘fourth moral idea’ namely Justice, and two others” (p. 50); the other writer reproduces this without quoting his source: “against the criticism of Herbart it has been more than once advanced¹ that we must take into account the other moral ideas. . . . For Herbart also laid down that we should aim at Benevolence, at Justice, at Equity” (p. 76). The one writer, in his list of supposed errors in Herbartianism, says, “Herbartianism confuses culture and many-sided Interest with Virtue” (p. 86); the second is harrowed by the thought that “the Herbartian theory tends to identify virtue with culture” (p. 83). The one writer points out that Herbartians, in the eyes of some people, “undervalue difficult formal studies” (pp. 88-9) and “lay too great stress on Instruction” (p. 87); the second writer bewails that “along with the overvaluing of instruction we have the under-estimation, and, in some cases, the almost total neglect of formal studies” (p. 112). The one writer replies to *his own objection*—that there may be in Herbartianism a subtle tendency towards “didactic materialism”—by referring to the “formal steps” as a proof that the Herbartians are no mere pilers-up of indiscriminate knowledge (pp. 53, 89); the other writer's exposition takes the same direction: “the Herbartian may reply: what about the five formal steps of method which form an integral and fundamental part in the theory?” (p. 109). The one writer, after discussing Ziller's plan of “concentration,” concludes that we must “keep in close touch with each other those subjects which throw light upon each other” (p. 67) or “belong to each other” (p. 72)—“we must

¹“More than once.” Yes, in Germany. Phrases like these, so suggestive of an encyclopædic study of Herbartianism, are characteristic of Mr. Darroch's work. See p. 74, “Napoleon and Bacon”.

follow wherever the laws of Association naturally lead us" (p. 73); the second writer, posing as a "critic of Herbartianism," comes to the same conclusion: "the only safe rule for the teacher is that wherever there is or has been *real* relation between two facts or groups of facts the nature of the relation should be unfolded and enforced" (p. 133). The one writer warns against the artificial forms of "concentration" which would "divorce materials which should naturally be united together" (p. 67); the second warns against "bonds of an imaginary nature" and urges us to be "sure that there is, or has been, a real connection between the facts which he seeks to conjoin" (pp. 146-7). The one writer urges that "subjects differ greatly in importance" (p. 73), some being of "supreme," others of "moderate," others of "small" importance (p. 22); the second writer is impressed by the fact that "some subjects are more valuable in the education of the child than others" (p. 145) and traces the recognition of this truth to the enunciation of the "concentration" principle.

Mr. Darroch introduces an occasional variation by, to all appearance, borrowing ideas from other writers than the present. Page 100 is a supreme example of his powers. The first complete thought is from *The Student's Herbart*, the next two are based on Professor Adams's chapters "Formal Education" and "Observation," and the last two on Professor James's chapter "Apperception". "Apperception," says the latter, "means nothing more than the act of taking a thing into the mind." "Apperception," says Mr. Darroch, after having impressed the same lesson as his American original, "means nothing more than the act of taking a thing into the mind," an act which, clearly, Mr. Darroch is well able to perform. He, at any rate, does not despise "Instruction".

Idea after idea, argument after argument, conclusion after conclusion, even phrase after phrase, does Mr. Darroch seem to borrow—almost exclusively from Herbartian writers; but his only references to the men who have saved his book from vacuity are hostile.

What is the conclusion of the matter? Mr. Darroch has nothing fresh, original, or stimulating to present to the teachers of Britain. His criticisms of Herbartianism are either irrelevant or antiquated. His positive suggestions are mainly those made by the present writer several months before his own essays appeared, or by other Herbartian or semi-Herbartian writers. Surely it is not right—not fair—for men to borrow suggestion after suggestion from a system and then profess to be its critics. Yet, after all, these critics are, though unwillingly, witnesses for the defence; whenever they prepare to grapple with practical educational problems they cannot help first refreshing themselves from the Herbartian spring.

The writer has no objection to Mr. Darroch, or any one else, using his work, but he thinks the bounds of legitimate use are passed when no acknowledgment is made, and when, to cover the service, an attack is made upon the very book that has proved so serviceable. The public must judge.

After all, *Herbartianism works*. Education is more an art than a science, and a system of education must be judged by its fruits. Perusing such a work as Mr. Darroch's, an Herbartian will impatiently recall the words of Edmund Burke: "Applaud us when we run; console us when we fall; cheer us when we recover; but let us pass on—for God's sake let us pass on".¹

P.S.—Mr. Darroch's reply is that his *Journal of Education* article was printed before the University booksellers at Edinburgh procured *The Student's Herbart*. Comment on this is hardly necessary in view of the facts (1) that the quotations given above are entirely taken from Mr. Darroch's book, not his article; (2) that his book followed *The Student's Herbart* at an interval of six months; (3) that in it he refers three times by name to *The Student's Herbart*.

The fact is, Mr. Darroch wrote in a hurry, and did not do justice either to himself or to the men from whom he hastily gathered ideas. He is surely capable of better things than this.

¹ Speech at Bristol, 1780.

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